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  This project examined variables that mediate the relationship between the 
exogenous variables numerical presentation and numeracy and the endogenous variables 
risk perception and risk related decisions.  Previous research suggested that numerical 
format and numeracy influence outcomes.  The question that remained unanswered was 
why?  The goal of this project was to peer into the proverbial black box to critically 
examine information processing at work.   
To examine possible mediating variables, two theoretical models that have 
emerged in the risk perception literature were tested. The first is an evolutionary theory 
proposing that over time, individuals have developed an augmented ability to process 
frequency information.  Thus, frequency information should be clearer and people should 
be faster at forming risk perceptions with information in this format. According to this 
model, processing speed and evidence clarity mediate the relationship between evidence 
format and risk perception.  A second framework, the affective processing theory, argues 
that frequency information is more vivid and people derive more affect from information 
in this format.  Therefore, according to this model, affect and vividness mediate the 
relationship between presentation format and risk perception. In addition to these two 
perspectives, a third theory was proposed and tested.  The integrated theory of risk 
 
information processing predicted that reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness would 
all influence risk perception.  
Two experiments were conducted to test the predictions of these three theories. 
Overall, some support for an integrated model was found. Results indicated that the 
mediating variables reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness had direct effects on risk 
perception.  In addition, risk perception had a strong influence on risk related decisions.  
In Study 2, objective numeracy had a direct effect on reaction time, such that people with 
high numeracy spent more time forming risk evaluations.  Furthermore, people with a 
preference for numerical information evaluated numerical evidence as clearer and more 
vivid than people who preferred to receive evidence in nonnumerical formats.  Both 
theoretical and applied implications of these results are discussed and recommendations 
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
John Paling plainly reminded us, "There is no such thing as a risk free life style" 
(Paling, 2010, n.p.).  Every day, we are exposed to threats in our environment. People 
live in earthquake and flood zones, drink milk from cows that were fed hormones, eat 
vegetables treated with pesticides, and drive to and from work each day.  Even day-to-
day activities are associated with predictable levels of risk. Risk refers to the probability 
that exposure to a hazard will lead to negative consequences (Ropeik, Grey, & Grey, 
2002).
1
   Given the risky circumstances in which humans live, understanding and 
managing risk is critical to daily life and human survival.  
An overly simplistic solution to helping individuals understand and manage their 
risk is providing them with risk information.  Fischhoff, in his historical analysis of risk 
communication, noted that it was once believed that providing people with the necessary 
numbers would foster understanding and informed risk management decisions (Fischhoff, 
1995). Unfortunately, even in the face of factual information, individuals experience a 
discrepancy between their probabilistic risk, the actual probability of an outcome, and 
their perception of their risk. McGregor (2006) referred to risk perception as the lens 
through which individuals view risk.  Risk perception is conceptualized as beliefs held by 
an individual about the chance of occurrence of a risk (perceived susceptibility) and 
beliefs about the seriousness of the consequences (perceived severity) (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Nelson, 2004).
2
 Risk perception has gained the 
attention of  scholars given that perceived risk is a significant predictor of behavior.  
Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, and Herrington (2004), for example, found that people with 
higher initial risk perceptions were more likely than people with lower risk perceptions to 
get immunizations.    
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Risk communication, ―an open, two-way exchange of information and opinion 
about risk, leading to better understanding and better decisions‖ (Edwards, Elwyn, & 
Mulley, 2002, p. 827), is at least partially aimed at shrinking the gap between individuals‘ 
probabilistic and perceived risk.  In order for risk communication to be effective at 
achieving this objective, communicators (and receivers) must be exposed to and 
understand the risk information included in the communication.  However, the nature of 
risk information makes the interpretation of risk challenging.  
Numerous challenges to the effective communication of risk information have 
been discussed in the risk communication literature (Lipkus, 2007; Skubisz, Reimer, & 
Hoffrage, 2009).  Specifically, risk information is communicated within a context of 
uncertainty and it is difficult for people to understand risk probabilities (Edwards, Elwyn, 
& Mulley, 2002; Lloyd, 2001). In addition, the process of science from which risk 
information is based, is contradictory, dynamic, and contains interactions of effects.  
Moreover, science is self-correcting; over time new evidence emerges that can be 
contradictory to previous conclusions. Finally, and most significant for this research, risk 
information often includes scientific terminology and numerical information that people 
can find difficult to interpret (Black, Nease, & Tosteson, 1995; Cuite, Weinstein, 
Emmons, & Colditz, 2008; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Rothman & Kiviniemi, 
1999). This final challenge will be the focus of this dissertation project.  
Risk probability is often communicated with numbers, creating a unique set of 
challenges (Skubisz, Reimer, & Hoffrage, 2009).  Indeed, science, including medicine 
and technology, is inherently numerical.  Although people may have difficulties with 
numerical data, there are several benefits to describing a risk with numbers.  First, 
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numbers can convey the magnitude of risks and benefits more clearly than verbal 
expressions can. This is due to the fact that verbal expressions of risk are open to 
subjective interpretations, compared to numerical magnitudes. Verbal probability 
expressions such as rarely, possible, and likely, can have multiple interpretations for 
receivers (Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988; Cohn, Schdlower, Foley, & Copeland, 
1995; Edwards, Elwyn, & Mulley, 2002).  For example, Gurmankin, Baron, and 
Armstrong (2004a) presented participants with risk information in one of three formats: 
verbal only, verbal plus a percentage, or verbal plus a fraction.  The data showed that 
messages that included numerical statements of risks caused less variation in risk 
perception than the message that included a verbal expression alone.  
Notably, research suggests that people prefer to receive risk information in a 
numerical format, as opposed to a verbal format, when they have to interpret a risk (Lion 
& Meertens, 2001; Mazur, Hickman, & Mazur, 1999; Shaw & Dear, 1990; Teigen & 
Brun, 1999).  In studies comparing numerical information to verbal probability 
information, numerical information was more trusted (Gurmankin, Baron, & Armstrong, 
2004b), participants reported being more satisfied with the information (Berry, Raynor, 
Knapp, & Bersellini, 2004), and numerical information increased awareness of residual 
risks without raising anxiety (Marteau, Saidi, Goodburn, Lawton, Michie, & Bobrow, 
2000). Overall, some researchers have argued that the only way to precisely present 
magnitude of risk is to use numbers (Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch, 1999).  Although 
other formats of presenting risks are available, numbers have some distinct advantages.  
However, all types of numerical information should not be considered equivalent.  
Making this point, studies have shown that the format of numerical risk information 
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affects information processing (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), comprehension (Brase, 
2002), and risk perception (Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000; Yamagishi, 1997). 
For example, Slovic et al. (2000) provided participants with a psychiatric patient‘s risk of 
violence as a frequency or as a probability with a percentage. Participants were then 
asked to make a decision to either discharge the patient or keep him in the hospital. Mean 
discharge judgments were statistically smaller for the percentage conditions than for the 
frequency conditions. In another study, Brase (2002) gave participants quantitative 
information in one of four formats and asked them to evaluate the clarity of the 
information. Statistically significant differences in clarity were reported; simple 
frequencies (―1 out of 3‖) and percents (―33 %‖) were rated clearer than probabilities 
(―0.33‖) and natural frequencies (―90 million Americans‖).  
Yet, the conclusions from the extant research do not provide a theoretical 
rationale underlying the results.  Generally, previous research in this area has compared 
numerical formats to solve practical problems. The research focus was placed on 
determining which format led to particular decisions or outcomes. Thus, the theoretical 
question, why frequencies are superior to percentages with regard to raising risk 
perceptions, is left unanswered.  In the extant literature, the question of why one format 
was more effective was generally ignored or talked about in the discussion sections of the 
manuscripts as an afterthought.   To date there are no empirical tests of the cognitive or 
affective mechanisms through which risk information is comprehended, processed, and 
used in decision making.  
The purpose of this dissertation project is to explore and test the theoretical 
rationale underlying when and why distinct forms of quantitative risk information affect 
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risk perception and decisions.  Laudan (1977) argued that an essential test of any theory 
is whether the theory provides satisfactory solutions to important problems. Although 
studies (e.g., Brase, 2002) have compared message features, including numerical format, 
previous research has been largely atheoretical.  Hence, there is no overriding explanation 
articulating why certain numerical formats create more negative risk perceptions (e.g., 
Cuite, Weinstein, Emmons, & Colditz, 2008; Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 
2000; Natter & Berry, 2005). Currently, these extant theoretical perspectives do not 
provide satisfactory solutions.  For example, various numerical formats have lead to 
inconsistent outcomes and we have yet to understand how a numerical message is 
cognitively processed when it is received. Understanding how information is processed 
will lead to more effective message design and risk communication.  This research 
project will explore and test the cognitive mechanisms through which numerical risk 
information is understood, processed, and used.   
 Although no theory has been tested in the literature on numerical format, two 
dominant theoretical perspectives have emerged in scholars‘ discussions (or literature 
reviews) to explain the findings in the risk literature (Brase, 2002; Brase, 2008; 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Slovic et al., 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2002b).  The first is an evolutionary perspective arguing that some numerical 
formats are more accessible in the mind, leading to an increase in perceived risk.  A 
second explanation for why numerical format affects risk perception is offered by the 
affective processing paradigm, represented by Cognitive-Experiential theory (Epstein, 
1994; Sloman, 1996) and the affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2002a).  This alternative perspective suggests that some numerical formats produce more 
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affect and vividness. Affect and vividness are predicted to influence risk perception and 
risk related decisions. Although these theoretical perspectives have been offered as post 
hoc explanations for patterns in the data, little work has systematically tested the 
predictions of these theories. In addition, it is important to note that these two theoretical 
perspectives are not competing models.  Therefore, it is possible that a third model, 
integrating the predictions of both the evolutionary perspective and the affective 
processing paradigm, fits the extant data.  Overall, the goal of this dissertation project is 
to compare the two alternative perspectives by explicating and testing the predictions of 
these theories. Through this process, this project aims to identify the boundary conditions 
of the two emerging theoretical paradigms. These two theories are widely cited in the 
literature but no studies have adequately tested and compared them.  In addition, no 
existing research has attempted to integrate the predictions of these two theories. This 
project strives to fill this research gap.  
Understanding how risk information is processed and used to make judgments 
and decisions is of both practical and theoretical importance.  In medicine and law the 
implications of presentation format can be a matter of life or death.  In public health 
campaigns, misunderstanding can be the difference between safety and injury. People 
rely on risk information to understand hazards and mitigate dangers.  Understanding why 
and how different types of numerical information affect risk perception and risk related 
decisions has implications for both message design and risk communication. Risk 
communicators can benefit from understanding the cognitive processing that takes place 
when numerical information is received and how the processing of numerical risk 
information affects risk perception and risk related decisions.  
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Chapter two will summarize the research comparing evidence types, review the 
various types of numerical evidence, and discuss the research comparing these numerical 























Chapter II:  Communicating Risk Information 
 There is a long tradition of research aimed at understanding the role of evidence 
contained in a message. Generally, risk messages contain evidence defined as ―data (facts 
or opinions) presented as proof for an assertion‖ (Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002, p. 429).    
Previous research has established that (a) evidence increases source credibility (O‘Keefe, 
1998), (b) people prefer unbiased evidence from a fair and justified source (McCroskey, 
1972), and (c) receiver characteristics including initial attitudes toward the topic and 
personal involvement can moderate the effects of evidence (Reinard, 1988).  Remarkably, 
up to 26 percent of the variance in persuasion can be attributed to the use of effective 
evidence (Reinard, 1988).  Although these findings are informative, there is an 
observable lack of research focused on specific message design features.  One exception 
is the line of research comparing qualitative to quantitative evidence.  Studies of this type 
have examined whether qualitative or quantitative evidence is more persuasive, 
memorable, or vivid. Quantitative evidence is broadly defined as empirically quantifiable 
information about objects, persons, concepts, or phenomena; whereas qualitative 
evidence includes narratives, personal anecdotes, case histories, personal stories, and 
testimonies (Church & Wilbanks, 1986; Kazoleas, 1993). Studies in this line of research 
generally compare two or more pieces of qualitative and quantitative evidence and 
measure various outcomes.   
Yet, the results of these comparisons are largely inconclusive.  Some research on 
this topic has concluded that quantitative messages are more effective than qualitative 
messages (see Allen & Priess, 1997).  In general, quantitative messages that included 
statistics or numbers produced a larger number of positive and negative thoughts, 
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generated higher ratings of message credibility and effectiveness, and produced a lower 
level of anxiety than qualitative messages (Kopfman, Smith, Ah Yun, & Hodges, 1998).  
Baesler and Burgoon (1994) compared qualitative (story) evidence to statistical evidence 
(presented as a percentage) in support of the claim that juvenile delinquents do not 
always become criminals later in life. In this study, the percentage information resulted in 
more attitude change in the direction of the position advocated, than the story evidence.  
Dickson (1982) gave participants a report about the breakdown rate of a refrigerator 
brand in the form of anecdotal evidence (quotations from five home-makers) or statistical 
evidence (frequency information).  Participants were subsequently asked about the 
likelihood of a Brand X refrigerator breaking down.  In the anecdotal evidence condition, 
the likelihood of the outcome was overestimated and participants reported less attitude 
change in the direction of the position advocated, compared to participants the frequency 
message condition. In another study, Allen et al. (2000) had participants read one of 
fifteen messages on a number of topics, including the validity of the SAT test and the use 
of cosmetics. The messages contained either statistical evidence, narrative evidence, or 
both forms of evidence. Overall, the messages with statistical evidence only were more 
persuasive than the messages that contained narrative evidence alone. Messages that 
contained both narrative and statistical evidence were rated most persuasive. Green and 
Brinn (2003) presented participants with one of two types of evidence: a statistic or a 
narrative about the risk of using tanning beds. The ―statistical‖ message stated, ―The 
myth regarding tanning bed use is that the UVA rays they emit are safer than the sun, but 
this is not true.‖  Notably, this ―statistical‖ message contained no numerical information. 
The narrative message described a young woman who used tanning beds and later 
10 
 
developed skin cancer. In this study, the statistical message was more effective in 
reducing tanning bed use.  Hoeken (2001) provided participants with a fictitious 
newspaper article that discussed a mayor‘s proposal to build a cultural center.  The article 
contained either statistical information (about the profitability of 27 cultural centers 
across the country) or anecdotal evidence (information about one center in another town). 
Results revealed no differences in vividness between the two messages, but the anecdotal 
evidence was perceived as weaker than the statistical evidence. Finally, in their study, 
Slater and Rouner (1996) presented the claim that alcohol is a harmful presence in 
society.  Participants received either anecdotal evidence (personal story) or statistical 
evidence (percentage information) in support of this claim.  Overall, the percentage 
information was rated as more convincing than the personal story.  
 In contrast, some researchers have found qualitative evidence to be more effective 
at persuading than quantitative evidence. In his often cited 1988 piece, Reinard concluded 
that all things being equal, anecdotal reports may have more persuasive impact than 
statistics.  Anecdotes have been shown to have a strong influence on judgments and 
decisions.  Fagerlin, Wang, and Ubel (2005) had participants read a scenario describing 
angina and indicate a preference for bypass surgery or balloon angioplasty. The success 
rate for both treatments was presented with statistics, a pictograph, a quiz, or a pictograph 
and quiz combination. In addition, participants also read anecdotes from hypothetical 
patients.  The number of anecdotes describing successful or unsuccessful treatments was 
manipulated to be representative or unrepresentative of the success rates provided.  
Among people in the statistical message condition, anecdotes from previous patients had 
a statistically significant influence on treatment choice; 41 percent of participants chose 
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bypass surgery when the anecdotes were representative of the statistical information.  In 
contrast, only 20 percent of participants chose the bypass surgery when the anecdotes 
were not representative of the statistical information. Koballa (1986) compared anecdotal 
evidence (report from a person who participated in a science program) with statistical 
evidence (aggregate information from several studies).  The evidence was in support of 
the claim that the introduction of a new science program would be beneficial. Participants 
were given two messages, each about a different science program, with one of the two 
types of evidence.  Overall, the personal report was rated more persuasive than the 
aggregate information (although, there was no statistically significant difference between 
the two experimental groups).  
 Still other research has found no differences in outcomes when qualitative or 
quantitative evidence was presented.  Kazoleas (1993) compared messages that contained 
multiple types of qualitative and quantitative information.  The quantitative message gave 
probability information (―50% more likely‖); whereas, the qualitative message contained 
examples, anecdotes, and analogies.  Both messages were equally effective in changing 
attitudes and no differences were found in trustworthiness, vividness, or source expertise.  
Sherer and Rogers (1984) also failed to find differences in effects due to evidence type.  
In this study, participants were presented with the claim that limiting drinking is a way to 
avoid negative consequences.  Participants were given qualitative evidence (stories about 
two problem drinkers) or statistical evidence (aggregate information about 2000 problem 
drinkers).  Based on the messages received, no differences in intention to limit or abstain 
from alcohol use were found.  Finally, Cox and Cox (2001) provided female participants 
with statistical evidence (―women are 43% more likely to die of breast cancer‖) or 
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anecdotal evidence (a story about a woman who found breast cancer early) about the 
benefits of regular mammography screening.  Both messages in this study were rated as 
equally persuasive.  
In attempt to make sense of these findings, two reviews of the evidence literature 
have been conducted. The only existing meta-analysis on the topic, conducted by Allen 
and Preiss (1997), found that overall a communicator is slightly more effective with 
statistical evidence than a qualitative message that uses examples or narratives alone.  A 
more recent informal review of fourteen experiments, conducted by Hornikx (2005), also 
concluded that statistical evidence is more persuasive than anecdotal evidence.  Although 
the meta-analysis and the review came to the same conclusion; there is a fatal flaw in the 
entire body of research calling any meta-analysis results into question.  The 
aforementioned studies have no consistency in the operational definition of quantitative 
(or qualitative) evidence.  These studies operationalized quantitative information as a 
percentage, a frequency, a probability, aggregate information from a few studies, 
aggregate information from thousands of people, combinations of all of these formats, 
and/or provided no numbers at all.  In all of these studies, including the Allen and Preiss 
(1997) meta-analysis, all forms of quantitative evidence were used interchangeably.  
Although it does not make a mathematical difference how numerical evidence is 
presented, research shows that the numerical format of evidence that is presented does 
make a psychological difference for receivers (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2000).  
That is, perceptions are not necessarily a function of quantitative over qualitative 




Format of Quantitative Evidence  
Research outside of the communication discipline has established that all numbers 
are not the same, with regard to how people cognitively process and respond to them. 
There are many types of quantitative information. The most commonly used 
representations of risk information are frequencies and percentages. Among frequencies, 
there are two types: natural frequencies and simple frequencies. A natural frequency is 
the number of times an event occurs within a sample. Sometimes called naturally 
sampled frequencies or absolute frequencies, these numbers result from counting specific 
cases (e.g., fatal accidents, infections, bankruptcies) within a specific reference class 
(e.g., a group of people, an event).  This number is often coupled with restrictions 
concerning the time interval during which the counting has been done.   For example, the 
information, 102 million U.S. Americans out of 307 million U.S. Americans will get the 
flu this year, is presented as a natural frequency.  A simple frequency is a natural 
frequency that has been scaled down to smaller numerical values. Using the same 
example, a statistic in a simple frequency format would state: 1 out of 3 U.S. Americans 
will get the flu this year. Percentages come in two types:  probabilities (e.g., there is a 
0.33 probability of getting the flu this year) and percentages (e.g., 33% will get the flu 
this year).  Risk information can be presented in any one of these four numerical formats.   
 Some general conclusions can be drawn regarding the ease or difficulty of 
understanding and using various numerical formats. Percentage information is difficult to 
interpret, because by definition it leaves the reference class open to interpretation 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).  This is illustrated in the often cited example given by 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995).  The statement ―there is a 30% chance of rain 
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tomorrow‖ can be interpreted in several ways.  The reference class is not provided, so the 
message receiver can conclude that it will rain tomorrow in 30 percent of the area, that it 
will rain 30 percent of the time, or that it will rain on 30 percent of the days like 
tomorrow.  The reference class can be the area, amount of time, or number of days.  In 
contrast, a number of studies have linked frequency information to positive outcomes 
(Brase, 2002; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1998; Yamagishi, 1997).  Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) argued that people 
make more accurate judgments when given frequency formats.  The research that has 
compared numerical formats will now be discussed further.  
Influence of Numerical Format  
 Several studies have compared one or more numerical formats to identify 
differences in outcomes.  The basic experimental design of these studies includes 
displaying the data in a variety of formats and measuring outcomes including accuracy, 
judgments, and decisions.  In an experiment conducted by Slovic et al. (2000), 
psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to evaluate the likelihood that a mental 
patient, Mr. Jones, would commit an act of violence within six months of being 
discharged from a psychiatric hospital.  In this study, participants were provided with a 
patient‘s risk of violence as a frequency (―of every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones, 10 
are estimated to commit an act of violence‖) or as a percentage (―patients similar to Mr. 
Jones are estimated to have a 10% chance of committing an act of violence‖). 
Participants were then asked to make a decision to either discharge Mr. Jones from the 
hospital or keep Mr. Jones in the hospital. Mean judgments to discharge Mr. Jones from 
the hospital were statistically significantly smaller for the percentage conditions than for 
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the frequency conditions.  Overall, participants who received frequency information 
evaluated Mr. Jones as more dangerous than participants who received percentage 
information.  
In another study, Brase (2002) compared four statistical formats: simple 
frequencies (―1 in 3‖), probabilities (―0.33‖), percents (―33 %‖), and natural frequencies 
for the U.S. population (―90 million‖). The message topic was also varied; participants 
received information in one of four contexts (disease prevalence, education, marketing, or 
drug efficacy). Each participant received one format and evaluated the clarity of the 
information. Statistically significant differences in clarity were reported; simple 
frequencies (M = 3.98) and percents (M = 3.89) were rated clearer than probabilities (M = 
3.13) and natural frequencies (M = 3.24). 
 In a related study, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) assigned participants to 
receive natural frequency or percentage information about the occurrence of fifteen 
health and accident risks.  Participants were asked to estimate the probability that one 
person would experience each specific event. Overall, the natural frequency format 
stimulated and facilitated statistical reasoning, operationalized as use of Bayesian 
algorithms, compared to the percentage information.   
 In an attempt to begin identifying the differences between numerical formats, 
Skubisz (2010) compared various forms of risk evidence by investigating how people 
evaluated evidence.  Using scales developed by Hample (2006), participants evaluated 
messages using 37 semantic differential scales that made up five latent factors—moral-
effective, clear-strong, prejudiced, artistic, and masculine-feminine.  Four types of 
quantitative risk evidence (a percentage with words and numbers, a percentage with no 
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numbers, a natural frequency, and a standard percentage), about the risk of driving while 
talking on a cell phone, were compared. The four messages were mathematically 
equivalent and varied only in their numerical presentation format.  This research found 
that people do in fact make distinctions between different, yet mathematically equivalent, 
pieces of evidence. Statistically significant differences were found between the four types 
of evidence and the four factors. For example, the standard percentage was rated as less 
prejudiced than the percentage with no numbers and the percentage with words and 
numbers. The natural frequency evidence was rated less artistic than the percentage with 
no numbers.  
 Finally, a qualitative study conducted by Schapira, Nattinger, and McHorney 
(2001) explored the use of frequency and percentage formats with focus groups. The 
frequency formats were described by the focus group participants as providing a human 
contextual quality, as simple, and as easy to interpret. The percentage formats were 
associated negatively with math and some participants had difficulty interpreting the 
information in this format.  When given the information, ―your risk is 10%‖, one woman 
asked ―10% of what?‖  This illustrates the interpretation problems that can result when a 
reference class is not provided.   
Summarizing the results discussed above, Brase (2008) proposed a theoretical 
ordering of numerical formats based on several dimensions of the numbers.  One end of 
the continuum is information that is not encountered in naturalistic environments, is 
normalized to an artificial reference class (between 0 and 1), is not flexible in usage, and 
is not conceptually easy to use.  Probabilities (e.g., 0.04) and percentages contain all of 
these characteristics.  On the other end of the continuum are formats that are encountered 
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in naturalistic environments, are not normalized, contain information about a reference 
class, are flexible in usage, and are conceptually easy to use. Naturally sampled 
frequencies anchor this end of the continuum. Simplified frequencies that have been 
normalized or scaled down to smaller values, but have all of the other positive features 
discussed above, also exist on this end of the continuum. Data supporting this continuum 
has been found.  In a modified version of a lost letter study, Brase (2008) mailed post 
cards to 6,000 potential participants that contained one piece of statistical evidence about 
cancer.  Four versions were created: a natural frequency (―More than 230,000 persons in 
the UK die of cancer each year‖), a simplified frequency (―More than 1 out of every 261 
persons in the UK die of cancer each year‖), a percent (―More than 0.38% of persons in 
the UK die of cancer each year‖), and probability (―A person has a .004 probability of 
dying of cancer this year‖). Instructions on the post card asked recipients to return the 
cards to an address of a cancer charity.  Returning the cards in the mail showed support 
for the charity.  Overall, natural frequencies were more effective in motivating behavioral 
responses than percentages or probabilities. Natural frequency post cards were returned 
most often and probability post cards were returned least often (although the difference 
was not statistically significant, p = 0.11). 
Overall, it is difficult to avoid using numbers when communicating about risk.  
Numbers can convey the magnitude of risks and benefits more clearly than words and 
people often prefer to receive risk information in a numerical format when they have to 
interpret a risk. It has been argued that the only way to precisely present magnitude is to 
use numbers.  However, the facts that people prefer numbers or that numbers can convey 
risk accurately, are meaningless if people cannot use the numbers to form risk 
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perceptions and make risk decisions. The moderating effects of numerical ability will 
now be discussed further.  
The Moderating Effect of Numeracy 
 The ability to draw meaning from numbers, called numeracy, may moderate the 
effects of message features. Numeracy refers to individuals‘ ability to understand, use, 
and attach meaning to numbers (Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, & Peters, 2008).  It is 
―a multidimensional skill that involves assessing when to use numerical skills, deciding 
which skills to use, using the skills effectively to solve problems, and then interpreting 
the results appropriately‖ (Rothman, Montori, Cherrington, & Pignone, 2008, p. 592).  
Individuals possess different levels of proficiency in numeracy depending on their 
background and experiences (e.g., Adelsward & Sachs, 1996; Fagerlin et al., 2007; 
Grimes & Snively, 1999; Lipkus, Samsa, et al., 2001; Peters, Västfjäll, et al., 2006).  
 The pervasiveness of low numeracy and the effects of low numeracy on 
comprehension, decision making, and behavior have been well documented. According 
to the most recent National Assessment of Adult Literacy (2003), 22 percent of U.S. 
adults performed below a basic quantitative skill level, 66 percent performed at a basic or 
intermediate quantitative skill level, and only 13 percent performed at a proficient 
quantitative skill level (Kutner, Greenberg, Lin, Paulsen, & White, 2006). Proficient was 
defined as the ability to perform complex and challenging literacy activities.  This would 
include making health and risk related decisions with numerical information.  Although 
these findings are startling, numeracy is more complicated than basic quantitative skills.  
Numeracy is a distinct construct from general intelligence or level of education.  Studies 
have shown that highly educated people often understand very little about mathematics 
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and use intuitions about numbers that do not conform to mathematical rules (Paulos, 
1988). There is variance in numeracy skills even within educated populations.  Lipkus, 
Samsa, et al. (2001) measured the quantitative performance of participants with a high 
school education or more.  Sixteen percent were unable to correctly determine risk 
magnitude (i.e., ―what represents a larger risk: 1%, 5%, or 10%‖). Sheridan and Pignone 
(2002) investigated the numeracy skills of medical students.  Students were given 
information about the baseline risk for developing a hypothetical disease, asked to 
interpret quantitative data, and complete a three item numeracy measure (determining 
how many heads would come up if a coin was flipped 100 times, converting 1% of 1000 
to 10, and converting 1 in 1,000 to 0.1%). Seventy-seven percent of the students 
answered all three numeracy questions correctly and only 61 percent of the students 
interpreted the quantitative data correctly.  
 Numeracy is related to health outcomes, cognition, and risk perception.  Low 
numeracy skills predict poorer health outcomes, less accurate perceptions of health risks, 
and compromised ability to make medical decisions (Reyna & Brainerd, 2007).  Lobb, 
Butow, Kenny, and Tattersall (1999) investigated the ability of women to understand 
breast cancer risk information. In this research, 53 percent of the women could not 
calculate how a therapy would reduce their risk, and 73 percent did not understand the 
statistical term ―median‖ when researchers used it to describe how long it typically takes 
for cancer to return.  In addition, research has found that people with low numeracy 
trusted numerical information less and were more likely to reject numerical data, 
compared to people with high numeracy (Gurmankin, Baron, & Armstrong, 2004a; 
Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007).  In addition, people with lower numeracy 
20 
 
overestimated the benefits of tests or treatment options (Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & 
Welch, 1997) and were more influenced by irrelevant nonnumeric sources of information 
(Peters, Västfjäll, et al., 2006). 
 More recent research has found that less numerate people are more affected by 
how numerical information is presented.  Peters, Västfjäll, et al. (2006) showed 
participants two pictures of bowls with colored and white jelly beans and told them to 
imagine that they could select one jelly bean.  If they selected a colored jelly bean, they 
would win five dollars.  The first bowl was larger, contained 100 jelly beans, 9 of which 
were colored, and was labeled as having ―9% colored jelly beans‖. This option was the 
inferior choice.  The second bowl was smaller, contained 10 jelly beans, 1 of which was 
colored, and was labeled as having ―10% colored jelly beans‖. Participants were asked 
which bowl they preferred to choose from.  Valence of feelings and numeracy were 
measured.  In this study, lower numeracy was associated with inferior choices; less 
numerate participants were more likely to choose the bowl with 100 jelly beans than 
participants who scored higher on the numeracy scale.   
In a related study, Galesic, Gigerenzer, and Staubinger (2009) investigated 
whether natural frequencies can improve outcomes for people with lower numeracy 
skills.  Participants were given information as a natural frequency or a conditional 
probability and asked to estimate a positive predictive value for a medical screening 
procedure. Overall, the number of accurate estimates was low, but accuracy was higher 






 Despite a sizeable accumulation of research on the subject, there is an observable 
lack of agreement regarding the most effective methods for communicating risk evidence 
(Ghosh & Ghosh, 2005; Lipkus, 2007).  This may be due to the way evidence types have 
been studied and compared.  Previous research is informative and sheds light upon the 
perceived differences between numerical formats; yet, this research does not provide 
information about the cognitive mechanisms that people use when processing numerical 
information. Few conclusions can be drawn from this body of work because there is a 
lack of consistency in testing formats using the same outcomes, a lack of critical tests 
using controlled studies that compare one format to another, and finally, there is a lack of 
theoretical progress identifying and testing mechanisms regarding why formats lead to 
particular outcomes (Lipkus, 2007). In the aforementioned studies, some researchers have 
suggested theoretical explanations without providing evidence ruling out alternative 
explanations. Other research in this area is completely atheoretical and simply compares 
one format to another, without attempting to provide explanations for the trends in the 
data. Without a frame of reference, research results have provided multiple and often 
competing conclusions that are difficult to interpret.   
An important theoretical question that has not been addressed, is related to why 
numerical message features influence risk perception and risk related decisions.  Some 
numerical formats facilitate statistical inference or ―mean more‖ than others but we do 
not have a theoretical perspective to explain why this is the case. The results of the extant 
research can be explained by two theoretical frameworks.  These theories offer 
predictions about why numerical presentation affects outcomes. Although these theories 
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make similar predications, the mechanism through which outcomes are influenced are 
quite different.  These two theoretical explanations, an evolutionary theory and an 























Chapter III:  Theoretical Explanations 
An Evolutionary Theory 
 In reaction to the heuristics and biases research (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982) suggesting that people make systematic and predictable errors in judgments and 
decisions, Gigerenzer (1991) began a line of work focused on ecological rationality. 
Gigerenzer (1991) argued that people will make rational decisions if the decisions are 
framed in a way that coincides with cognitive mechanisms innately in place in the human 
mind.   This research was the first to devote attention to the role of evolutionary biology 
in decision making (Brase, 2008).  In general, this perspective argues that the mind 
functions best in situations that reflect learning and decision making in the real world. 
Noteworthy for this dissertation project, the evolutionary perspective argues that humans 
have mental mechanisms for probabilistic reasoning that is specific for the frequency 
format.   
Referred to as the frequency hypothesis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) or the 
evolutionary argument (Amitani, 2008; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), this perspective 
argues that information represented as frequencies was more adaptive over the course of 
evolutionary history, than information represented as percentages. Specifically, humans 
have built-in mental algorithms to solve frequency problems, but do not have these 
mechanisms for other numerical formats (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1998). 
This pattern of appreciating frequencies over percentages occurred because frequencies, 
counts that are not normalized, were more useful to people in the natural environment 
(Brase, 2002; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).   
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 The theory provides three arguments for why frequency information has been 
more adaptive, compared to other numerical formats (Brase, 2002).  First, over 
evolutionary history, people have learned from direct experience (Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995; Kleiter, 1994).  For example, consider a person who observed, case by 
case, members of his village drink from the same stream and counted whether or not each 
person got sick.  In more recent times, consider a physician who observed, case by case, 
whether or not her patients have a new disease and whether the outcome of the diagnostic 
test was positive or negative. In both of these examples, information was gathered as 
frequencies.  Frequency information was privileged because this is how people encounter 
information in the world; people ―count things up‖ (Brase, 2002; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1998).  Second, Brase (2002) argued that frequency 
information was privileged because new frequency information can be easily, 
immediately, and usefully incorporated with old frequency information. The human mind 
is a database of information and it is easier to update this database with frequency 
information than with percentage information (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996).  Using a 
method of natural sampling, people count occurrences of events as they encounter them, 
and store the information as natural frequencies for later use (Brase, 2002). Finally, data 
in frequency format retains valuable information that is lost in other formats.  
Specifically, sample sizes are retained with frequency information. For example, a 
percentage (e.g., 50%) or a likelihood (e.g., 0.50) could be based on a sample of 1 out of 
5, 25 out of 50, or 500,000 out of one million. The reference class and the number it 
represents are not preserved with all numerical formats.  
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Several studies have attributed the superiority of frequency information to this 
evolutionary argument. Research supporting this perspective has shown that people are 
more skilled at using numerical information when the information is presented in a 
format that is consistent with information processing in the real world. For example, 
Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) had participants solve the classic Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) ―Linda problem‖ when the information was presented as a frequency. The 
traditional Linda problem describes a 31 year old woman named Linda who is single, 
outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in psychology and as a student she was 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice.  Linda also participated in 
anti-nuclear demonstrations. The question asks participants to determine which 
alternative is more probable: a.) Linda is a bank teller or b.) Linda is a bank teller and 
active in the feminist movement. Consistently, people chose the second option which 
violates probabilistic logic.  The conjunction of two events, Linda being a bank teller and 
Linda being active in the feminist movement cannot be more probable than just one 
event, Linda being a bank teller (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). As a test of the 
evolutionary theory, Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999), changed the instructions of the 
Linda problem to read, ―There are a hundred persons who fit the description above.  How 
many of them are: a) bank tellers and b) bank tellers and active in the feminist 
movement?‖  The effect found by Kahneman and Tversky disappeared. Based on these 
results, Hertwig and Gigerenzer argued that frequency information improved statistical 




Although the evolutionary theory has not been depicted as a causal model in the 
literature, the predictions of the theory can be expressed in this way. Figure 1 illustrates 
the evolutionary perspective.  Overall, this theory argues that the human mind has 
mechanisms in place for processing frequency information.  Thus, the format in which 
information is presented should affect the processing speed of the information. The 
human mind has evolved mechanisms to process frequency information, allowing for 
faster processing of information in this format.  In addition, numerical evidence should be 
clearest and most transparent when presented in the format that can most easily be 
processed by the human mind.  Numerical information will be clearest when presented in 
a frequency format (Brase, 2002). According to the theory, reaction time and clarity are 
mediating variables that influence the perception of a risk. Finally, given that risk 
perception is the lens through which risks are evaluated, risk perception will influence 
risk related decisions.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Evolutionary Theory. 
An alternative theory, an affective processing model, also argues that numerical 
formats have differential influences on risk perception and risk related decisions.  
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However, this theory provides an alternative explanation for these outcomes.  The 
affective processing paradigm and its predictions will now be described further.  
An Affective Processing Theory 
 The affective processing theory suggests that people operate within two systems, 
one cognitive and the other affective (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996).  The first system, 
System 1 is cognitive and deliberative (Epstein, 1994).  It can be defined as a rational 
system, guided by formal logic, rules, and evidence.  It is important to note that rational 
refers to the following of analytical principles, not the reasonableness of the thinking or 
behavior (Epstein, 2004). Information processing in System 1 is conscious, based on 
reason, and obtained from logical inference.  This conscious, reasoned processing, makes 
the cognitive system slow compared to its affective counterpart (Peters, Västfjäll, et al., 
2006).  
System 2 is the affective or experiential system. Affective processes are 
preconscious or unconscious, automatic, rapid, and minimally demanding of cognitive 
resources (Epstein, 2003).  Zajonc (1980) argued that the first reactions to stimuli are 
automatic and affective and these reactions may have the ability to serve as orienting 
mechanisms (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2005). The world is complex and 
uncertain and reliance on affect and emotion is sometimes quicker, easier, and more 
efficient (Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).  System 2 is image based and 
operates impressionistically. The affective system evolves and adapts from experience. 
This is how humans have adapted to their environments over millions of years of 
evolution (Epstein, 2003). Knowledge comes from personal experience (Sloman, 1996; 
Epstein, 2003). Within System 2, information is encoded in an abstract way, as images, 
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metaphors, or narratives to which feelings may become attached (Epstein, 2003; Slovic et 
al., 2002a). Before probability theory and risk assessment, humans had to rely on 
intuition and ―gut feelings‖ (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2005).   
 Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST) is based on the assumption that 
information is processed within these two separate, but interrelated, systems (Sloman, 
1996; Epstein, 1994).  The theory argues that the two systems operate in parallel and are 
interactive (Epstein, 1994).  The amount of processing in each system and the influence 
of this processing on risk perception is an individual difference.  The guiding 
assumptions of CEST are at the root of several other related theories.  
The affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002a), the risk as 
feelings hypothesis (Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), the affect as information 
hypothesis (Clore, Schwartz, & Conway, 1994; Schwartz & Clore, 1983), and exemplar 
cueing theory (Koehler & Macchi, 2004) are all consistent with the assumptions of 
CEST.  In general, all of these frameworks suggest that people use affect or feelings to 
form judgments and make decisions. Affect is a faint whisper of emotion or a specific 
quality of goodness or badness (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002a; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2005).  The affect heuristic refers to the reliance on 
feelings to understand and use risk information. Consistent with the experiential system, 
affective responses are automatic and rapid (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2002a; Zajonc, 1980).  
 Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2005) explained risk perception in 
terms of System 1 and System 2.  They argued that risk in our modern world is perceived 
and acted upon in two fundamental ways.  The first, risk as feelings (System 2), refers to 
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fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions to risk information. The second, risk as analysis 
(System 1), brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to the perception of risk. This 
affective perspective suggests that perceptions of risk have little to do with 
consequentalist aspects, such as outcomes or probabilities.  
 The affect or feelings that become salient when a message is presented depend 
upon the characteristics of the receiver and the message.  Individual differences may exist 
in regards to how people react to a message. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and Macgregor 
(2005) suggested that individuals may differ in the extent to which System 1 and System 
2 processing influences their risk perception and behavior. Supporting this idea, 
Reventlow, Hvas, and Tulinius (2001) found that a medical practitioners‘ understanding 
of a risk as a statistical probability was influenced more by the cognitive system; 
whereas, a patient‘s understanding was more affective.  In addition, the affective 
processing paradigm makes predictions about numeracy.  Research has suggested that 
vivid images induce greater perceptions of risk. Thus, information presented in a 
frequency format should produce more negative affect and vividness, compared to 
information presented in a percentage or single event probability format.  People with 
higher numeracy should have more mental access to all numerical formats (Peters, 
Västfjäll, et al., 2006); although it should be noted this assertion has never been formally 
tested.  For example, when presented with frequency information, the highly numerate 
should be able to calculate a percentage. Thus, presentation format should have less 
influence on outcomes for highly numerate people and more influence on outcomes for 
less numerate people who do not have access to all formats.  Again, these predictions 
have not been tested empirically.   
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In addition to individual differences, some formats may produce more vivid 
imagery than other formats (Slovic et al., 2000). Qualitative evidence may produce more 
affect and vivid imagery than quantitative formats, but there should be variance within 
quantitative formats as well.  The affective processing paradigm suggests that these 
formats influence risk perception and decisions because the numbers are easier to 
imagine, produce vivid images of the risk, and stimulate more affect.  For example, 
Slovic et al. (2000) explained their finding that experts given frequency information were 
less likely to discharge a mental patient than experts given percentage information, with 
the affect heuristic. Unpublished follow up studies conducted by the authors suggested 
that percentage formats, that are conceptually more difficult, lead to benign images of the 
patient, unlikely to do any harm.  In contrast, the frequency representations created 
frightening images of a violent patient (discussed in Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006).  In 
their conclusion, Slovic et al. (2000) argued that numerical formats that cause negative 
affect, like frequencies, produce higher perceptions of risk. But, these conclusions also 
need to be tested empirically.  
 Overall, people attach more weight to unlikely, risky events when they can easily 
imagine the event has occurred or will occur (Koehler & Macchi, 2004). Frequencies 
increase perceptions of a risk because this numerical format elicits more vivid images 
(Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004).  In 
addition to the Slovic et al. (2000) study, other empirical findings have been explained in 
terms of the affect heuristic.  For example, perception of risk and responses to risk are 
strongly linked to the feelings of dread (affect) associated with the risk (Fischhoff, 
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Reid, & Coombs, 1978; Slovic, 1987). In addition, Alhakami and 
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Slovic (1994) found that the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived 
benefit of an activity was linked to the strength of the feelings associated with the 
activity.  If people liked an activity (positive affect) they judged the risks to be low and 
the benefits high.  If people disliked an activity (negative affect) they judged the risks 
high and the benefits to be low. For example, participants who judged the benefits of 
using of pesticides on food crops to be high also judged the risks of pesticides to be low. 
Although the affective processing paradigm has not been illustrated as a causal model in 
the literature, the predictions can be illustrated in the model shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Affective Processing Theory. 
Overall, few studies have systematically tested the predictions of the affective 
processing theory and none have successfully been able to rule out alternative theoretical 
explanations.  In their review of the affect heuristic, Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and 
MacGregor (2002a) write, ―we have developed the affect heuristic to explain findings 
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from studies of judgment and decision making‖ (p. 27). This highlights the fact that the 
affect heuristic is a post hoc explanation for patterns in the data. In addition, little 
research has examined why affect influences risk perception.  Thus, little progress has 
been made toward a comprehensive theory describing the relationships between 
presentation format, affect, vividness, risk perception, and risk related decisions.  
An Integrated Theory of Risk Information Processing 
 It is of significance to point out that the evolutionary theory and the affective 
processing theory do not make competing predictions.  In fact, the two explanations have 
important variables and causal relationships in common.  For example, the evolutionary 
perspective argues that the mind is constructed of adaptations that have been useful in the 
evolutionary past. Processing information quickly is critical for survival. Concurrently, 
System 2 processes that are fast, easy, or automatic should also be well adapted to 
function in the environment in which we have evolved. Both theories make predictions 
based upon evolutionary arguments.  In addition, the affective processing model 
explicitly makes arguments about the speed of which affect-based decisions are made.  
Similarly, the evolutionary model implies that one might make faster decisions with 
frequency information, than with information presented in other numerical formats. 
Therefore, a third model that integrates the predications of both theoretical perspectives is 
being proposed and tested.  This integrated theory of risk information processing, 
proposed for this first time in this dissertation project, predicts that frequency information 
will lead to faster risk evaluations, will be clearer, will be cause the risk to be more vivid, 
and will lead to more negative affect.  This model integrates the mediating variables from 
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both theories into one larger model.  All of these mediating variables are predicted to 
influence risk perception.  This integrated model is illustrated in Figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3. Conceptual Integrated Theory of Risk Information Processing. 
 
 Three theoretical perspectives can explain when and why numerical presentation 
influences risk perception and decisions. If there is a frequency mechanism that has been 
selected for and evolved in human beings over time, then frequency information should 
be more accessible. If frequency information leads to more negative affect and causes 
more vivid images of the risk, differences between frequency formats and percentage 






Predictions of the Evolutionary Model 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the evolutionary perspective implies that if people have 
developed a cognitive mechanism for processing frequency information, frequency 
formats should promote faster and easier evaluation of numerical evidence. Frequencies 
facilitate reasoning because they reduce the number of required mathematical 
computations. The information is natural in the sense that it corresponds to how humans 
have experienced statistical information over the course of evolutionary history 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). The speed with which information is processed may have 
implications for how a risk is perceived and evaluated. Therefore, research questions one 
and two ask: 
RQ1:  Do people make faster risk evaluations when provided with frequency 
evidence, than when provided with evidence in other formats (percentages and 
probabilities)? 
RQ2: Does the speed of reaction time influence risk perception? 
Given the way that the human mind processes numbers, the evolutionary perspective 
argues that the frequency format is more transparent than other formats (e.g., Brase, 
2002; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). The clarity of the numerical evidence is predicted to 
influence perception about the risk and subsequently, risk related decisions.  Specifically, 
it is predicted that:  
H1:  When risk evidence is presented in a frequency format, the evidence will be 
rated as clearer than when the evidence is presented in other formats (percentages 
or probabilities).  
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H2: Evidence clarity has a direct effect on risk perception.  
Finally, if risk perception is the lens through which a risk is understood and evaluated, as 
risk perceptions increase (with high scores indicating higher perceptions of severity and 
susceptibility) risk related decisions will become more averse, as operationalized by high 
scores on the decision measure.  Therefore, it is predicted:  
 H3:  Risk perception influences risk related decisions, such that higher risk 
 perception causes more risk averse decisions.  
These two research questions and three hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4. Evolutionary Model Hypotheses. 
 
Predictions of the Affective Processing Model 
As illustrated in Figure 2, frequency information should be more vivid and cause more 
affect in message receivers, than information presented in other formats.  Therefore it is 
predicted: 
H4: Numerical format yields a main effect on reaction time; people make faster 
risk evaluations when presented with frequency evidence than when presented 
with evidence in any other format (percentages and probabilities).  
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H5: Numerical format yields a main effect on affect, such that frequency evidence 
leads to more negative affect compared to evidence presented in other formats 
(percentages and probabilities). 
H6: Numerical format will yield a main effect on vividness, such that frequency 
evidence will be more rated as more vivid than evidence presented in other 
formats (percentages and probabilities).  
Differences based on objective numeracy have been found to influence information 
processing. Compared to less numerate people, highly numerate people are more likely to 
deliberate and think about numerical evidence. Less numerate people lack a clear 
understanding of numbers and are more likely to make fast (System 2) evaluations and 
form perceptions quickly (Peters et al., 2006).  The affective processing paradigm 
predicts that less numerate people will experience stronger negative affect when 
presented with numerical information.  More numerate people will have more neutral 
feelings because they can draw more precise meaning from the numbers. People with low 
numeracy are more influenced by irrelevant affective sources. In addition, compared to 
less numerate people, highly numerate people are expected to extract more vividness 
from numerical information (Peters, Lipkus, & Diefenbach, 2006; Slovic et al., 2000).  
Peters et al. (2006) explained that when low numeracy people are presented with numbers 
they lack the complexity and richness in understanding that is available to people with 
high numeracy. Therefore, it is predicted that: 
H7: Numeracy yields a main effect on reaction time; as numeracy increases, 
reaction time increases linearly (highly numerate people spend more time 
deliberating about a risk). 
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H8:  Numeracy yields a main effect on affect, such that people with lower 
numeracy have more negative affect from numerical risk information and people 
with higher numeracy have more neutral affect from numerical risk information.  
H9: Numeracy yields a main effect on vividness, such that people with high 
numeracy have more vivid images of a risk when provided with any numerical 
information than people with lower numeracy.  
If numerical format influences reaction time, and lower numerate people respond 
differentially to certain formats, then people with lower numeracy should react faster to 
evidence in these formats.  In contrast, people with higher numeracy should have no 
reaction time differences based on format. These people have cognitive access to any 
numerical format, not only the one they have been given.  In addition, numerical format 
and numeracy will interact to influence the feelings and vividness experienced. Highly 
numerate people should have equal cognitive access to all numerical formats (Peters, 
Västfjäll, et al., 2006).  Thus, presentation format should not influence the amount of 
vividness reported or affect experienced for people with higher numeracy.  Thus, people 
with lower numeracy, though, will only have cognitive access to the format they are 
provided (i.e., they will not or cannot transform the numbers).  People with lower 
numeracy will derive more vividness and experience more affect from frequency 






H10:  Numerical format and numeracy interact to influence reaction time, such 
that lower numerate people make faster (System 2) risk evaluations when 
provided with frequency evidence, compared to evidence presented in other 
numerical formats (percentages and probabilities); whereas, people with higher 
numeracy have no reaction time differences based on evidence format.   
H11: Numerical format and numeracy interact to influence affect such that people 
with lower numeracy have more negative affect from frequency evidence, 
compared to evidence presented in other numerical formats (percentages and 
probabilities); whereas, people with higher numeracy will have no affect 
differences based on format. 
H12: Numerical format and numeracy interact to influence vividness ratings, such 
that people with lower numeracy will report more vividness when provided with 
frequency evidence, compared to evidence presented in other numerical formats 
(percentages and probabilities); whereas, people with higher numeracy will have 
no vividness differences based on format.  
According to the affective processing paradigm, when a person is presented with 
information about a risk, informative signals about the qualities of a risk are felt.  
Heuristic evaluations are intuitive, nonanalytical, and require minimal processing speed.  
Faster processing of information has implications for risk perception; people should form 
different evaluations if they spend time cognitively processing the evidence than if they 
make immediate or automatic evaluations. Therefore it is predicted: 
H13:  Reaction time influences risk perception; a longer response time is 




H14:  Affect has a positive direct influence on risk perception, such that negative 
 affect lead to higher risk perception. 
H15: Vividness has a positive direct influence risk perception, such that higher 
vividness causes higher risk perception. 
Finally, if risk perception is the lens through which a risk is understood and evaluated it 
is predicted that:  
H16:  Risk perception influences risk related decisions, such that higher risk 
perception causes risk aversion, as indicated by high scores on the decision items.  
Hypotheses 4 through 16 are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 







Predictions of the Integrated Model  
 
The integrated model predicts that reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness all 
influence risk perception or a person‘s beliefs about a risk.  In addition to the preceding 
predications, the integrated model includes two additional paths that hypothesize: 
H17:  Numeracy yields a main effect on evidence clarity, such that people with 
higher numeracy evaluate numerical evidence as clearer than people with lower 
numeracy. 
H18:  Numerical format and numeracy interact to influence evidence clarity, such 
that lower numerate people evaluate evidence as clearer when it is presented in 
frequency formats; whereas, people with higher numeracy have no clarity 
differences based on format. 
Figure 6. Integrated Model Hypotheses 
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Chapter IV: Pilot Study 
This chapter describes the project‘s pilot study.  The purpose of the pilot study 
was to pre-test the messages that were proposed for use in the main experiments. This 
study and the subsequent experiments were approved by the University of Maryland‘s 
Institutional Review Board.  
Pilot Study Method 
A pilot study was designed to obtain information about the messages proposed for 
use in the main experiments.  This dissertation contains two main experiments that test 
the predictions put forward by the evolutionary model, the affective processing model, 
and the integrated model.  The two experiments employ scenarios and measures 
previously used by Brase (2002) and Slovic et al. (2000).  The Brase and Slovic et al. 
studies were chosen because the respective scholars (or team of scholars) are the 
dominant adherents to the theories being empirically tested.  Due to the fact that these 
messages and measures have already been employed in experiments posited to be 
consistent with the respective theories, it is logical to use these messages and measures to 
explore the variables that mediate the relationship between numerical format and risk 
perception, as well as numeracy and risk perception.  
For Study 1, the topics of disease prevalence and drug efficacy from Brase (2002) 
were pre-tested with a college age population.  For Study 2, a modified version of the 
Slovic et al. (2000) ―Mr. Jones‖ vignette was pre-tested.  In the original ―Mr. Jones‖ 
study, participants were psychologists and psychiatrists who were presented with risk 
evidence about Mr. Jones, a mental patient who committed a violent act.  Risk evidence 
was provided in one of two formats (a frequency or a percentage) and participants were 
asked to make an assessment about the risk of Mr. Jones committing another violent act. 
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Due to the fact that the sample being studied in this dissertation project was significantly 
different than Slovic et al. (2000) sample, the topic of the ―Mr. Jones‖ study was 
modified to create a scenario that would have high involvement for to a college age 
population. Thus, a vignette describing a University of Maryland student was developed. 
In the vignette, a student committed a violent act and was expelled from the University. 
Participants were presented with evidence about the student in one of four numerical 
formats and asked to make decisions either allowing the student to return to the 
University of Maryland or let the expulsion stand.  The essence of the case remained the 
same. In the pilot study, name of the student in the vignette was pre-tested.  The original 
Slovic et al. study used a male name (James Jones) in the vignette. This study aimed to be 
gender neutral and three names (Taylor, Cameron, and Jordan) were pre-tested to find a 
name that could refer to either a male or a female student.  
In addition, the three topics and messages were evaluated by the pilot study 
participants for realism.  Open ended questions allowed for feedback on message clarity 
and suggestions for improvement. The entire survey instrument for the pilot study is 
provided in Appendix A.  
Pilot Study Participants 
 Forty-seven undergraduate students at the University of Maryland participated in 
the pilot study (62.00% of the participants were female and 38.00% were male). In the 
sample, 57.40% of participants were Caucasian or White, 19.10% were Asian, 10.60% 
were African-American or Black, 8.50% were Hispanic or Latino, and 4.30% selected 
more than one race or ethnicity.  Freshman made up 42.60% of the sample, 23.40% were 
43 
 
sophomores, 19.10% were juniors and 14.90% were seniors. The mean age was 19.63 
(SD = 1.27, Mdn = 19.00).  
Pilot Study Procedure 
After completing an informed consent form, participants read and evaluated three 
messages, two from each topic in Study 1 and one message from Study 2. After 
evaluating each of the three messages all participants completed demographic questions.  
Pilot Study Results 
Participants were asked to rate the realism of the messages using a scale from 0 
(not realistic at all) to 100 (completely realistic). The disease prevalence message had a 
mean rating of 75.53 (SD = 22.99) and the drug efficacy message had a mean rating of 
50.77 (SD = 37.76). The violent student vignette had a mean realism rating of 72.28 (SD 
= 24.20).  Responses from the open ended questions indicated that a context was needed 
for the messages in the Study 1.  Several participants questioned the source of the 
information.   
Pilot results for the Study 2 vignette showed that participants imagined Jones as a 
male most often (98.80% for Taylor, 100% for Jordan, and 91.70% for Cameron).  When 
asked if each name is typically a man‘s name, woman‘s name, or could be used for both 
sexes, 14.40% said that Taylor is typically a man‘s name, 25.50% said that Taylor was 
typically a woman‘s name, and 59.60% replied that name could be used for both sexes.  
For Jordan, 66.00% reported that the name is typically used for men and 34.00% 
indicated that the name can be used for both sexes. No participants reported that the name 
can be used for both men and women.  For Cameron, 48.90% reported that the name is 
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typically used for men, 12.80% reported that the name is typically used for women, and 
38.30% reported that the name is used for both men and women.   
Modifications to the Messages 
Based on these results, modifications were made to the messages.  To the drug 
efficacy and disease prevalence messages, the following sentence was added:  ―The 
following information is a recent New York Times newspaper headline‖.  The goal of 
this addition was to provide a context for the participants, albeit minimal.  This provided 
an explanation regarding why the message was brief. The name Taylor Jones was 

















Chapter V: Study 1  
Method 
Overview 
Study 1 was based on Brase‘s (2002) work that compared and tested four 
numerical formats:  simple frequencies, natural frequencies, percentages, and 
probabilities. Brase found that simple frequencies and percentages were rated clearer than 
probabilities and natural frequencies.  In the current research, a more comprehensive 
measure of clarity was used (Brase used a one item measure) and reaction time, a variable 
that emerged as important to the theories from the extant literature was included.   In 
Brase‘s original study, participants were provided with one of four pieces of numerical 
evidence in the context of four unique situations (disease prevalence, drug efficacy, 
marketing, and education).  Two of the four topics, disease prevalence and drug efficacy, 
that are relevant to risk communication, were used in this dissertation project.  
 Data collection for Study 1 was carried at the University of Maryland between 
April 2010 and November 2010.  The data from Study 1 was used to test all three of the 
proposed models (the evolutionary model, the affective model, and the integrated model).   
Design 
 A 2 (contexts: disease prevalence and drug efficacy) x 4 (numerical format: 
simple frequency, natural frequency, probability, and percentage) independent groups 
factorial design was implemented.  Numeracy was a measured (versus indicated) 






Participants were 553 students at the University of Maryland.  Females made up 
56.00% of the sample and the mean age was 19.78 (SD = 1.89, Mdn = 19.00, minimum = 
18, maximum = 40).  Most participants were White or Caucasian (60.60%), 13.20% were 
Asian or Pacific Islander, 14.80% were Black or African American, 4.70% were Hispanic 
or Latino, 0.09% were Middle Eastern, 0.02% were Native American, 4.50% indicted 
more than race or ethnicity, and 0.09% of participants did not provide a response to this 
open ended question. Of the 553 participants, 30.90% of the participants were freshman, 
27.30% were sophomores, 23.50% were juniors, 17.60% were seniors, 0.07% were 
graduate students, and 0.05% did not provide a response to this question.  Participants 
signed up to participate in the study using the Department of Communication‘s online 
participant pool.  In an effort to make the sample more diverse, students were asked to 
bring a friend to the study who was not a communication major. Communication majors 
made up 21.70% of the final sample. Students in the participant pool received course 
credit in exchange for their participation in this study. Any student who could not receive 
course credit had the option of entering a drawing for a $200 gift card.  
Procedure 
Participants signed up for a time slot online and reported to the Center for Risk 
Communication Research lab in groups of 10.  After signing in, all participants 
completed an informed consent form.  When all 10 participants arrived to the lab they 
were seated at computer stations.  Once participants started the study, they were 
randomly assigned to an experimental condition by the DirectRT computer program. 
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Both the researcher and the participants were blind to the experimental condition. This 
resulted in each participant receiving one piece of numerical evidence in one risk context.  
After reading the experimental scenario, participants completed measures for each 
of the dependent variables of interest (see Appendix B).  Participants were instructed to 
answer questions using either their computer keyboard or a button box that was attached 
to their computer.   The nine response buttons on the button box corresponded with 
answer choices on the computer screen.  For all items, reaction time was measured as the 
time in milliseconds it took participants to answer each question. Demographic 
information including age, year in school, and college major was also collected.  The 
complete protocol for Study 1 is provided in Appendix B.   
Independent Variables 
Experimental Scenarios 
Participants were given one piece of risk evidence that was provided in one of 
four numerical formats: a natural frequency, a simple frequency, a probability, and a 
percentage. Each participant read one headline about one of the two topics (284 
participants read the disease prevalence headline and 269 participants read the drug 
efficacy headline).  Participants were equally divided between experimental conditions: 
129 participants received the simple frequency headlines, 140 participants received the 
natural frequency headlines, 140 participants received the percentage headlines, and 144 
participants received the probability headlines.  All eight headlines are provided below.  
Natural Frequency Headlines 
Disease Prevalence:  It is estimated that by the year 2020, 2.7 million of all U. S. 
Americans will have been exposed to Flu strain X.  
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Drug Efficacy: A new drug is about to be approved by the FDA.  It has been 
estimated to cause negative side effects in 263 million of all U.S. Americans.  
Simple Frequency Headlines 
Disease Prevalence It is estimated that by the year 2020, 1 out of 100 U. S. 
Americans will have been exposed to Flu strain X.  
Drug Efficacy: A new drug is about to be approved by the FDA.  It has been 
estimated to cause negative side effects in 99 of every 100 U.S. Americans.  
Percentage Headlines 
Disease Prevalence:  It is estimated that by the year 2020, 1% of all U.S. 
Americans will have been exposed to Flu strain X.  
Drug Efficacy: A new drug is about to be approved by the FDA.  It has been 
estimated to cause negative side effects in 99% of all U.S. Americans.  
Probability Headlines 
Disease Prevalence: It is estimated that by the year 2020, any given U.S. 
American will have a probability of 0.01 of having been exposed to Flu strain X.  
Drug Efficacy: A new drug is about to be approved by the FDA.  It has been 
estimated to have a probability of 0.99 to cause negative side effects in any given 
U.S. American.  
Numeracy 
 Objective numeracy was measured using a 15-item expanded numeracy scale 
developed by Schwartz et al. (1997), Lipkus, Samsa, and Reimer (2001), and Peters, 
Dieckmann, Västfjäll, Mertz, and Slovic (2009). This measure is similar to a math test; 
questions were scored as correct (1) or incorrect (0). This 15-item scale provides a 
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numeracy score with the potential to range from 0 - 15 for each participant.  In this 
sample, scores ranged from 2 to 15 (M = 11.06, SD = 2.14, Mdn = 12).  A high score on 
the scale is indicative of high objective numeracy and a low score represents low 
objective numeracy.  Objective numeracy was included as a continuous variable for most 
analyses.  When indicated, a median split was used to examine differences between 
higher numeracy and lower numeracy (high numeracy = 12 – 15, low numeracy = 2 – 
11).    
Preference for Numerical Information:  Subjective Numeracy 
Preference for numerical information was measured using a 13-item subjective 
numeracy measure developed by Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, and 
Smith (2007). This is a subjective measured that evaluated participants‘ preference for 
numerical information. A mean score was created for each participant (M = 6.00, SD = 
1.44, Mdn = 6.23, minimum = 1.44, maximum = 9.00). A high score on the scale (9) 
indicates a preference for numerical information and a low score (0) indicates a 
preference for non numerical information.  Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for these 13 items 
was .86.  Preference for information was correlated with objective numeracy (r = .48, p < 
.01)  
Numerical Format by Objective Numeracy Interaction Term 
 A numerical format by objective numeracy interaction term was created for use in 
the causal models. Objective numeracy was included in the interaction term because this 
variable was proposed to be part of the affective processing model (subjective numeracy 
was not proposed as part of this theory). To create the interaction term, the continuous 
variable (objective numeracy) was first mean centered.  If the variable was not mean 
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centered, the interaction term would be highly correlated with the objective numeracy 
variable and problems with multicollinearity could occur when both variables were 
included in the causal models. To center the variable, the mean objective numeracy score 
was subtracted from each participant‘s individual score. The interaction product term was 
created by multiplying the centered variable and the categorical (numerical format) 
variable (Cortina, Chen, & Dunlap, 2001).  
Dependent Variables 
Thought Listing  
Using a procedure modified from Benthin, Slovic, Moran, Severson, Mertz, and 
Gerrard (1995), participants were asked to list the first five images that came to mind 
after reading the headline.  For each image that was listed, participants were asked:  
Using a scale from 0 - 100, how positive is this image (0 = completely negative, 100 = 
completely positive), how clear is this image (0 = completely fuzzy, 100 = completely 
clear), and how intense is this image (0 = weak, 100 = strong).  The mean rating on the 
negative/positive scale was 35.34 (SD = 20.47, minimum = 0, maximum = 100).  The 
mean rating on the fuzzy/clear scale was 69.25 (SD = 18.59, minimum = 0, maximum = 
100) and the mean rating on the weak/strong intensity scale was 59.70 (SD = 17.68, 
minimum = 1.00, maximum = 100).  The average number of words used for each image 
was 2.55 (SD = 1.93, Mdn = 1.80, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 15.80) and the mean 
number of words used in the entire image listing task, for all five images, was 12.73 (SD 






Perceived clarity of the evidence was measured with nine items.  Brase‘s (2002) 
one item clarity measure asked ―how clear and easy to understand is the statistical 
information presented in the headline‖ (1 = unclear, 9 = clear). The mean score for this 
item was 7.23 (SD = 1.93, Mdn = 8.00, minimum = 1, maximum = 9). In addition to this 
one item, participants completed Hample‘s (2006) multi-item clarity scale.  Participants 
rated the evidence in the message with eight semantic differential items (unclear/clear, 
confusing/not confusing, hard to understand/easy to understand, vague/precise, not a 
noticeable point/a noticeable point, weak/strong, abstract/concrete, not relevant to the 
conclusion/relevant to the conclusion). A high score indicates that the evidence in the 
message was evaluated as clear to the reader; whereas, a low score is indicative of 
unclear evidence.  Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for the Hample scale was .86 (M = 4.54, 
SD = 1.78, Mdn = 4.5, minimum = 1, maximum = 9). 
Vividness 
Vividness of the risk was measured with seven items on 0 - 100 scales (fuzzy, 
detailed, vivid, intense, lifelike, sharp, and well-defined).  A high score on the scale (100) 
indicates high perceived vividness and a low score (0) indicates low perceived vividness. 
Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for these seven items was .64 (M = 41.80, SD = 18.68, Mdn 
= 41.43, minimum = 0, maximum = 100). 
Affect 
Affect was measured with nine semantic differential items adapted from Roskos-
Ewoldsen, Yu, and Rhodes (2004). In the disease prevalence condition, participants were 
asked to respond to the statements: ―Flu strain X is‖ and ―Dedicating resources to dealing 
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with Flu strain X is.‖ Appendix B provides the questions for the drug efficacy conditions.  
Response scales included: positive/negative, bad/good, beneficial/harmful, safe/unsafe, 
wise/foolish, undesirable/desirable, tense/calm, annoyed/pleased, and 
delighted/disgusted.  A high score is indicative of positive affect and a low score is 
indicative of negative affect about the risk. Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for these nine 
items was .76 (M = 4.08, SD = 1.14, Mdn = 4.11, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 7.22). 
Risk Perception  
Risk perception is a multidimensional construct, typically conceptualized as 
perceived susceptibility and perceived severity. Perceived susceptibility is an individual's 
assessment of his or her risk and perceived severity is an individual's assessment of the 
seriousness of the risk and its potential consequences (Rosenstock, 1966).  Using the 
items modified from Real (2008) and Rimal and Real (2003), risk perception was 
measured with three perceived severity and three perceived susceptibility items. In the 
disease prevalence conditions, items included: ―Using a scale from 0 (impossible to 
happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how certain are you that you will be exposed to Flu 
strain X?‖, ―Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what 
is the chance that you will be exposed to Flu strain X?‖, and ―Using a scale from 0 
(impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how likely is it that you will be exposed 
to Flu strain X?‖. See Appendix B for the drug efficacy items. Perceived severity was 
also measured with three items.  In the disease prevalence conditions items included: 
―Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what is the risk 
of being exposed to Flu strain X?‖, ―Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 
(certain to happen) how dangerous is Flu strain X?‖, and ―Using a scale from 0 
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(impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how serious is the existence of Flu 
strain X?‖.  A high score reflects high risk perception. Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for 
these six items was .93 (M = 57.33, SD = 30.35, Mdn = 63.33, minimum = 0, maximum = 
100). 
Risk Related Decisions  
Brase‘s (2002) outcome measure was used to assess risk related decision making. 
Participants were asked to decide how much money should be allocated to each risk 
situation. For the disease prevalence topic, participants were asked ―If you were in charge 
of the annual budget for the U.S. Department of Health, how much of every $100 would 
you dedicate to dealing with Flu strain X?‖. For the drug efficacy topic participants were 
asked ―If you were in charge if the production budget for the manufacturer of this drug, 
how much of every $100 would you dedicate to producing this drug?‖.  The drug efficacy 
item was re-coded so that more money allocated indicted risk aversion for both topics. 
The values on this outcome variable ranged from 0 to 100 dollars (M = 43.75, SD = 
36.03, Mdn = 40.00).  In addition to this measure, participants completed two more 
decision items on 1 (low risk) to 9 (high risk) scales (r = .14, p < .01, M = 5.76, SD = 
1.64, Mdn = 5.50, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 9.00).  These items are provided in 
Appendix B. 
Reaction Time 
 Participants completed all items on computers that were equipped with response 
time software. Speed of response in milliseconds was measured for all questions in this 
study.  Mean speed in milliseconds for the six risk perception items described above was 
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used as the reaction time variable (M = 8225.59, SD = 3349.32, Mdn = 7682.60, 
minimum = 1063.20, maximum = 30447.40). 
Study 1 Data Analysis 
This section is divided into two parts.  The first part describes the preparation of 
the data for Study 1.  The second part presents the primary data analysis: the replication 
of Brase (2002) and the tests of the hypotheses with the Study 1 data.  
Preliminary Analyses 
 The frequencies of all observed variables were examined to look for errors. After 
compiling the data set, 24 participants from Study 1 and 20 participants from Study 2 had 
incomplete data files. The responses in these files did not record properly from the 
DirectRT computer program.  The missing data did not show a systematic pattern (e.g., 
no particular experimental condition and no particular questions) and these participants 
were removed from the analysis. All other participants (553 from Study 1 and 395 from 
Study 2) had complete data files for all items used in the analyses.  The reaction time 
items had to be transformed to reduce skewness. Reaction time scores are typically 
clustered at one end of the scale.  This was the case with this data as well.  A logarithmic 
transformation was used, reducing the skewness from 2.06 to - 0.08.  When mean 
reaction time scores are discussed, the un-transformed values are provided for clarity.  
Data Analysis Plan 
A two stage data analysis procedure was used to test the three causal models 
described in this project (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).  LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
2006) was used in both stages. The model parameters were estimated using maximum 
likelihood procedures. In the first stage, the adequacy of the measurement models was 
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assessed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).  In all of the measurement models, 
all latent variables were allowed to correlate freely and a metric assumption was made by 
fixing one indicator item from each variable equal to 1.  The statistical significance of the 
parameter estimates was established by use of the t-statistic (the parameter divided by its 
standard error).  At the .05 level, the test statistic needs to be greater than |1.96| for the 
parameter estimate to be statistically significant.  In addition, squared multiple 
correlations (R
2
) were examined for each of the observed measures.  Squared multiple 
correlations represent the extent to which a measured item explains a latent construct.  
These values range from 0 to 1.  
Four fit indices were used to evaluate the models: model chi square (χ
2
), an 
incremental fit index (CFI), an absolute fit index (SRMR), and a parsimonious fit index 
(RMSEA).  The goodness of fit criteria used in this project are based on the 
recommendations made by Hu and Bentler (1999).   The χ
2
 goodness of fit statistic was 
used as a measure of fit between the sample covariance and fitted covariance matrices. A 
high probability associated with the χ
2
 test indicates a good model fit (Bollen, 1989).  
Although the χ
2
 will be reported as an indicator of model fit, some researchers argue that 
this is not appropriate measure of model fit for samples larger than 200 participants 
(Kline, 2005). Given that both samples in this project are larger than 200, three additional 
indices will be used to assess model fit.   The CFI index was used to evaluate the absolute 
fit of the model. This is the degree to which the unexplained variance remaining in the 
model, after fitting, is substantial (Maruyama, 1998).  The CFI index ranges from 0 to 1, 
and values greater than or equal to .95 indicates a good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
The SRMR fit index is a measure of the standardized difference between the observed 
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covariance matrix and the predicted covariance matrix. A SRMR of 0 indicates a perfect 
fit. A SRMR less than .08 is indicative of a good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Finally, 
the RMSEA index evaluates the parsimony of the model.  Hu and Bentler (1999) 
recommend that a model has a good fit if the RMSEA value is less than or equal to .06.   
After testing the proposed models, standardized residuals and modification 
indices were examined for ways to improve the fit of the models.  Residuals represent a 
discrepancy between the observed and fitted covariance values and removing measures 
with large standardized residuals will improve the fit of the model (Byrne, 1998). Large 
residuals represent a misspecification in the model. In LISREL, a modification index is 
provided for each parameter.  This index provides a measure of how much a model‘s χ
2
 is 
expected to decrease if the parameter is set free (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999).  In addition, 
factor loadings can also be evaluated.  Removing measures with small factor loadings 
will improve the fit of the model. The goal is to have a good fitting measurment model 
before moving on to fitting the structural model to the data. However, it is important to 
note that making modifications to a structural model moves the data analysis from a 
confirmatory procedure to an exploratory procedure.  The goal of this project was to test 
the proposed theories.  Therefore, modifications were made conservatively.  Only 
modifications that could be supported by the underlying theoretical frameworks were 
made.  
After establishing that the measured indicators explained the latent variables well, 
the overall fit of the proposed structural models were tested.  A Multiple Indicator 
Multiple Cause (MIMIC) approach was used to examine the differences between the four 
experimental conditions (four numerical formats). In a MIMIC model, dummy coded 
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variables are included in a model to differentiate between experimental groups. The 
number of groups in the analysis is equal to the number of experimental groups minus 
one.  In this study, three coded variables were included in the model to represent three of 
the experimental groups (simple frequencies, natural frequencies, and percentages).  
These three groups were compared to the fourth group (probabilities).  To conduct this 
analysis, scores from all observed variables and all four experimental conditions were 
combined together in one data set.  A covariance matrix of the measured variables was 
then computed.  The covariance matrix contained the variances and covariances among 
the measured indicators of the latent factors (reaction time, clarity, affect, vividness, risk 
perception, and risk related decision), the covariances between the dummy coded 
variables, and the variances of the dummy coded variables. This matrix contained both 
the between-group covariance matrix among the means on the indicator variables in 
addition to the within-group covariance matrix of indicator scores deviated about their 
means. The covariance matrices for the final structural models are provided in 
Appendices D through I. 
To examine differences in factor means, the unstandardized parameter estimates 
between the dummy coded variables and the latent factors these variables directly 
influence were interpreted. If statistically significant paths were found, standardized 
effect size statistics were evaluated to assess the strength of the effects (Hancock, 2001).  
Two of the three models tested in this project included an interaction term.  
Jöreskog and Yang (1996) recommend that one latent product indicator should be 
included in a structural model as an interaction term.  A format by objective numeracy 
interaction product term was used in the affective processing model and the integrated 
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model.  This interaction term has no real conceptual meaning; it is purely a tool for 
examining a pattern of relationships among variables.  The addition of an interaction term 
in causal modeling leads to interrelatedness among predictor variables.  This can cause a 
multitude of problems related to identification and multicollineary.  Cortina, Chen, and 
Dunlap (2001) recommended mean centering all observed variables to avoid specification 
problems. This strategy was used in this project to minimize the problems associated with 
the addition of an interaction term in a causal model. In all of the structural models, the 
observed variables were mean centered before data analysis.  
The next section describes the analysis of the three causal models using the data 
from Study 1.  The variables and indicators are discussed by using shorted codes (e.g., 
DEC, CLARITY, SEV1).  The actual items from the study are provided in the 
Appendices B and C with the corresponding codes that are used throughout the following 
sections.  
Study 1 Results 
Replication of Brase  
 Brase (2002) presented information to participants in one of four numerical 
formats: simple frequencies (e.g. 1 in 3), probabilities (e.g. 0.33), percentages (e.g. 33%), 
and natural frequencies for the US population (e.g. 90 million).  Four risk topics were 
used: disease prevalence, education, marketing, and drug efficacy.  After reading the 
information, participants responded to items that measured clarity (―how clear and easy 
to understand was the statistical information‖) and monetary pull of the information. 
Clarity was measured on a 5-point scale and monetary pull was measured by asking 
participants to allocate an amount of money, out of 100 dollars, to the particular issue 
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discussed in the message. Brase found statistically significant differences in clarity 
between the numerical formats. Post hoc analyses indicated that both simple frequencies 
and percents were rated clearer than probabilities and natural frequencies.  
 In this project, participants were also presented with numerical evidence in one of 
four numerical formats. After reading the information, participants were asked to respond 
to Brase‘s clarity item (―How clear and easy to understand is the statistical information 
presented in the headline?‖) and one monetary pull item. The clarity item was measured 
on a 9-point scale and monetary pull was measured by asking participants to allocate an 
amount of money out 100 dollars to the particular issue discussed in the message. 
Statistically significant differences in clarity were also found between the numerical 
formats, F (3, 552) = 14.41, p < .01, η
2 
= 0.07. The mean ratings for each condition are 
provided in Table 1. Post hoc least squares difference (LDS) tests show that simple 
frequencies, percents, and natural frequencies (M = 7.35, p < .01) were rated statistically 
significantly clearer than probabilities, replicating the Brase (2002) findings. 
Table 1 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Evidence Clarity by Numerical Format. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Numerical Format     Mean (SD) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Probabilities      6.31 (2.21)
a 
 
Simple Frequency     7.49 (1.84)
b 
 
Percent      7.69 (1.68)
b 
 








When the outcome measure was examined, Brase (2002) did not find statistically 
significant differences between conditions for the monetary pull item. This study 
confirmed that result as well. No statistically significant differences were found between 
formats overall (F (3, 552) = .574, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.003) or between formats when each 
topic was examined separately (see Table 2).  
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Monetary Pull by Numerical Format and Condition. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
            
     Means (SD) by Topic 
       __________________________________ 
 
Numerical Format   Disease Prevalence    Drug Efficacy  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Probability    16.16 (23.60)    70.28 (25.17) 
 
Simple Frequency   23.94 (25.26)    74.15 (28.79) 
Percent    16.74 (20.31)    68.42 (30.61) 
Natural Frequency   20.71 (23.70)    66.25 (29.28) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  The monetary values in the drug efficacy conditions were reverse coded, so a high 
dollar amount was indicative of risk aversion across topics.  
 
Overall, numerical format caused a change in clarity ratings; but, format did not 
influence risk related decisions directly. In addition, a one item double barreled measure 
of clarity was used in the Brase (2002) study.  Specifically, clarity and ease of 
understanding were measured simultaneously.  Study 1 in this project examined clarity 
with a more comprehensive eight item measure in addition to testing three other possible 
mediating variables: reaction time, affect, and vividness.  The tests of the evolutionary 
model, affective processing model, and integrated model will now be discussed further.  
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Evolutionary Measurement Model 
 The evolutionary measurement model included three latent variables (clarity, risk 
perception, and risk related decisions).  The proposed CFA model would not converge 
with the data.  To examine problems in the model, separate CFAs were conducted for 
each latent variable and the corresponding indicators.  The CFAs indicated that two of the 
decision items (DEC2 and DEC3) were very highly correlated with the Brase (DEC1) 
item.  These two items were removed from the model and the Brase monetary pull item 
that asked participants to indicate how many dollars out of 100 they would allocate to the 
new flu or testing the new drug was retained and this item served as a single indictor of a 
risk related decision.  
The first estimation of the two factor (clarity and risk perception) measurement 
model showed a poor fit to the data, χ
2
 (75, N = 553) = 1259.16, p < .01; CFI = .87; 
SRMR = .12; RMSEA = .17. To examine problems in the model and look for ways to 
improve model fit, the standardized residuals and modification indices were examined.  
The items CLARITY3, CLARITY5, CLARITY6, CLARITY7, CLARITY8, and SEV3 
(see Appendix B for these items) had large standardized residuals and were removed 
from the model.  The largest modification index was between the items SEV1 and SEV2 
and the error between these variables was allowed to covary.  These items share a similar 
question stem and allowing the measurement errors between these items improved the fit 
of the model.  A second CFA was conducted with the three indicator clarity factor and 
the five indictor risk perception factor.  This resulted in a final measurement model that 
had a good fit to the data based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (18, N = 
553) = 43.33, p < .01; CFI = .99; SRMR = .02; RMSEA = .05.  In the final model, clarity 
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was now measured with three items (Cronbach‘s alpha reliability = .84, M = 4.36, SD = 
2.28, Mdn = 4.00, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 9.00) and risk perception was measured 
with five items (Cronbach‘s alpha reliability = .95, M = 58.91, SD = 33.46, Mdn = 64.00, 
minimum = 0, maximum = 100). The unstandardized indicator loadings for each latent 
variable are provided in Table 3.  
Table 3 
 
Clarity and Risk Perception Variables with Indicator Loadings for the Evolutionary 
Measurement Model with the Study 1 Data. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




clear/unclear   1.00 (0.91)     0.84  
confusing/not confusing 0.76 (0.72)*     0.52 
vague/precise   0.83 (0.77)*     0.60 
Risk Perception 
SUS1    1.00 (0.93)*     0.86 
SUS2    1.07 (0.99)*     0.97 
SUS3    1.04 (0.97)*     0.94 
SEV1    0.87 (0.84)*     0.71 
SEV2    0.57 (.64)*     0.41 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
Appendix B includes the complete list of items.  





Evolutionary Structural Model  
 A structural model (see Figure 7) was tested to determine if reaction time and 
evidence clarity mediate the relationship between numerical format and risk perception.  
Overall, the evolutionary model was a good fit to the data based on the CFI, SRMR, and 
RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (57, N = 553) = 129.16, p < .01; CFI = .99; SRMR = .04; RMSEA 
= .05.  Therefore, it was deemed acceptable to proceed and examine the structural 
equations and path estimates (see Table 4). 
Table 4 
Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Evolutionary Model with the Study 1 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Path    Unstandardized Path Coefficients (SE) t-values 
FORM1 ---> RT            - 0.01 (0.02)             - 0.68  
 
FORM1 ---> CLARITY  0.48 (0.32)    1.52 
FORM2 ---> RT            - 0.01 (0.02)             - 0.68 
FORM2 ---> CLARITY  0.44 (0.31)    1.38 
FORM3 ---> RT   0.00 (0.02)             - 0.14 
FORM3 ---> CLARITY  0.32 (0.32)    1.02 
RT ---> RISKPER             83.05 (61.50)    1.35 
CLARITY ---> RISKPER                - 3.83 (0.66)*             - 5.83 
RISKPER ---> DEC             0.65 (0.04)*             18.37 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  FORM1 = simple frequency, FORM2 = natural frequency, FORM3 = percent, RT 
= reaction time, RISKPER =  risk perception, DEC = decision 






Evolutionary Model Hypotheses 
The full evolutionary perspective structural model is provided in Figure 7. Two 
research questions and three hypotheses were proposed for the evolutionary model.  
Research question 1 asked if people would make faster risk evaluations when provided 
with frequency information than when provided with information in other numerical 
formats.  In this study, numerical presentation format did not have a statistically 
significant main effect on reaction time. The paths from the numerical format dummy 
variables to the reaction time variable were not statistically significant; meaning, the 
average time participants spent making risk evaluations did not differ statistically 
between experimental groups. The means and standard deviations are provided in Table 
5.  
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Reaction Time by Numerical Format. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Numerical Format    Mean Time in Milliseconds (SD) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Simple frequency    7995.65 (2531.91) 
Natural frequency    7687.83 (2923.834)   
Percent     8034.30 (3144.08)   
Probability     8184.37 (4293.82) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Research question 2 asked if processing speed would influence risk perception. In 
this study, reaction time did not have a direct effect on risk perception; the path between 
reaction time and risk perception was not statistically significant (β = 83.05, SE = 61.50, t 
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= 1.35).  The three evolutionary model hypotheses were then tested. Hypothesis 1 
predicted that when risk evidence was presented in a frequency format the evidence 
would be rated clear than when the evidence was presented as percentages or 
probabilities. This hypothesis was not supported by these data. Numerical format did not 
a have a statistically significant main effect on evidence clarity, as shown by the three 
nonsignificant coefficients in Table 4.  ANOVA results confirm this finding, F (3, 552) = 
1.08, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.006.  For clarity, no statistically significant differences were found 
between the four numerical formats.   
Hypothesis 2 predicted that clarity has a direct effect on risk perception. The data 
support this prediction.  Evidence clarity was a statistically significant predictor of risk 
perception (β = -3.83, SE = 0.66, t = -5.83). The negative sign of the path coefficient 
indicates that, as ratings of evidence clarity increased, participants reported lower risk 
perceptions.  Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted that as risk perceptions increase, decisions 
will become more risk averse. This hypothesis was also supported. Risk perception 
influenced the number of dollars participants chose to allocate to reducing a risk (β = 
0.65, SE = 0.04, t = 18.37).   The higher risk perception that participants felt, the more 





Figure 7.  Evolutionary Structural Model with Standardized Path Coefficients with the 
Study 1 Data.  In the model the simple frequency, natural frequency, and percentage 
variables represent three dummy variables that can be compared to the fourth message 
condition, probability. 
* p < .05 
 
Affective Processing Measurement Model 
 The affective processing measurement model included three latent variables 
(affect, vividness, and risk perception).  Two pairs of vividness indicators had perfect 
1.00 correlations (defined/intense and sharp/vivid).  As a result, the indicators intense and 
vivid were removed from the model before estimation.  The first estimation of the 
measurement model showed a poor fit to the data, χ
2
 (167, N = 553) = 2642.74, p < .01; 
CFI = .77; SRMR = .16; RMSEA = .16. Standardized residuals were examined and 
AFFECT2, AFFECT3, AFFECT5, AFFECT7, AFFECT8, AFFECT9, VIVIDNESS7, 
VIVIDNESS8, and SEV3 were removed from the model (these items are provided in 
Appendix B).  As in the evolutionary model, the measurement error between SEV1 and 
SEV2 was allowed to covary. These items share a similar question stem and allowing the 
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measurement errors between these items to covary improved the overall fit of the model.   
This resulted in a final measurement model with three latent variables and 10 indicators.  
This model had an acceptable fit based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA fit indices and 
was retained, χ
2
 (31, N = 553) = 97.27, p < .01; CFI = .98; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .06.  
In the final model vividness was measured with three indicators (Cronbach‘s alpha 
reliability = .60, M = 37.54, SD = 25.21, Mdn = 36.67, minimum = 0, maximum = 100) 
and affect was measured with two indictors (r = .47, p < .01, M = 2.66, SD = 1.52, Mdn = 
2.50, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 8.50). 
Table 6 
 
Affect, Vividness, and Risk Perception Variables with Indicator Loadings for the Affective 
Processing Measurement Model with the Study 1 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




negative/positive   0.64 (0.58)    0.34 
undesirable/desirable   1.00 (0.81)*    0.65 
Vividness 
detailed    1.00 (0.89)*    0.79 
vivid     0.77 (0.55)*    0.30 
fuzzy     0.49 (0.36)*    0.13 
Risk Perception 
 SUS1     0.93 (0.93)*    0.86 
 SUS2     1.00 (0.99)    0.97 
 SUS3     0.97 (0.97)*    0.94 
 SEV1     0.81 (0.84)*    0.70 
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 SEV2     0.53 (.64)*    0.41 
________________________________________________________________________
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
Appendix B includes the complete list of items. 
*p < .05 
 
Affective Processing Structural Model 
 The affective processing structural model predicted that reaction time, affect, and 
vividness mediate the relationship between the exogenous variables numerical format and 
numeracy and the endogenous variables risk perception and risk related decision. Overall, 
the data fit this model reasonably well based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA indices, χ
2
 
(105, N = 553) = 276.35, p < .01; CFI = .97; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .05.  Table 7 
provides the structural equations and path estimates for the model. 
Table 7 




Path     Unstandardized Path Coefficients (SE)        t-values 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
FORM1 ---> RT              0.03 (0.02)              1.55 
FORM1 ---> AFFECT                        0.07 (0.09)                         0.76
 
FORM1 ---> VIVIDNESS                       - 0.33 (1.66)                        - 0.20 
FORM2 ---> RT    0.03 (0.02)    1.55 
FORM2 ---> AFFECT            - 0.09 (0.09)             - 0.92 
FORM2 ---> VIVIDNESS   0.15 (1.65)    0.09 
FORM3 ---> RT             - 0.01 (0.02)             - 0.48 
FORM3 ---> AFFECT                        0.14 (0.10)                        1.40 
FORM3 ---> VIVIDNESS   1.70 (1.69)    1.01 
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ONUM ---> RT             - 0.01 (0.01)             - 1.13 
ONUM ---> AFFECT                             - 0.08 (0.04)             - 1.86 
ONUM ---> VIVIDNESS                  0.78 (0.69)               1.13 
SNUM ---> RT    0.00 (0.01)    0.11 
SNUM ---> AFFECT                             - 0.04 (0.03)                      - 1.36 
SNUM ---> VIVIDNESS                            - 0.40 (0.47)                        - 0.87 
FORMxONUM ---> RT   0.00 (0.00)             - 0.08 
FORMxONUM ---> AFFECT                      0.04 (0.02)*                          2.35 
FORMxONUM ---> VIVIDNESS               - 0.11 (0.25)                        - 0.44  
RT ---> RISKPER             - 56.92 (47.06)                        - 1.21 
AFFECT ---> RISKPER            - 15.30 (2.23)*             - 6.85 
VIVIDNESS ---> RISKPER                       - 0.10 (0.13)                        - 0.74 
RISKPER ---> DEC             0.65 (0.04)*    18.34  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  FORM1 = simple frequency, FORM2 = natural frequency, FORM3 = percent, RT 
= reaction time, RISKPER = risk perception, DEC = decision, SNUM = subjective 
numeracy, ONUM = objective numeracy, FORMxONUM = interaction term 
*p < .05  
 
 
Affective Processing Model Hypotheses 
 The affective processing structural model is presented in Figure 9. Hypothesis 4 
predicted that numerical format would yield a main effect on reaction time. People should 
make faster risk evaluations with frequency evidence than evidence presented in other 
numerical formats. This hypothesis was not supported.  The paths between the 
experimental conditions and the reaction time variable were not statistically significant 
(see Table 7).  
70 
 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted that numerical format would yield main effects on 
both affect and vividness.  Overall, numerical format did not influence vividness or affect 
in this study.  As shown in Table 7, the paths between the numerical format dummy 
variables and vividness and the numerical format dummy variables and affect were not 
statistically significant.  ANOVA results confirm these findings.  Overall, there were no 
statistically significant differences between numerical formats for affect (F (3, 552) = 
1.54, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.008) or vividness (F (3, 552) = 0.95, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.005). The data 
from the image listing task support the conclusion that numerical format did not influence 
the reported vividness of the risks.  In this study, no statistically significant differences 
were found between the experimental conditions and positivity of the reported images (F 
(3, 536) = .50, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.003), clarity of the reported images (F (3, 540) = .96, p > 
.05, η
2
 = 0.003), or intensity of the reported images (F (3, 532) = .12, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.003).   
Hypothesis 7 predicted that numeracy would yield a main effect on reaction time.  
This hypothesis was not supported. Neither objective numeracy (β = - 0.01, SE = 0.01, t = 
- 1.13) nor preference for numerical information (β = 0.00, SE = 0.01, t = 0.11) had 
significant direct effects on the reaction time variable. When high and low objective 
numeracy were compared using the numeracy median split variable, the two groups did 
not differ statistically (t = -1.23, SE = .01, df = 551, p > .05).   
Hypothesis 8 predicted that numeracy would yield a main effect on affect, such 
that people with lower numeracy would experience more negative affect from numerical 
risk information. This hypothesis was not supported by the causal model. Neither 
objective numeracy (β = - 0.08, SE = 0.04, t = -1.86), nor preference for numerical 
information (β = - 0.04, SE = 0.03, t = -1.36) had a direct influence on affect in the 
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model. However, when a median split was used to compare higher objective numeracy to 
lower objective numeracy, statistically significant differences were found for reported 
affects (t = 2.11, SE = .09, df = 551,  p < .05).  People with higher numeracy (M = 4.18, 
SD = 1.10) experienced more positive/neutral affect; whereas, people with lower 
objective numeracy reported more negative affect (M = 3.97, SD = 1.18).  On the affect 
scale, 1.00 is negative affect and 9.00 is positive affect.  
Hypothesis 9 predicted that numeracy would have a main effect on vividness, 
such that people with higher numeracy would report more vividness from numerical 
information than people with lower numeracy. This hypothesis was not supported; neither 
objective numeracy (β = 0.78, SE = 0.69, t = 1.13), nor preference for numerical 
information (β = - 0.40, SE = 0.47, t = - 0.87) directly influenced vividness. When higher 
and lower objective numeracy were compared using a median split, no statistically 
significant differences were found for vividness (t = 0.78, SE = 2.14, df = 551, p > .05).  
Hypothesis 10 predicted that numerical format and numeracy would interact to influence 
reaction time. This prediction was not supported by the data (β = 0.00, SE = 0.00, t =        
-0.08).  ANOVA results using the median split variable corroborate this result, F (3, 553) 
= 1.10, p > .05.   
Hypothesis 11 predicted that numerical format and numeracy would interact to 
influence affect.  Specifically, it was predicted that people with lower numeracy would 
report more negative affect from frequency information, compared to information 
presented in other numerical formats. The numerical format by numeracy interaction term 
did have a direct effect on reported affect (β = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t = 2.35).  To determine 
the nature of the interaction, a follow up test using ANOVA was conducted employing 
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the objective numeracy variable with a median split.  The ANOVA revealed statistically 
significant differences between the simple frequency format and the probability format 
on the affect variable, F (1, 273) = 3.58, p < .05, η
2
 = 0.01. For those with higher 
numeracy, probability information yielded more positive affect.  For those with lower 
numeracy, simple frequencies yielded more positive affect ratings.  This interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 8 below.  
 
 
Figure 8. Numerical Format by Numeracy Interaction 
 
Although, the effect is small and 5.00-6.20 represents a neutral position on the 1 
(negative affect) to 9 (positive affect) scale, this finding contradicts the prediction made 
by Peters et al., 2006.  Peters et al. predicted that people with high numeracy will have no 
differences in affect based on evidence format.  
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Hypothesis 12 predicted that numerical format and numeracy would interact to 
influence the amount of vividness reported. This hypothesis was not supported by these 
data.  The objective numeracy by format interaction term did not directly influence 
vividness (β = - 0.11, SE = 0.25, t = - 0.44).   ANOVA results, using the objective 
numeracy median split variable, support this result, F (3, 552) = 0.07, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.004.  
Hypothesis 13 predicted that reaction time would influence risk perception. This 
hypothesis was not supported; the path from reaction time to risk perception was not 
statistically significant (β = -56.92, SE = 47.06, t = - 1.21).  Hypothesis 14 predicted that 
affect would influence risk perception, such that negative affect (low on the scale) would 
be related to higher risk perceptions (high on the scale). This prediction was supported by 
the data.  An increase in negative affect caused higher risk perceptions (β = -15.30, SE = 
2.23, t = - 6.85).  Hypothesis 15 predicted that vividness of the risk would influence risk 
perception, such that higher perceived vividness would lead to higher risk perceptions. 
The prediction was not supported; vividness did not have a direct influence on risk 
perception in the model (β = - 0.10, SE = 0.13, t = 0.74).   Finally, Hypothesis 16 
predicted that risk perception would influence risk related decisions.  This hypothesis was 
supported.  Risk perception did influence the amount of money allocated (β = 0.65, SE = 
0.04, t = 18.34). The positive sign of the path coefficient indicates that participants who 
had higher risk perceptions allocated more money to reducing the risk (more money on 




Figure 9.  The Affective Processing Structural Model with Standardized Path 
Coefficients with the Study 1 Data.  In the model the simple frequency, natural 
frequency, and percentage variables represent three dummy variables that can be 
compared to the fourth message condition, probability. 
* p < .05 
 
Integrated Measurement Model  
 The integrated measurement model combined the mediating variables from both 
the evolutionary model and the affective processing model.  This model included four 
latent mediating variables (clarity, affect, vividness, and risk perception).  Overall, the 
measurement model had a good fit to the data based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA fit 
indices, χ
2





Clarity, Affect, Vividness, and Risk Perception Variables with Indicator Loadings for the 
Integrated Measurement Model with the Study 1 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 





clear/unclear    1.00 (0.90)    0.81 
 confusing/not confusing  0.77 (0.72)*    0.51 
vague/precise    0.86 (0.79)*    0.63 
Affect 
 negative/positive   0.71 (0.62)*    0.38 
 undesirable/desirable   1.00 (0.76)    0.58 
Vividness 
detailed    1.00 (0.78)    0.61  
vivid     0.86 (0.54)    0.29 
fuzzy     0.75 (0.49)    0.24 
Risk Perception 
 SUS1     0.93 (0.93)*    0.86 
 SUS2     1.00 (0.99)*    0.97 
 SUS3     0.97 (0.97)*    0.94 
 SEV1     0.81 (0.84)*    0.70 
 SEV2     0.53 (0.64)*    0.41 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
Appendix B includes the complete list of items.  
*p < .05 
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Integrated Structural Model 
 To determine if reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness mediate the 
relationship between the exogenous variables numerical format and numeracy and the 
endogenous variable risk perception, a structural model was tested. As in the previous 
models, the measurement error between SEV1 and SEV2 was allowed to covary.  The 
integrated structural model showed a promising, but unacceptable fit to the Study 1 data, 
χ
2
 (153, N = 553) = 670.47, p < .01; CFI = .94; SRMR = .10; RMSEA = .08.   Based on 
the modification indices, the errors between vividness and clarity were allowed to covary. 
These variables were very highly correlated (r = .55, p < .05).  This high correlation was 
most likely due to measurement error.  It was likely very difficult for participants to rate 
the clarity for the evidence and the vividness of the risk independently. Future research 
should improve upon the measurement of these two variables.  Theoretically these are 
independent constructs, but the measurement error caused them to be highly correlated. 
This modifications improved the overall fit of the model, χ
2
 (151, N = 553) = 413.87, p < 
.01; CFI = .97; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .05.   Table 9 provides the structural equations 
and path estimates for the model. 
Table 9 
Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Integrated Model with the Study 1 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




FORM1 ---> RT            - 0.04 (0.02)            - 1.82   
FORM1 ---> CLARITY  0.46 (0.31)   1.47  
FORM1 ---> AFFECT            0.08 (0.08)             0.94 
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FORM1 ---> VIVIDNESS            0.92 (2.42)             0.38 
FORM2 ---> RT             0.03 (0.02)             1.79   
FORM2 ---> CLARITY  0.39 (0.31)   1.23 
FORM2 ---> AFFECT           - 0.07 (0.08)            - 0.84 
FORM2 ---> VIVIDNESS           1.76 (2.42)            0.73   
FORM3 ---> RT            - 0.01 (0.02)            - 0.39 
FORM3 ---> CLARITY  0.31 (0.31)             1.00 
FORM3 ---> AFFECT            0.12 (0.09)             1.39 
FORM3 ---> VIVIDNESS            3.24 (2.44)   1.33 
ONUM ---> RT                    - 0.01 (0.01)            - 1.27 
ONUM ---> CLARITY        0.09 (0.13)    0.71 
ONUM ---> AFFECT                    - 0.07 (0.04)            - 1.89 
ONUM ---> VIVIDNESS            1.18 (0.99)             1.19 
SNUM ---> RT                     0.00 (0.01)              0.13 
SNUM ---> CLARITY  0.04 (0.09)   0.47 
SNUM ---> AFFECT                    - 0.03 (0.02)            - 1.40 
SNUM ---> VIVIDNESS           - 0.25 (0.67)            - 0.37 
FORMxONUM ---> RT            0.00 (0.00)              0.19 
FORMxONUM ---> CLARITY       - 0.03 (0.05)            - 0.64 
FORMxONUM ---> AFFECT          0.03 (0.01)*        2.28 
FORMxONUM ---> VIVIDNESS   - 0.12 (0.36)            - 0.33  
RT ---> RISKPER            - 22.99 (45.52)            - 0.51  
CLARITY ---> RISKPER           - 5.55 (1.20)*            - 4.64  
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AFFECT ---> RISKPER           - 13.98 (2.16)*            - 6.48 
VIVIDNESS ---> RISKPER  0.51 (0.19)*   2.76    
RISKPER ---> DEC             0.65 (0.04)*             18.20   
_______________________________________________________________________  
Note:  FORM1 = simple frequency, FORM2 = natural frequency, FORM3 = percent, RT 
= reaction time, RISKPER = risk perception, DEC = decision, SNUM = subjective 
numeracy, ONUM = objective numeracy, FORMxONUM = interaction term 
*p < .05  
 
In addition to the predictions put forth in the previous two models, the integrated 
model included two additional paths represented by hypotheses 17 and 18 (the full 
integrated structural model with standardized path coefficients is provided in Figure 10). 
Hypothesis 17 predicted that numeracy would yield a main effect on clarity, such that 
people with higher numeracy would rate the numerical evidence as clearer than people 
with lower numeracy.  This hypothesis was not supported.  Neither objective (β = 0.09, 
SE = 0.13, t = 0.71) nor subjective numeracy (β = - 0.03, SE = 0.05, t = - 0.64) had a 
statistically significant influence on perceived evidence clarity. Hypothesis 18 predicted 
that numerical format and numeracy would interact to influence perceived evidence 
clarity, such that low numerate people would rate the evidence as clearer when it was 
presented in frequency format.  In contrast, people with high numeracy should have no 
clarity differences based on format. Hypothesis 18 was not supported. Numeracy and 
format did not interact to influence perceived evidence clarity (β = 0.04, SE = 0.09, t = 
0.47).   
As in the previous models clarity and affect had a direct influence on risk 
perception.  When vividness was allowed to covary with clarity, the path between 
vividness and risk perception became statistically significant. Again, risk perception had 




Figure 10.  Integrated Structural Model with Standardized Path Coefficients with the 
Study 1 Data.  In the model the simple frequency, natural frequency, and percentage 
variables represent three dummy variables that can be compared to the fourth message 
condition, probability. 
* p < .05 
 
Summary of Study 1 
 Overall, frequencies, percentages, and probabilities did not differentially 
influence reaction time, clarity, affect, or vividness.  Numeracy did not have a main effect 
on the mediating variables tested in the models.  The objective numeracy and format 
interaction term did have a direct influence on affect.  However, the results did not 
support the predictions of the theory.  It was predicted that people with high objective 
numeracy would have no differences in affect due to format.  In this study, people with 
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higher objective numeracy reported more positive affect when given probability 
information than when provided simple frequency information. The mediating variables, 
clarity, affect, and vividness had direct effects on risk perception.  Also, in all three 
models, risk perception directly influenced the risk related decision.  
 The three models from Study 1 were compared using the Expected Cross-
Validation Index (ECVI). This index can be used to compare models that are not nested. 
ECVI coefficients can take any value, therefore no potential range of values exists 
(Byrne, 1998).  This index is computed for each model and the values can then be 
compared.  The evolutionary model, affective model, and integrated model had ECVI 
indices of 0.36, 0.74, and 1.04 respectively.  The model with the smallest ECVI has the 
greatest potential for replication (Byrne, 1998).  It is important to note that ECVI does 
not compare the models statistically; this index compares the overall fit of the models. In 
addition, this index favors small and parsimonious models; which explains the preference 
of the evolutionary model. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a second option for 
comparing candidate models. The preferred model had the lowest AIC value.  The 
evolutionary model, affective model, and integrated model had AIC indices of 197.16, 
408.35, and 573.87 respectively.  Again, based on this index the evolutionary model is 








Chapter VI: Study 2  
Method 
Overview 
Study 2 was replication of Study 1 using the messages adapted from the Slovic et 
al. (2000) ―Mr. Jones‖ study.  After reading a vignette about a University of Maryland 
student, Taylor Jones, participants were asked to make risk perceptions and risk related 
decisions regarding Taylor Jones‘ future at the University. Data collection for Study 2 
was carried at the University of Maryland between November 2010 and December 2010.  
The data from Study 2 was used to test all three proposed causal models (the evolutionary 
model, the affective processing model, and the integrated model) and test the predictions 
of the corresponding hypotheses.   
Participants 
Participants were 395 students at the University of Maryland.  Females made up 
53.00% of the sample and the mean age was 19.90 (SD = 2.06, Mdn = 20.00, minimum = 
18, maximum = 46).  Most participants were White or Caucasian (62.50%), 15.40% were 
Asian or Pacific Islander, 12.40% were Black or African American, 3.80% were Hispanic 
or Latino, 1.80% were Middle Eastern, 2.80% indicted  more than race or ethnicity, and 
1.30% of participants did not provide a response to this open ended question. In the 
sample, 22.80% of the participants were freshman, 28.70% were sophomores, 18.0% 
were juniors, 29.90% were seniors, and 0.05% were graduate students.  Participants 
signed up to participate in the study using the Department of Communication‘s online 
participant pool.  To increase the diversity in the sample, students were asked to bring a 
friend to the study who was not a communication major.  In the final sample, 30.10% of 
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the students were communication majors.  Students in the participant pool received 
course credit in exchange for their participation in this study and any student who could 
not receive course credit had the option of entering a drawing for a $200 gift card.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one the four numerical format conditions. 
After completing an informed consent form, participants were seated at a computer 
station and read a vignette about Taylor Jones, a University of Maryland student who was 
expelled from the University and is now applying to be re-admitted.
  
 At the end of the 
vignette, participants were given piece of risk evidence that varied by condition. 
Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition by the DirectRT 
computer program.  Both the researcher and the participants were blind to the 
experimental condition.  The vignette was identical in all four conditions, except for the 
format of the numerical evidence. Participants were told that the risk evidence came from 
an expert psychological evaluation of Taylor Jones.  After reading the vignette, 
participants completed measures of the dependent variables of interest as well as 
demographic questions. The complete study protocol is provided in Appendix C.  
Independent Variables 
Experimental Conditions  
The risk evidence in the message was modified from Slovic et al. (2000).
3
 The 
only modifications to the original messages were the change of topic and the change to 
the patient‘s name. Risk evidence was provided in one of four numerical formats: a 
natural frequency, a simple frequency, a probability, and a percentage.  Participants in the 
percentage condition read:   
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Taylor Jones, a University of Maryland student, was expelled for committing a 
violent act on campus. Jones has been treated at a mental health facility for 
violent behavior. Currently, Jones has applied to be re-admitted to the University 
of Maryland.  A psychologist has done a state-of-the art assessment of Jones.  
Among the conclusions reached in the psychologist‘s assessment is the following: 
 
Patients similar to Taylor Jones are estimated to have a 10% probability of  
committing another act of violence.  
 
University officials are currently deciding if Jones will be allowed to return to the 
University. 
 
In the natural frequency condition, participants read: ―Of every 100 patients similar to 
Taylor Jones, 10 are estimated to commit another act of violence‖. In the simple 
frequency condition, participants read: ―Of every 10 patients similar to Taylor Jones, 1 is 
estimated to commit another act of violence‖.  Finally, in the probability condition 
participants read:  ―Patients similar to Taylor Jones have a 0.10 probability of committing 
another act of violence‖.   
Numeracy 
 The same objective numeracy scale described in Study 1 was used in Study 2.  In 
this sample, scores ranged from 2 to 15 (M = 11.19, SD = 2.26, Mdn = 12).  Again, 
objective numeracy was included as a continuous variable in most analyses. When 
indicated, a median split was used to examined differences between higher and lower 
numeracy groups (high numeracy = scores 12 – 15, low numeracy = scores 2 – 11).    
Preference for numerical information was also measured using the scale described in 
Study 1. In this sample, the mean score was 6.08 (SD = 1.42, Mdn = 6.23, minimum = 
1.62, maximum = 9) in this sample.  Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for these 13 items was 
.86.   As in Study 1, subjective numeracy was correlated with objective numeracy (r = 
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.42, p < .01).  In the same manner described in Study 1, a numerical format by objective 
numeracy interaction term was created for use in the causal models.  
Dependent Variables 
Evidence Clarity 
Hample‘s (2006) eight item scale discussed in Study 1 was used as a measure of 
evidence clarity.  Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for the Hample scale was .90 (M = 4.43, 
SD = 1.70, Mdn = 4.38, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 9.00). 
Vividness 
Vividness was measured with seven items used in Study 1. Cronbach‘s alpha 
reliability for these seven items was .83 (M = 38.46, SD = 19.68, Mdn = 37.14, minimum 
= 0, maximum = 100).  
Thought Listing  
The same thought listing procedure described in Study 1 was used in this study. 
The mean rating on the negative/positive scale was 36.34 (SD = 21.47, minimum = 0, 
maximum = 100).  The mean rating on the fuzzy/clear scale was 66.54 (SD = 18.84, 
minimum = 0, maximum = 100) and the mean rating on the weak/strong intensity scale 
was 63.19 (SD = 17.83, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 100).  The average number of 
words used for each image was 5.53 (SD = 4.26).  The mean number of words used in the 
entire image listing task for all five images was 27.29 (SD = 21.29, minimum = 5.00, 
maximum = 118.00).   
Affect 
Affect was measured with the same nine semantic differential items adapted from 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, Yu, and Rhodes (2004). Items included: positive/negative, bad/good, 
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beneficial/harmful, safe/unsafe, wise/foolish, undesirable/desirable, tense/calm, 
annoyed/pleased, and delighted/disgusted.  Participants were asked to respond to the 
statement, ―Having Taylor Jones at the University of Maryland is.‖  A high score reflects 
positive affect and a low score reflects negative affect.  Cronbach‘s alpha reliability was 
.98 (M = 3.29, SD = 1.39, Mdn = 4.11, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 8.56).  
Risk Perception  
Slovic et al.‘s (2000) one item, ―Would you describe Taylor Jones as being at 
high risk, medium risk, or low risk of harming someone?‖ was used to measure risk 
perception.  As Slovic et al. had done, high risk, medium risk, and low risk were coded as 
1, 2, and 3 respectively.  Overall, 18.20% of participants rated Jones as low risk, 62.30% 
rated Jones as medium risk, and 19.50% rated Jones as high risk.  
In addition, perceived susceptibility was measured with three items (how certain 
are you that Taylor Jones will commit another act of violence, what is the chance that 
Taylor Jones will commit another act of violence, and how likely is Taylor Jones to 
commit another act of violence).  Participants responded using a scale from 0 (impossible 
to happen) to 100 (certain to happen).  Perceived severity was also measured with three 
items (―What is the risk of Taylor Jones committing another violent act?‖, ―How 
dangerous is Taylor Jones?‖, and ―How serious is Taylor Jones‘ violent behavior?‖).  
Participants responded on a scale from 0 (no risk) to 100 (high risk).  A high score 
indicates high perceived risk.  Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for the six items was .90 (M = 





Risk Related Decisions 
After completing two practice items, participants responded to five decision 
questions using button boxes attached to their computers. Participants were asked, ―How 
much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: Taylor Jones should not be 
allowed to re-apply to the University of Maryland; Speaking as a student at the 
University of Maryland, I think Taylor Jones should be re-admitted; If it were my 
decision, I would re-admit Taylor Jones to the University of Maryland; Once a student is 
expelled, he or she should never be re-admitted to the University of Maryland; University 
of Maryland administrators should re-admit Taylor Jones‖ (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = 
strongly agree).  Items were coded so that a high score reflects an opinion that Taylor 
Jones should not be allowed to return to the University of Maryland (risk averse). 
Cronbach‘s alpha reliability for these five items was .87 (M = 4.72, SD = 1.90, Mdn = 
4.60, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 9.00).    
Reaction Time 
 Reaction time was operationalized as the time in milliseconds it took respondents 
to answer the six risk perception questions described above. Speed in milliseconds was 
measured and recorded for each question. A mean reaction time score was calculated for 
each participant and this reaction time variable was included in the causal model (M = 
8067.59, SD = 4045.16, Mdn = 7438.20, minimum = 2252.00, maximum = 59949.60).   
As in Study 1, reaction time items had to be transformed to reduce skewness. A 
logarithmic transformation was used, reducing the skewness from 5.94 to 0.50.  When 




Study 2 Results  
This section presents the primary data analysis of the Study 2 data.  First, a 
replication of Slovic et al. (2000) will be described followed by the tests of the 
hypotheses with the Study 2 data. The Study 2 data was prepared and analyzed using the 
same procedure described in the Study 1 data analysis plan (provided in the previous 
chapter).  
Replication of Slovic et al.  
 Before detailing the results with regard to this dissertation‘s specific hypotheses, 
analyses were conducted to assess the replicability of Slovic et al.‘s findings.  In the 
Slovic et al. (2000) ―Mr. Jones‖ study, participants were mailed a written questionnaire 
with a vignette describing a psychiatric patient named James Jones. Jones was being 
treated at a mental health facility for committing a violent act.  Participants were 
provided with numerical evidence (as a frequency or a percentage) about the risk of 
James Jones committing another violent act. After reading the vignette, participants were 
asked to rate James Jones as high risk, medium risk, or low risk.  
Participants in Study 2 were asked the Slovic et al. (2000) question about Taylor 
Jones, the student in the Study 2 vignette (―Would you describe Taylor Jones as being at 
high risk, medium risk, or low risk of harming someone?‖).  Following Slovic et al., the 
low risk, medium risk, and high risk judgments were coded as 1, 2, 3 respectively and 
means were calculated for each condition (see Table 10). In Study 2, the omnibus F test 
was statistically significant, F (3, 394) = 2.76, p < .05, η
2
 = 0.02.  A post hoc least 
squares difference (LSD) test showed that participants in the probability (.10 probability) 
condition were  more likely to evaluate Taylor Jones as low risk than participants in the 
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percent (10%) condition (M = 2.07, p < .05) and participants in the natural frequency (10 
in 100) condition (M = 2.13, p < .01).     
Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for Risk Judgments by Numerical Format 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Numerical Format     Mean (SD) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Percent (10%)      2.07 (0.61)
b 
Natural Frequency (10 out of 100)   2.13 (0.62)
c 
Simple Frequency (1 out of 10)   2.00 (0.60)
 
Probability (0.10 probability)    1.89 (0.61)
a 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  a is statistically smaller than b (p < .05) and a is statistically smaller than c (p < 
.01) 
 
The Study 2 results replicate the Slovic et al. (2000) findings.  The original study 
found that risk judgments were lower for the 10% condition than the 10 out of 100 
condition.  Furthermore, Slovic et al. found no statistical differences between the 10% 
condition and the 1 in 10 condition.  Overall, evidence presented in a frequency format 
led to higher risk perceptions, than evidence presented as a probability or a percentage.  
Evolutionary Measurement Model 
 The evolutionary measurement model included three latent variables (clarity, risk 
perception, and risk related decisions).  The first estimation of the measurement model 
showed a poor fit, χ
2
 (149, N = 395) = 681.04, p < .01; CFI= .94; SRMR = .06; RMSEA 
= .09. The standardized residuals and modification indices were examined to look for 
ways to improve the fit of the measurement model. One decision item (DEC4) and one 
risk perception item (SEV3) were removed from the model.  The largest modification 
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indices were between the items CLARITY1 and CLARITY4, CLARITY2 and 
CLARITY3, and SUS2 and SUS3.  To improve model fit, the measurement errors 
between these variables were allowed to covary.  These pairs of variables share question 
stems and allowing the measurement error to covary improved model fit. This resulted in 
a final measurement model that showed a good fit to the data based on the CFI, SRMR, 
and RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (113, N = 395) = 265.38, p < .01; CFI = .98; SRMR = .04; 
RMSEA = .06.  In the final measurement model, risk perception had five indicators 
(Cronbach‘s alpha reliability = .92, M = 38.46, SD = 21.62, Mdn = 36.00, minimum = 
5.00, maximum = 99.00) and the latent decision variable had four indicators (Cronbach‘s 
alpha reliability = .92, M = 4.46, SD = 2.06, Mdn = 4.50, minimum = 1.00, maximum = 
9.00).  All eight measured clarity indicators were retained.  
Table 11 
Clarity and Risk Perception Variables with Indicator Loadings for the Evolutionary 
Model with the Study 2 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 






clear/unclear     1.00 (0.76)   0.57  
confusing/not confusing   1.02 (0.68)*   0.46 
hard to understand/easy    0.98 (0.66)*   0.44 
vague/precise     0.88 (0.71)*   0.51 
not a noticeable point/a noticeable point 0.98 (0.74)*   0.55 
weak/strong     1.00 (0.84)*   0.70 
abstract/concrete    0.86 (0.65)*   0.42 
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not relevant to the conclusion/relevant…  0.75 (0.62)*   0.38 
Risk Perception 
SUS1      1.00 (0.86)*   0.75 
 SUS2      0.98 (0.83)*   0.69 
 SUS3      1.01 (0.87)*   0.75 
 SEV1      1.08 (0.82)*   0.67 
 SEV2      0.87 (0.74)*   0.55 
Risk Related Decisions 
 DEC1      1.00 (0.66)*   0.44  
 DEC2      1.22 (0.89)*   0.79  
 DEC3      1.32 (0.95)*   0.90 
 DEC5      1.27 (.95)*   0.91 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
Appendix C includes the complete list of items. 
*p < .05 
 
Evolutionary Structural Model 
 To determine if reaction processing time and evidence clarity mediate the 
relationship between numerical format and numeracy and risk perception, the structural 
evolutionary model was tested. Overall, the evolutionary model had a good fit to the 
Study 2 data based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (178, N = 395) = 
359.57, p < .01; CFI = .98; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .05.  As suggested in the 
measurement model phase, the measurement error between CLARITY2 and CLARITY3, 
CLARITY1 and CLARITY4, and SUS2 and SUS3 were allowed to covary. These pairs 
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of items contained similar question stems. Table 12 provides the structural equations and 
path estimates for the evolutionary model. 
Table 12 
Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Evolutionary Model with the Study 2 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




FORM1 ---> RT                         - 0.02 (0.02)             - 0.77   
FORM1 ---> CLARITY  0.09 (0.25)    0.35 
FORM2 ---> RT                        0.01 (0.02)              0.38 
FORM2 ---> CLARITY  0.44 (0.26)    1.70 
FORM3 ---> RT                       0.01 (0.02)              0.45 
FORM3 ---> CLARITY  0.32 (0.24)    1.35 
RT ---> RISKPER                       - 60.65 (97.87)                  0.62 
CLARITY ---> RISKPER                - 2.23 (0.70)*             - 3.19 
RISKPER ---> DEC                        0.04 (0.00)*            8.76 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  FORM1 = 10%, FORM2 = 10 in 100, FORM3 = 1 in10, RT = reaction time, 
RISKPER = risk perception, DEC = decision 
*p < .05  
 
The entire evolutionary structural model with the Study 2 data is illustrated in 
Figure 11. Research question 1 asked if people would make faster risk evaluations when 
provided with frequency evidence, than when provided with evidence in other formats.  
In this study, numerical format did not have a statistically significant influence on 
reaction time. The average time participants took to make risk assessments did not differ 
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statistically between groups, F (3, 394) = 0.39, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.003.  The means and 
standard deviations for reaction time are provided in Table 13.  
Table 13 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Reaction Time with the Study 2 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Numerical Format    Mean Time in Milliseconds (SD) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Percent     7821.66 (3497.51) 
Natural Frequency    8204.89 (3317.09) 
Simple Frequency    8348.08 (5590.33)   




Research question 2 asked: Will processing speed influence risk perception? The 
results show that the path between reaction time and risk perception was not statistically 
significant (β = -60.65, SE = 97.87, t = - 0.62). Reaction time did not have a statistically 
significant influence on risk perception. Hypothesis 1 predicted that when risk 
information was presented in a frequency format the evidence would be rated clearer than 
when it was presented as a percentage or probability. Overall, no statistically significant 
differences were found between the experimental conditions in regards to evidence 
clarity.  Table 12 shows that the paths between the experimental condition dummy 
variables and the latent evidence clarity variable are not statistically significant.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that clarity would have a direct influence on risk perception. This 
prediction was consistent with the data.  Evidence clarity did have a direct, negative, 
linear effect on risk perception in the model (β = -2.23, SE = 0.70, t = -3.19).  Lower 
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clarity ratings were associated with higher risk perception. Finally, Hypothesis 3 
predicted that as risk perceptions increase, decisions will become more risk averse. This 
hypothesis was also supported; risk perception did directly influence the participants risk 
related decisions (β = 0.04, SE = 0.00, t = 8.76).  People, who felt that the risk presented 
by Taylor Jones was high, did not want him back on campus (as indicated by higher 
scores on the decision variable). 
 
Figure 11. Evolutionary Structural Model with Standardized Path Coefficients with the 
Study 2 Data.  In the model the percentage, natural frequency, and simple frequency 
variables represent three dummy variables that can be compared to the fourth message 
condition, probability. 
 * p < .05 
 
 
Affective Processing Measurement Model 
 The affective processing measurement model included four latent variables 
(affect, vividness, risk perception, and risk related decisions).  Based on the fit of the 
evolutionary measurement model, SEV3 and DEC4 were not included in this model.  
Again, the errors between SUS2 and SUS3 were allowed to covary. The first estimation 
of the affective measurement model showed a borderline fit to the data based on the CFI 
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and SRMR fit indices, χ
2
 (268, N = 395) = 724.41, p < .01; CFI= .97; SRMR = .07; 
RMSEA = .07. Standardized residuals and modification indices were examined to look 
for ways to improve the fit of the measurement model.  The largest modification indices 
were between AFFECT8 and AFFECT9 and AFFECT1 and AFFECT2.  To improve 
model fit, the measurement errors between these variables were allowed to covary (these 
items shared similar question stems). This resulted in a final measurement model that had 
a good fit to the data based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (266, N = 395) 
= 586.99, p < .01; CFI = .99; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .05.   
Table 14 
Affect, Vividness, Risk Perception, and Decision Variables with Indicator Loadings for 
the Affective Measurement Model with the Study 2 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




negative/positive   1.00 (0.87)    0.76 
 bad/good    0.97 (0.92)*    0.84 
harmful/beneficial   0.87 (0.86)*    0.73 
unsafe/safe    0.92 (0.88)*    0.77 
foolish/wise    0.97 (0.89)*    0.80 
undesirable/desirable   0.96 (0.87)*    0.75 
tense/calm    0.81 (0.75)*    0.56 
annoyed/pleased   0.85 (0.78)*    0.61 






detailed    1.08 (0.67)*    0.45  
vivid     1.39 (0.77)*    0.59 
intense     1.04 (0.56)*    0.32 
lifelike     1.01(0.51)*    0.26 
sharp     1.26 (0.74)*    0.55 
defined    1.34 (0.75)*    0.56 
fuzzy     1.00 (0.51)    0.27 
Risk Perception 
 SUS1     1.00 (0.86)    0.74 
 SUS2     0.97 (0.82)*    0.68 
 SUS3     1.01 (0.86)*    0.74 
 SEV1     1.09 (0.82)*    0.68 
 SEV2     0.89 (.75)*    0.56 
Risk Related Decisions 
 DEC1     1.00 (0.67)    0.44 
 DEC2     1.21 (0.89)*    0.79 
 DEC3     1.30 (0.95)*    0.89 
 DEC5     1.27 (0.96)*    0.91 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
Appendix C includes the complete list of items.  





Affective Processing Structural Model 
 To determine if affect and vividness mediate the relationship between the 
exogenous variables numerical format and numeracy and the endogenous variables risk 
perception and risk related decisions, the affective processing model was tested with the 
Study 2 data. Based on the measurement phased, the measurement errors between SUS2 
and SUS3, VIVIDNESS5 and VIVIDNESS6, and AFFECT8 and AFFECT9 were 
allowed to covary. These pairs of items shared similar question stems. The affective 
processing structural model had an acceptable fit to the data using the CFI and RMSEA 
fit indices, χ
2
 (431, N = 395) = 1035.48, p < .01; CFI = .97; SRMR = .12; RMSEA = .06.  
Table 15 provides the structural equations and path estimates. 
Table 15 
 




           Path   Unstandardized Path Coefficients (SE) t-values 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
FORM1 ---> RT            - 0.01 (0.02)             - 0.68 
 
FORM1 ---> AFFECT           - 0.19 (0.23)                        - 0.84
 
FORM1 ---> VIVIDNESS           - 1.48 (2.40)                        - 0.62 
FORM2 ---> RT   0.02 (0.02)    0.85 
FORM2 ---> AFFECT           - 0.28 (0.23)                        - 1.21 
FORM2 ---> VIVIDNESS  3.11 (2.47)    1.26 
FORM3 ---> RT   0.01 (0.02)              0.59 
FORM3 ---> AFFECT            - 0.06 (0.21)                        - 0.26 
FORM3 ---> VIVIDNESS  2.32 (2.27)    1.02 
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ONUM ---> RT   0.02 (0.01)*    1.97 
ONUM ---> AFFECT            - 0.12 (0.10)                        - 1.19 
ONUM ---> VIVIDNESS  0.58 (1.06)    0.55 
SNUM ---> RT   0.00 (0.00)    0.34 
SNUM ---> AFFECT   0.05 (0.06)    0.88 
SNUM ---> VIVIDNESS  1.66 (0.67)*    2.47 
FORMxONUM ---> RT  0.00 (0.00)             - 0.70 
FORMxONUM ---> AFFECT          0.02 (0.03)              0.51 
FORMxONUM ---> VIVIDNESS    - 0.44 (0.36)                        - 1.22   
RT ---> RISKPER            - 93.13 (38.96)*                    - 2.39 
AFFECT ---> RISKPER           - 7.67 (0.66)*                        - 11.68 
VIVIDNESS ---> RISKPER   0.10 (0.06)    1.65 
RISKPER ---> DEC             0.04 (0.00)*                         9.56   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  FORM1 = 10%, FORM2 = 10 in 100, FORM3 = 1 in 10, RT = reaction time, 
RISKPER = risk perception, DEC = decision, SNUM = subjective numeracy, ONUM = 
objective numeracy, FORMxONUM = interaction term 
*p < .05  
 
 
The complete affective processing structural model is illustrated in Figure 12. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that numerical format would have a main effect on reaction time. 
This prediction was not supported with the Study 2 data (Table 15 shows that the paths 
between the numerical format dummy variables and reaction time are not statistically 
significant). Hypothesis 5 predicted that numerical format would yield a main effect on 
affect, such that frequency information would cause more negative affect in receivers 
than information presented in other formats (percentages and probabilities).  The paths 
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between the numerical format dummy variables and affect were not statistically 
significant (see Table 15).  Numerical format did not significantly influence affect as 
predicted. Hypothesis 6 predicted that numerical format would yield a main effect on 
vividness, such that frequency information would produce more vividness than 
information presented in other formats (percentages and probabilities). Again, the paths 
between the experimental formats and vividness were not statistically significant in the 
model.  Numerical format did not influence vividness as predicted by the model (see 
Table 15). However, the thought listing data provides some support for this hypothesis. 
Statistically significant differences between the experimental groups were found for 
image intensity ratings, F (3, 383) = 2.80, p < .05, η
2
 = 0.02.  A post hoc least squares 
difference (LSD) test showed that the images reported by participants in the natural 
frequency condition (10 in 100) were evaluated as more intense (M = 67.96, SD = 16.82) 
than images in the percentage (10%) condition (M = 62.64, SD = 16.22, p < .05), the 
simple frequency (1 in 10) condition (M = 62.76, SD = 16.65, p < 0.05 ), and the 
probability (0.10 probability) condition (M = 60.52, SD = 20.34, p < .01).  This is 
consistent with the predictions of the affective processing theory. No statistically 
significant between group differences existed between the experimental conditions for 
positivity of the reported images (F (3, 385) = 0.58, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.002) or clarity of the 
reported images (F (3, 387) = 0.59, p > .05, η
2
 = 0.002).  
Hypothesis 7 predicted that numeracy would have a main effect on reaction time. 
This hypothesis was supported by the data (β = 0.02, SE = 0.01, t = 1.97).  The positive 
path coefficient indicates that higher numeracy is associated with a longer response time. 
ANOVA F-test results, using the objective numeracy median split variable, confirmed 
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this finding, F (1, 394) = 5.38, p < .05, η
2
 = 0.01.  People with higher objective numeracy 
(M = 8307.02, SD = 3230.22) spent more time making risk evaluations than participants 
with lower objective numeracy (M = 7801.26, SD = 4786.89).  This is consistent with the 
literature.  People with higher numeracy are more likely to spend time deliberating about 
a risk, weighing the pros and cons. People with lower numeracy lack a clear 
understanding of numbers and make faster, less deliberate evaluations. Preference for 
numerical information did not have a statistically significant influence on reaction time 
(see Table 15).  Hypothesis 8 predicted that numeracy would yield a main effect on 
affect, such that people with lower numeracy would experience more negative affect 
from numerical information than people with higher numeracy.  This hypothesis was not 
supported for objective numeracy (β = - 0.12, SE = 0.10, t = - 0.26) or preference for 
numerical information (β = 0.05, SE = 0.06, t = 0.88).   
Hypothesis 9 predicted that numeracy would have a main effect on vividness, 
such that people with higher numeracy would reported more vividness from numerical 
information, than would people with lower numeracy. The path between objective 
numeracy and vividness was not statistically significant; but, this hypothesis was 
supported with the causal model for subjective numeracy data. Preference for information 
influenced the amount of vividness reported (β = 1.66, SE = 0.67, t = 2.47).  People who 
prefer numerical information reported more vividness from the risk information in the 
vignette.  
Hypothesis 10 predicted that numerical format and numeracy would interact to 
influence reaction time. This prediction was not supported.  The path between the 
interaction term and reaction time was not statistically significant (β = 0.00, SE = 0.00, t 
100 
 
= - 0.70). Hypothesis 11 predicted that numerical format and numeracy would interact to 
influence affect, such that people with lower numeracy will report more negative affect 
from frequency information, compared to information presented in other numerical 
formats. This hypothesis was also not supported.  Numerical format and objective 
numeracy did not interact to influence affect (β = 0.02, SE = 0.03, t = 0.51). Hypothesis 
12 predicted that numerical format and objective numeracy would interact to influence 
the amount of vividness reported, such that people with lower numeracy would report 
more vividness from frequency information, compared to information presented in other 
numerical formats.  This prediction was not supported by the data (β = - 0.44, SE = 0.36, t 
= - 1.22).  
Hypothesis 13 predicted that reaction time would have a direct effect on risk 
perception.  This path was statistically significant (β = - 93.13, SE = 38.96, t = - 2.39).  
Reaction time had a direct effect on risk perception. Longer (higher) response time was 
associated with lower risk perception. People who took their time to evaluate the risk, had 
lower risk perceptions than people who made quick, affective, System 2 evaluations.  
Hypothesis 14 predicted that affect would influence risk perception, such that negative 
affect would lead to higher perceived risk. This prediction was supported with the data (β 
= -7.67, SE = 0.66, t = -11.66).  As affect decreased (became more negative) risk 
perception increased. Hypothesis 15 predicted that vividness would influence risk 
perception, such that higher vividness would lead to higher risk perception. This 
hypothesis was not supported (β = 0.10, SE = 0.06, t = 1.65). Hypothesis 16 predicted 
that risk perception would influence risk related decisions. This hypothesis was supported 
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(β = 0.04, SE = 0.00, t = 9.56).  Again, participants who evaluated the threat presented by 
Taylor Jones as high did not want him back on campus (risk aversion).  
 
Figure 12. Affective Processing Structural Model with Standardized Path Coefficients 
with the Study 2 Data. In the model the percentage, natural frequency, and simple 
frequency variables represent three dummy variables that can be compared to the fourth 
message condition, probability 
* p < .05 
 
 
Integrated Measurement Model 
 The integrated measurement model included five latent variables (clarity, affect, 
vividness, risk perception, and risk related decisions). Overall, the data had an acceptable 
fit to the measurement model based on the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (479, 




Clarity, Affect, Vividness, Risk Perception, and Decision Variables with Indicator 
Loadings for the Integrated Measurement Model with the Study 2 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




clear/unclear     1.00 (0.79)   0.62  
confusing/not confusing   0.97 (0.67)*   0.45 
hard to understand/easy…   0.92 (0.65)*   0.42 
vague/precise     0.88 (0.74)*   0.55 
not a noticeable point/a noticeable point 0.91 (0.72)*   0.51 
weak/strong     0.96 (0.84)*   0.70 
abstract/concrete    0.81 (0.64)*   0.42 
not relevant to the conclusion/relevant… 0.68 (0.59)*   0.34 
Affect 
negative/positive    1.00 (0.87)   0.76  
bad/good     0.97 (0.92)*   0.84 
harmful/beneficial    0.87 (0.86)*   0.73 
unsafe/safe     0.92 (0.88)*   0.77 
foolish/wise     0.97 (0.89)*   0.80 
undesirable/desirable    0.96 (0.87)*   0.75 
tense/calm     0.81 (0.75)*   0.56 
annoyed/pleased    0.85 (0.78)*   0.61 




detailed     1.06 (0.70)*   0.49  
vivid      1.28 (0.75)*   0.57 
intense      0.92 (0.53)*   0.28 
lifelike      0.87 (0.46)*   0.21 
sharp      1.12 (0.70)*   0.50 
defined     1.30 (0.77)*   0.60 
fuzzy      1.00 (0.55)   0.30 
Risk Perception 
 SUS1      1.00 (0.86)   0.75 
 SUS2      0.97 (0.83)*   0.68 
 SUS3      1.01 (0.86)*   0.75 
 SEV1      1.09 (0.82)*   0.68 
 SEV2      0.88 (0.75)*   0.56 
Risk Related Decisions 
 DEC1      1.00 (0.67)   0.44 
 DEC2      1.21 (0.89)*   0.79 
 DEC3      1.30 (0.95)*   0.89 
 DEC5      1.27 (0.95)*   0.91 
________________________________________________________________________
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
Appendix C includes the complete list of items.  







Integrated Structural Model 
 To determine if reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness mediate the 
relationship between the exogenous variables numerical format and numeracy and the 
endogenous variable risk perception, the integrated model was tested. The model had an 
acceptable fit to the Study 2 data based on the CFI and RMSEA fit indices, χ
2
 (698, N = 
395) = 1644.31, p < .01; CFI = .96; SRMR = .13; RMSEA = .06.  In an effort to improve 
the fit of the model, the errors between the latent variables vividness and clarity were 
allowed to covary. As in Study 1, these variables were very highly correlated (r = .52, p < 
.01).  This high correlation was most likely due to measurement error.  It was likely very 
difficult for participants to rate the clarity for the evidence and the vividness of the risk 
independently. Future research should improve upon the measurement of these two 
variables.  Theoretically these are independent constructs, but the measurement error 
causes them to be highly correlated.  This adjustment improved the overall fit of the 
model, χ
2
 (697, N = 395) = 1555.15, p < .01; CFI = .97; SRMR = .11; RMSEA = .05.   
Table 17 provides the structural equations and path estimates for the model. 
Table 17 
Unstandardized Parameter Estimates for the Integrated Model with the Study 2 Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
            Path   Unstandardized Path Coefficients (SE)      t-values 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
FORM1 ---> RT                      - 0.02 (0.02)            - 0.80  
 
FORM1 ---> CLARITY   0.10 (0.26)   0.39  
FORM1 ---> AFFECT                       - 0.19 (0.23)            - 0.84 
FORM1 ---> VIVIDNESS                       - 1.55 (2.50)            - 0.62 
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FORM2 ---> RT    0.01 (0.02)             0.71   
FORM2 ---> CLARITY   0.50 (0.27)   1.88 
FORM2 ---> AFFECT                       - 0.28 (0.23)            - 1.21 
FORM2 ---> VIVIDNESS        3.32 (2.56)            1.30   
FORM3 ---> RT                         0.01 (0.02)             0.54 
FORM3 ---> CLARITY   0.32 (0.25)   1.31 
FORM3 ---> AFFECT                       - 0.06 (0.21)            - 0.26 
FORM3 ---> VIVIDNESS   2.52 (2.36)   1.07 
ONUM ---> RT    0.02 (0.01)*    1.99 
ONUM ---> CLARITY   0.08 (0.11)   0.74 
ONUM ---> AFFECT                         - 0.12 (0.10)            - 1.19 
ONUM ---> VIVIDNESS   0.66 (1.10)   0.61 
SNUM ---> RT    0.00 (0.01)              0.09 
SNUM ---> CLARITY   0.17 (0.07)*   2.43 
SNUM ---> AFFECT    0.05 (0.06)   0.88 
SNUM ---> VIVIDNESS   1.70 (0.70)*   2.43 
FORMxONUM ---> RT   0.00 (0.00)            - 0.76 
FORMxONUM ---> CLARITY                   - 0.02 (0.04)            - 0.63 
FORMxONUM ---> AFFECT  0.02 (0.03)    0.51 
FORMxONUM ---> VIVIDNESS               - 0.48 (0.38)            - 1.27  
RT ---> RISKPER             - 77.14 (36.55)*                      - 2.11  
CLARITY ---> RISKPER                       - 2.19 (0.79)*            - 2.78  
AFFECT ---> RISKPER                       - 7.43 (0.65)*            - 11.43 
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VIVIDNESS ---> RISKPER   0.24 (0.09)*   2.79 
RISKPER ---> DEC                         0.04 (0.00)*             9.47 
________________________________________________________________________
Note:  FORM1 = 10%, FORM2 = 10 in 100, FORM3 = 1 in 10, RT = reaction time,  
RISKPER = risk perception, DEC = decision, SNUM = subjective numeracy, ONUM =  
objective numeracy, FORMxONUM = interaction term 
*p < .05  
 
Figure 13 presents the complete integrated structural model with the Study 2 data. 
Hypothesis 17 predicted that numeracy would yield a main effect on clarity, such that 
people with high numeracy would rate the numerical evidence as clearer than people with 
low numeracy.  Objective numeracy did not influence clarity ratings. However, 
differences in preference for numerical information (subjective numeracy) were found.  
The path between subjective numeracy and clarity was statistically significant in the 
model (β = 0.17, SE = 0.07, t = 2.43). As preference for numerical information increased, 
ratings of evidence clarity also increased.  
Hypothesis 18 predicted that numerical format and objective numeracy would 
interact to influence perceived evidence clarity, such that low numerate people would rate 
evidence as clearer when it is presented in frequency formats; whereas, people with high 
objective numeracy will have no clarity differences based on format. This hypothesis was 
also not supported; the path from the interaction term to the evidence clarity variable was 
not statistically significant (β = - 0.02, SE = 0.04, t = - 0.63). 
In the integrated model, reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness each had a 
direct influence on risk perception. In the affective model, vividness was not a 
statistically significant predictor of risk perception.  In this model, clarity and vividness 
were included at the same time and the errors between these variables were permitted to 
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covary.  This modification caused the path from vividness to risk perception to become 
statistically significant.  This suggests that the evidence clarity and vividness variables 
are interrelated.  As in the previous models, risk perception had a direct effect on risk 
related decisions.  
 
Figure 13.  Integrated Model of Risk Information Processing with Standardized Path 
Coefficients with the Study 2 Data.  In the model the percentage, natural frequency, and 
simple frequency variables represent three dummy variables that can be compared to the 
fourth message condition, probability. 
* p < .05 
 
 
Summary of Study 2 
 Overall, frequencies, percentages, and probabilities did not differentially 
influence reaction time, clarity, affect, or vividness in any of the models.  Objective 
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numeracy had a main effect on reaction time and preference for numerical information 
(subjective numeracy) had a direct influence on reported vividness and evaluations of 
evidence clarity.  Reaction time did not have any direct effects on risk perception in the 
evolutionary model.  But, when combined in the affective and integrated models, reaction 
time did have a direct effect on risk perception. The mediating variables, reaction time, 
clarity, affect, and vividness all directly influenced risk perception in the integrated 
model.  Also, in all three models, risk perception directly influenced risk related 
decisions. As risk perception increased, people became more risk averse.  
 The three theories tested in Study 2 were compared using the Expected Cross-
Validation Index (ECVI). The evolutionary model, affective model, and integrated model 
had ECVI indices of 1.18, 3.12, and 4.57 respectively.  The model with the smallest 
ECVI, the evolutionary model in this case, has the greatest potential for replication 
(Byrne, 1998).  The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a second option for comparing 
candidate models. The preferred model had the lowest AIC value.  The evolutionary 
model, affective model, and integrated model had AIC indices of 465.57, 1229.48, and 
1640.00 respectively.  Again, the evolutionary model is preferred.  Notably, all three 









Chapter VII: Discussion 
 This chapter is separated into three parts.  First, a summary of the results from 
both studies is provided.  This is followed by a discussion of the project‘s limitations and 
finally the project‘s implications and directions for future research.  
Summary of the Results 
This dissertation project examined the variables that mediate the relationship 
between the exogenous variables numerical presentation of risk information and 
numeracy and the endogenous variables risk perception and risk related decisions.  
Previous research suggested that numerical format and numeracy influence outcomes.  
The question that remained unanswered was why?  The goal of this project was peer into 
the proverbial black box to critically examine information processing at work.   
To examine possible mediating variables, two theoretical models that have 
emerged in the risk perception literature were tested.  The first was an evolutionary 
model arguing that over time, human beings have developed an augmented ability to 
process frequency information.  Thus, frequency information is clearer and people are 
faster at making decisions with information in this format. According to this model, 
reaction time and evidence clarity mediate the relationship between numerical format and 
risk perception.  A second theoretical framework, the affective processing model, argued 
that frequency information is more vivid and people can derive more affect from 
information in this format.  Therefore, according to this model, affect and vividness 
mediate the relationship between evidence format and risk perception. In addition to 
these two perspectives, a third model was also proposed and tested.  The integrated model 
of risk information processing predicted that the mediating variables reaction time, 
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clarity, vividness, and affect all influence risk perception. Two experiments were carried 
out to test the predictions of these theories.  These experiments were based on the work 
of two teams of researchers that have been the principal advocates of the first two 
theoretical perspectives.  
 The first goal of these two studies was to replicate the results found by Brase 
(2002) and Slovic et al. (2000). Data from the two studies reported here support previous 
findings. The data from Study 1 was able to replicate Brase‘s work that found statistically 
significant differences between numerical formats on his one item clarity measure. In 
addition, the data from Study 2 was used to replicate Slovic et al.‘s finding that numerical 
format influenced risk perception.  However, these two studies had flaws and limitations.  
Brase measured clarity with one double barreled item and Slovic et al. measured risk 
perception with one item on a three point scale.  The two studies in this project aimed to 
extend and elaborate upon previous research. First, this project made an effort to improve 
the measurement of the latent variables of interest.  Multiple items were used to measure 
each latent variable and CFA procedures were used to assess the construct validity of 
these measures.  In addition, this project tested three theories that make predictions about 
risk information processing.   Three theoretical models were tested to explore the 
mediating variables that influence risk perception.  
When the mediating variables reaction time, clarity, affect, and vividness were 
examined, Study 1 and Study 2 elicited a similar pattern of results.  Numerical format did 
not have a main effect on any of the mediating variables of interest in either study. In 
both studies clarity, affect, and vividness had direct effects on risk perception. In all six 
models, risk perception directly influenced risk related decisions. In Study 2, objective 
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numeracy had a main effect on reaction time, preference for numerical information 
(subjective numeracy) had a direct effect on vividness and clarity, and reaction time had a 
direct effect on risk perception in the affective and integrated models.  
Limitations 
Ecological Validity 
First, the nature of the experiments and the sample of participants may have 
affected the results of this study.  This project included two lab experiments with a 
sample of college age students.  Lab studies allowed for experimental control. But, this 
control came at a cost.  Lab studies like this one lack mundane realism. When people are 
presented with risk information in real world situations they feel differently than when 
they are presented with a hypothetical risk in the lab.  
Another concern is related to one of the main variables of interest, objective 
numeracy.  Collecting data with an educated sample of college students limited the 
variance in numeracy.  Few participants received very low scores on this scale.  This is a 
global limitation of numeracy research; this variable has been studied largely in educated 
populations.  To date, there is very little data available regarding how people with low 
numeracy respond to and use quantitative risk information. In addition, numeracy can be 
studied in conjunction with other individual differences that are related to the 
comprehension and processing of numerical information. These individual differences 
may include math anxiety or math dyslexia.  
Study Design 
Some limitations to the study design have been identified.  First, future research 
should make an effort to design messages that sound like real newspaper headlines, if this 
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medium is provided as the context for the evidence. As written, the Brase messages do 
not read like newspaper headlines. This may have influenced the evaluation of the 
messages in this study.  
In addition, personal involvement may be one cause of the difference in results 
between the two main studies.  In Study 1, participants were given short messages.  These 
messages were not particularly involving.  In Study 2, participants were given a longer 
message, a hypothetical vignette. The vignette was about a student at the participants‘ 
own University.  This topic should be more personally and emotionally relevant to the 
participants. Therefore, the differences between the two studies may be caused by the 
messages and topics. For example, no interaction effects between format and numeracy 
were found for affect in Study 2. It is plausible that the more involving violent student 
topic caused more negative affect regardless of the numerical presentation format.  In 
Study 1, participants did not report strong affect overall.  Only two of the eight observed 
variables (negative and undesirable) were strong predictors of the latent affect variable.  
In contrast, all seven observed variables were strong indicators of affect in Study 2.  
In addition to involvement, the comments provided by participants in Study 1 
identified another concern.  Several participants mentioned that they quickly read the 
headline with the evidence, not realizing that they would be asked questions about it later.  
The headline did appear again half way through the study, but this did not help 
participants answer the questions that immediately followed the original message. To 
minimize this concern, at the start of Study 2 participants were instructed that they would 
be asked questions about the vignette and once they move forward, the computer program 
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will not allow them to go back.  The addition of this reminder could be one cause of the 
differences between the two studies.  
Finally, one possible explanation for the lack of differences between the 
experimental groups, on the mediating variables of interest, may be because it was too 
difficult for participants to evaluate the numerical evidence. It is challenging to decide if 
a piece of evidence is clear or vivid when it is received in isolation.  Future research 
could have participants make comparisons, as opposed to evaluating only one message at 
a time.  Perhaps by asking participants, ―is .10 easier to understand than 10 out of 100‖ or 
―is 1 in 10 easier to imagine than 10%‖, researchers can more adequately assess the 
differences between numerical formats.  Alternatively, definitions of the terms being used 
could be provided. This final concern is related to another set of limitations involving the 
measurement of the dependent variables.  
Measures of the Dependent Variables 
As discussed previously, the measurement of the dependent variables may have 
affected the results. In general, the observed measures were stronger indicators of the 
latent mediating variables in Study 2 than in Study 1. This may have been caused by 
participants rushing through the headline, as previously mentioned. Another possible 
cause may be the topic of Study 2. The topic may have been more interesting and 
involving to the participants causing them to take more time to complete the measures of 
the dependent variables. Perhaps a risk that could exist on the participants‘ own campus 
was truly more affective, vivid, or clear.  
 This study improved upon the single item measures employed by Brase (2002) 
and Slovic et al. (2000), but measurement of the variables of interest can continually be 
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improved upon.  For example, affect was measured with nine items focused on evaluating 
positive or negative feelings.  Including a more comprehensive measure of affect that 
includes discrete emotions could be useful.  The Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) is one example of a more comprehensive measure (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). This scale measures 11 specific emotions: fear, sadness, guilt, hostility, 
shyness, fatigue, surprise, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, and serenity.   
 Finally, the risk perception measures could be expanded in future research.  In 
these studies risk susceptibility and risk severity were measured with six items. These 
items were general in nature and did not measure specific risk factors (e.g., ―how likely is 
Taylor Jones to commit another act of violence?‖).  More specific items could distinguish 
between different aspects of a risk.  For example, in Study 2 more specific risk 
susceptibility measures could include:  how likely is Taylor Jones to commit another act 
of violence on campus?; how likely is Taylor Jones to commit another act of violence off 
campus?; and how likely are you to be a victim of Taylor Jones? 
Exclusion of a Control Group 
 The inclusion of a control group may have assisted in the interpretation of the 
results in this project.  If each study included a fifth message condition that contained no 
numerical evidence, the effects of numerical evidence in general on the mediating 
variables of interest may have been clarified.  It could be useful to compare the effects of 
numerical evidence to the effects of no evidence.  From a data analysis standpoint, this 
control group could serve as the comparison group in the MIMIC procedure that was 




Implications and Future Research Directions 
Theoretical Implications 
 Numerical format did not directly influence any of the mediating variables 
suggested by the evolutionary model or the affective processing model.  Although one 
might conclude that no variables mediate the relationships between numerical format and 
risk perception, these data provide some evidence against this stance.  When the 
mediating variables were removed from the models, neither numerical format nor 
numeracy had statistically significant direct effects on risk perception or risk related 
decisions. Therefore, a second conclusion may be that there are other mediating variables 
that have not been included in the model.  Possible mediating variables may include 
discrete emotions rather than positive or negative affect.  Discrete emotions were not 
included in the predictions of the two theories tested in this project; but, the effects of 
discrete emotions on risk perception have been well documented.  For example, Lerner 
and Keltner (2000) found that fear and anger have opposite effects on risk perception. 
When experiencing fear, people have pessimistic risk estimates and are more risk averse 
in their decision making.  In contrast, angry people make more optimistic risk evaluations 
and are more risk seeking in their choices.   
 Future research projects should work toward the development of message design 
theory.  There continues to be a lack of theory in the field of communication focused on 
message design features.  This project focused on one message design feature, numerical 
format. Beyond numerical format, there is a multitude of other ways to present risk 
information.  Risk information can be presented without numbers, using verbal labels 
such as rarely or often. A risk can be described with qualitative evidence, such as a 
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testimony or a narrative.  Risk information can also be presented visually with pictures, 
graphs, or icons. These formats need to be systematically tested as well. It is plausible 
that formats (e.g., qualitative, quantitative, graphical) may have differential effects on the 
mediating variables hypothesized in the theoretical models.  The integrated model can be 
expanded to include various formats of risk information (see Figure 14).  
   
 
Figure 14. Expanded Integrated Theory of Risk Information Processing 
 
Previous research had documented the differential effects of presentation format. 
For example, Tait, Voepel-Lewis, Zikmund-Fisher, and Fagerlin (2010) randomized 
participants to receive information about risks using text, tables, or pictographs.  The 
authors found that tables and pictographs led to increased comprehension, compared to 
standard text.  It is possible that visual information has differential effects on reaction 
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time, clarity, affect, and vividness as well.  The inclusion of other presentation formats 
would make for a wide ranging theory that makes predictions about the effects of 
evidence presentation on risk perception.  
Finally, in addition to numeracy, other individual differences may influence the 
mediating variables of interest.  Involvement, personal control, and personal experiences 
may serve as a lens through which risk information is evaluated. 
Applied Implications 
 In addition to theory building, the results of this research also have applied 
implications.  Preference for information (subjective numeracy) was a statistically 
significant predictor of perceived evidence clarity and perceived vividness of the risk. 
This variable is correlated with objective numeracy in the literature and these variables 
were correlated in this project as well.  Risk communicators often must provide 
numerical information to a patient about a risk. That risk may be side effect of a 
medication the patient is being prescribed, a treatment option for a diagnosed disease, the 
risks of lifestyle factors, or the results of genetic testing.  A subjective numeracy measure 
could provide feedback to communicators regarding how to best communicate risk to a 
patient.  This measure can also serve as a proxy for objective numeracy in situations 
where fast feedback is needed or an objective test is not feasible.  A short version of the 
13-item subjective numeracy scale could be useful in patient-provider interactions. A 
CFA of the entire 13-item subjective numeracy scale showed that three items are the 
strongest indictors of the latent preference for numerical information variable.  By asking 
a patient three questions (how good are you at working with fractions?, how good are you 
at working with percentages?, and when reading a newspaper, how helpful do you find 
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tables and graphs that are part of a story?) a health care provider can quickly assess a 
patient‘s numeracy.  Based on this information, messages can quickly and easily be 
tailored to a patient‘s needs and personal preferences.   
 Future work in this area can take an applied direction as well.  There is still an 
unanswered question involving real direct effects on decision making.  This study, like 
most of the work that came before, asked people to report about their susceptibility for 
and the severity of a hypothetical risk.  In addition, participants were asked what they 
would do in a risk situation or how much money they would donate.  The question that 
remains is: can these findings be translated into actual behavior, not only behavioral 
intention?  This is an enormous unanswered question that could have a tremendous 
amount of practical value.   
Conclusion 
 This project was an initial effort to test variables that have been predicted to 
mediate the processing of quantitative risk evidence. This project worked toward finding 
an answer to the question: why does numerical format and numeracy influence risk 
perception? Although numerical format did not influence the predicted mediating 
variables differentially, the hypothesized mediating variables did have consistent and 
direct effects on risk perception.  As predicted in this model, reaction time, clarity, affect, 
and vividness had direct effects on risk perception. And, risk perception had a strong 
influence on risk related decisions.  This last finding was consistent across three risk 
topics:  disease prevalence, drug efficacy, and campus safety.  In addition, this project 
provided evidence for the prediction that people with high numeracy will spend more 
time evaluating a risk when given numerical information.   
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 For the first time, two theories of risk information processing, an evolutionary 
theory and an affective processing theory, were depicted as causal models.  Testing these 
theories in their entirely is the only way to develop and extend these models.  Support 
was found for all three theories, including the integrated theory of risk information 
processing that was proposed in this project for the first time.  Overall, the results of this 
project support the prediction that the evolutionary theory and the affective processing 
theory are not competing perspectives. The integrated theory of risk information 



















1. Risk has been defined in other ways.  Yates and Stone (1992) defined risk as the 
possibility of loss. Oglethorpe and Monroe (1994) defined risk as probability times 
outcome.  
2. Risk perception has been defined in other ways in the literature. Slovic (1987) defined 
risk perceptions as intuitive risk judgments.  Oglethorpe and Monroe (1994) suggested 
that the perception of risk is comprised of some combination of the probability of a 
negative outcome and severity of that outcome. Perceived risk is defined as an 
individual's subjective belief that there is some probability that an undesired outcome will 
result from a choice. That is, there is some nonzero chance that any given choice may 
lead to an undesired result or outcome.  
 
3. In the original Slovic et al. (2000) study, only two formats, frequencies and 
percentages, were compared.  Four formats (natural frequencies, simple frequencies, 



































Pilot Study Survey Instrument 
 
Risk Situations Survey 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study.  You will complete two sets of 
questions.  Please do your best to answer every question.  
 
Instructions: You will read three short risk situations.  Please read each situation and 
answer the questions that follow. 
 
Situation 1 
A student, Taylor Jones, was expelled from the University of Maryland last year for 
committing a violent act.  Jones has been treated for the past several weeks at an acute 
civil mental health facility and has been evaluated for discharge.  A psychologist has 
done a state-of-the art assessment of Jones.  Among the conclusions reached in the 
psychologist‘s assessment is the following: 
 
Patients similar to Jones are estimated to have a 10% probability of committing an act of 
violence to others during the first several months of discharge. 
 
Currently, Jones has applied to be re-admitted to the University of Maryland.  This 
application is currently being evaluated.  
 
1. Do you think this situation is realistic?  (0 = not realistic at all, 9= completely realistic) 
2. Please explain why you think this situation is realistic or not realistic. 
3. What could be added or removed to make this situation more realistic? 
4. Do you think Taylor Jones is:  male female 
5. Is Taylor typically man‘s name or a woman‘s name?   man woman 
6. Is this scenario clear as it is written? 
7. Is anything confusing or unclear about this scenario? Be specific.  
8. If this situation was happening at UMD, how would you feel? 
9.  How much do you care about Jones attending UMD? (0 = I do not care if Jones 
returns to UMD or not, 9 = I care a great deal if Jones returns to UMD).  
 
Situation 2 
It is estimated that by the year 2020, 1% of all Americans will have been exposed to a 
new flu strain X.  
1. Do you think this situation is realistic?  (0 = not realistic at all, 9 = completely 
realistic)  
2. Please explain why you think this situation is realistic or not realistic.  
3. What could be added or removed to make this situation more realistic? 
4. Is this information clear as it is written?  
5. Is anything confusing or unclear about this information? Be specific.  
6. How does this information make you feel? 
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A new drug is about to be approved by the FDA.  It has been estimated to cause negative 
side effects in 99% of all Americans.  
 
1. Do you think this situation is realistic? (0 = not realistic at all, 9= completely realistic) 
2. Please explain why you think this situation is realistic or not realistic.  
3. What could be added or removed to make this situation more realistic? 
4. Is this information clear as it is written? 
5. Is anything confusing or unclear about this information? Be specific.  
6. How does the pending approval of this new drug make you feel?  
7.  How much do you care about the approval of this new drug? (0 = I do not care at all, 9 
= I care a great deal) 
 
Instructions:  In this final set of questions, we would like to get some general information 
about you.  
 
1. What is your sex?   male female 
2. Which of the following best describes your race? Please mark all that apply. 
African-American or Black 
Hispanic or Latino 
Asian-American 
Native American 
Caucasian or White 
Other.  Please specify _____________ 
 






Other.  Please specify 
4. How old are you?    ____________ years old 
5. Do you have any questions or comments about this survey? 
Thank you for completing all questions.  We appreciate your participation 
 in this research study. The information you just read is fictitious and does not refer to 






Study 1 Experiment Protocol  
 
Welcome.  Thank you for participating in this research study.  Press any key to begin.  
 
For this research study, you will read a recent New York Times newspaper headline. 
Using the information in the headline, you will be asked to answer several questions. You 
will answer some questions by using your computer keyboard.  Other questions will ask 
you to provide answers by using the button box that is attached to your computer.  For 
each question, you will be instructed to use the keyboard or the button box.  Press any 
key to continue.  
 
Instructions:  In a minute, a series of questions will appear on your computer screen. 
Some questions will ask you to answer by using the computer keyboard.  Other questions 
will ask you to use the button box that is attached to your computer.  Let‘s practice using 
both.  Press any key to continue.  
 
Press 1 on the button box.  
 
Enter the number 10 using the keyboard.  
 
Please use the button box to answer the following question.  How much do you like 
chocolate ice cream? (1 = not at all, 9 = very much) 
 
Let‘s begin.  Press any key to continue.  
 
The following information is a recent New York Times newspaper headline.   
 
It is estimated that by the year 2020, any given American will have a probability of 0.01 
of having been exposed to Flu strain X.  
Press any key to continue.  
What year was mentioned in the headline you just read? Please type a year using the 
keyboard.  If no year was mentioned type, ―no year‖. 
 
BRASEclarity. How clear and easy to understand is the statistical information presented 
in the headline? (1 = unclear, 9 = clear) 
 
DEC1(disease prevalence). If you were in charge of the annual budget for the U.S. 
Department of Health, how much of every $100 in the budget would you dedicate to 
dealing with Flu strain X? Using your keyboard please enter a value between 0 and 100. 
 
DEC1(drug efficacy). If you were in charge of the production budget for the 
manufacturer of this drug, how much of every $100 would you dedicate to producing this 
drug?  Using the keyboard, enter a number between 0 and 100.  
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(thought listing items) 
Instructions: We have images and ideas about things.  Often when people hear about a 
particular risk, they develop images in their minds about the meaning of the risk. We are 
interested in the meaning of certain risks to people like you. Think for a moment about 
the [the flu/the drug] in the headline you just read.  We are interested in the first five 
images that come to your mind when you think about [the flu/the drug] in the headline. 
Think about five images now and write them down on your paper. When you are done 
writing, press any key to continue.  
 






Now that you have thought about and listed five images that come to mind when you 
think about [the flu/the drug] in the headline, we want to be sure that we understand what 
these images mean to you. Remember, we are asking you to evaluate your five images, 
not the headline. Press any key to continue.  
 
From your list, type your first image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your first image (0 = completely negative and 
100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard.  
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your first image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 = 
completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your first image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard 
 
From your list, type your second image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your second image (0 = completely negative 
and 100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your second image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 
= completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your second image (0 = weak and 100 = strong) 





From your list, type your third image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your third image (0 = completely negative and 
100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your third image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 = 
completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your third image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard 
 
From your list, type your fourth image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your fourth image (0 = completely negative 
and 100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your fourth image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 
= completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your fourth image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
From your list, type your fifth and final image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your fifth image (0 = completely negative and 
100 = completely positive)?  Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your fifth image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 = 
completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your fifth image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
For this next set of questions, use the button box attached to your computer.  
DEC2(disease prevalence). If a vaccination for Flu strain X was available, how likely 
would you be to get it? (1= not likely at all, 9 = very likely)  
 
DEC3(disease prevalence). How closely should the U.S. government monitor Flu strain 
X? (1= not closely at all, 9 = very closely).  
 
DEC2(drug efficacy). How likely would you be to take the drug in the headline if it was 
prescribed to you? (1= not likely at all, 9 = very likely) 
 
DEC3(drug efficacy). How closely would you want the FDA to monitor the drug in the 
headline after it is approved? (1= not closely at all, 9 = very closely).  
 
(vividness items) 
This next set of questions will ask you how vivid the risk in the headline is to you.  




VIVIDNESS1. How FUZZY is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not fuzzy 
at all) to 100 (extremely fuzzy) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS2. How DETAILED is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not 
detailed at all) to 100 (extremely detailed) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the 
keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS3.  How VIVID is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not vivid 
at all) to 100 (extremely vivid) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS4. How INTENSE is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not 
intense at all) to 100 (extremely intense) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the 
keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS5. How LIFELIKE is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not 
lifelike at all) to 100 (extremely lifelike) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the 
keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS6. How SHARP is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not sharp 
at all) to 100 (extremely sharp) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS7. How WELL-DEFINED is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 
(not defined at all) to 100 (extremely well-defined) enter a number from 0 to 100 using 
the keyboard. 
 
(affect items)  
For this next set of questions, we are interested in learning about how the risk makes you 
feel.  Please use the button box to respond to the next set of questions.  Press any key to 
begin this set of questions.  
Flu strain X is/The side effects of the drug in the headline are: 
AFFECT1 negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 positive 
AFFECT2 bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 good 
AFFECT3 harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 beneficial 
AFFECT4 unsafe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 safe 
 
Dedicating resources to deal with Flu strain X is/The drug in the headline is: 
AFFECT5 foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 wise 




Dedicating resources to deal with Flu strain X is/Dedicating resources to the testing of the 
drug in the headline: 
AFFECT7 makes me 
feel tense 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  makes me 
feel calm 
AFFECT8 make me 
feel 
annoyed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 makes me 
feel pleased 
AFFECT9 makes me 
feel 
disgusted 




(evidence clarity items) 
For the next set of questions, please evaluate the headline you just read.  Use the button 
box for this set of questions. Press any key to continue.  
The information in the headline is: 
CLARITY1 unclear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 clear 
CLARITY2 confusing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not  
confusing 
CLARITY3 hard to 
understand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 easy to 
understand 
CLARITY4 vague 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Precise 
CLARITY5 not a 
noticeable 
point 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a noticeable 
point 
CLARITY6 weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strong 
CLARITY7 abstract 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 concrete 
CLARITY8 not relevant 
to the 
conclusion 




(risk perception items) 
This next set of questions will ask you how you feel about the risk in the headline.  Use 
the keyboard to type your answers. Press any key when you are ready to begin.  
 
(perceived susceptibility items) 




SUS1. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how 
certain are you that you will be exposed to flu strain X? 
SUS2. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what is the 
chance that you will be exposed to flu strain X? 
SUS3. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how likely 
is it that you will be exposed to Flu strain X?  
 
(drug efficacy)  
SUS1. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how 
certain are you that you will experience negative side effects if you take the drug in the 
headline? 
SUS2. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what is the 
chance that you will experience negative side effects if you take the drug in the headline? 
SUS3. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how likely 
is it that you will be experience side effects if you take the drug in the headline? 
 
(perceived severity items)  
Using a scale from 0 (no risk) to 100 (high risk)  
(disease prevalence) 
SEV1. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what is the 
risk of being exposed to Flu strain X? 
SEV2. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how 
dangerous is Flu strain X? 
SEV3. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how 
serious is the existence of Flu strain X?  
 
(drug efficacy) 
SEV1. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what is the 
risk of experiencing negative side effects if you take the drug in the headline? 
SEV2. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) what is the 
risk if the FDA approves the drug in the headline?  
SEV3. Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) how 
serious are the negative side effects of the drug in the headline?  
 
(objective numeracy items) 
For this next set of questions, read each question and use the keyboard to provide an 
answer.  Use the scratch paper next to your computer if you need it.  Press any key to 
begin. 
 
ONUM1. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a 
disease?  1 in 100, 1 in 1,000, or 1 in 10?  Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 1 in 10) 
 
ONUM2. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease:  1%, 
10%, or 5%? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 10%) 
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ONUM3.  If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected 
to get the disease out of 100? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 10) 
 
ONUM4. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected 
to get the disease out of 1,000? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 
100) 
ONUM5. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as 
having a ___% chance of getting the disease. Please type your answer using the 
keyboard. (Answer: 20%) 
ONUM6. If person A‘s chance of getting a disease is 1% in 10 years, and person B‘s risk 
is double that of A‘s, what is B‘s risk? Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 2% in 10 years; 2 in 10; 1 in 5) 
ONUM7. If person A‘s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in 10 years, and person B‘s 
risk is double that of A‘s, what is B‘s risk? Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 2; 2 in 100; 1 in 50 in 10 years) 
ONUM8. In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%.  What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1000 people each 
buy a single ticket from Big Bucks? Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 10) 
ONUM9. Imagine that we roll a fair six-sided die 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up as an even number (2, 4, or 6)?  Please 
type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: half the time; 50%; 500; 1:2) 
ONUM10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005.  Out of 10,000 people, about 
how many of them are expected to get infected? Please type your answer using the 
keyboard. (Answer: 5) 
ONUM11. In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the chances of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets in Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car? Please type 
your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: .10; 1%) 
ONUM12. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a 
disease? 1 chance in 12 or 1 chance in 37. Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 1 chance in 12) 
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ONUM13. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a 
mammography.  Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant tumor and 
90 of them do not.  Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the mammography 
indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 of them 
does not have a tumor.  Of the 90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammography 
indicates correctly that 81 of them do not have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 9 of 
them do have a tumor. Imagine that your friend test positive (as if she had a tumor).  
What is the likelihood that she actually has a tumor? Please type your answer using the 
keyboard. (Answer:  9 out of 18; 1 out of 2; 50%; 1:2) 
ONUM14. Imagine that you are taking a class and your chances of being asked a 
question in class are 1% during the first week of class and double each week thereafter 
(i.e., you would have a 2% chance in Week 2, a 4% chance in week 3, and 8% chance in 
week 4).  What is the probability that you will be asked a question in class during week 
7? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 64%) 
 
ONUM15. Suppose that 1 out of every 10,000 doctors in a certain regimen is infected 
with the SARS virus; in the same region, 20 out of every 100 people in a particular at-risk 
population are also infected with the virus.  A test for the virus gives a positive result in 
99% of those who are infected and in 1% of those who are not infected.  A randomly 
selected doctor and a randomly selected person in the at-risk population in this region 
both test positive for the disease.  Who is more likely to actually have the disease? Please 
type A, B, or C using your keyboard. (Answer: C) 
A. They both tested positive for SARS and therefore are equally likely to have the disease 
B. They both tested positive for SARS and the doctor is more likely to have the disease 
C. They both tested positive for SARS and the person in the at-risk population is more 
likely to have the disease 
 
(subjective numeracy items) 
For this set of questions, please choose one response using the 1-9 scale on your button 
box.  Press any key to begin.  
 
SNUM1. How good are you at working with fractions? (1 = not good at all, 9 = 
extremely good) 
 
 SNUM2. How good are you at working with percentages? (1 = not good at all, 9 = 
extremely good) 
 
SNUM3. How good are you at calculating a 15% tip on a bill? (1 = not good at all, 9 = 
extremely good) 
 
SNUM4. How good are you at figuring out how much a shirt will cost if it is marked 




SNUM5. When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs that 
are part of a story? (1 = not helpful at all, 9 = extremely helpful) 
 
SNUM6. When people tell you the chance of something happening, do you prefer that 
they use words (―it rarely happens‖) or numbers (―there is a 1% chance‖)? (1 = always 
prefer words, 9 = always prefer numbers) 
 
SNUM7. When you hear a weather forecast, do you prefer predictions using percentages 
(―there will be a 20% chance of rain today‖) or predictions using only words (―there is a 
small chance of rain today‖)? (1 = always prefer words, 9 = always prefer percentages) 
 
SNUM8. How often do you find numerical information to be useful? (1 = never, 9 = 
always) 
 
SNUM9. When reading about the likelihood of something happening, how helpful it is to 
see the exact percentage (like 45% chance)? (1 = not helpful at all, 9 = extremely helpful) 
 
SNUM10. How much do you like statistics? (1= not at all, 9 = very much) 
 
SNUM11. How often do you use percentages in conversations (like ―I am 75%  done 
with packing‖, for example)?  (1 = not at all, 9 = very often) 
 
SNUM12. When you ask someone with time it is, do you prefer that they tell you the 
exact time (like 10:04) or the approximate time (like ―it is a little after 10 o‘clock‖)? (1 = 
always prefer approximate timer, 9 = always prefer the exact time) 
 
SNUM13. How often do you express an opinion using numbers?  For example, ―on a 
scale from 1 to 10, I give it a 7‖.  (1= never, 9 = always) 
 
(demographic items) 
This is the final set of questions.  Press any key to continue.  
 
What is your sex? Type male or female. 
What is your race or ethnicity?  Please type your race using the keyboard.  
What year are you in at school (Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, or Senior)?  Please type 
your year using the keyboard.   
What is your college major?  Please type your major using the keyboard.  
How old are you?   Please type your age in years.  
What was your SAT CRITICAL READING score? This score ranges from 200-800.  
What was your SAT CRITICAL WRITING score?  This score ranges from 200-800. 
What was your SAT MATH score? This score ranges from 200-800. 
What year did you take the SAT exam? 
What is your current college GPA? 




Thank you for completing all questions.  We appreciate your participation in this research 
study!  The information you just read is fictitious and does not refer to any existing flu 





























Study 2 Experiment Protocol 
Welcome.  Thank you for participating in this research study:  Attitudes toward risk 
topics.  When the researcher tells you to start, press any key to begin.  
 
In a minute, you will read about a University of Maryland student.  You will be asked to 
answer several questions about the student‘s situation.  During this study, once you go 
forward, you cannot go back to the previous questions.  Answer carefully before moving 
on to the next question.  Press any key to continue.  
 
During this study you will answer some questions by using your computer keyboard.  
Other questions will ask you to provide answers by using the button box that is attached 
to your computer.  For each question, you will be instructed to use either the keyboard or 
button box.  Let‘s practice using both.  Press any key to continue.  
 
Press 1 on the button box.  (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
Enter the number 10 using the keyboard.  Type your answer.  
 
Please use the button box to answer the following question.  How much do you like 
chocolate ice cream?  (1 = not at all, 9 = very much) 
 
Let‘s begin.  Press any key to continue.  
 
(vignette and evidence manipulation) 
 
Taylor Jones, a University of Maryland student, was expelled for committing a 
violent act on campus.  Jones has been treated at a mental health facility for 
violent behavior. 
 
Currently, Jones has applied to be re-admitted to the University of Maryland.  A 
psychologist has done a state-of-the art assessment of Jones.  Among the 
conclusions reached in the psychologist‘s assessment is the following: 
 
Patients similar to Taylor Jones are estimated to have a (10% probability/1 in 
100/1 in 10/.10 probability) of committing another act of violence.  
 
University officials are currently deciding if Jones will be allowed to return to the 
University. 
 
Read this information carefully, you will be asked several questions about this situation.  






(thought listing items) 
Instructions: We have images and ideas about things.  Often when people hear about a 
particular risk, they develop images in their minds about the meaning of the risk. Think 
for a moment about the Taylor Jones situation. Would you describe Taylor Jones as being 
at low risk, medium risk, or high risk of harming someone?  What would it be like to be 
on campus with Taylor Jones?  Think about these questions.   
 
Using the piece of paper to your right, please write down five brief thoughts or images 
that come to mind as you think about these questions.  You can write anything you would 
like.  When you are done writing, press any key to continue.  
 






Now that you have thought about and listed five images that come to mind when you 
think about the Taylor Jones situation, we want to be sure that we understand what these 
thoughts or images mean to you. Remember, we are asking you to evaluate your five 
thoughts or images, not the information you read.  Press any key to continue when you 
are ready.  
 
From your list, type your first image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your first image (0 = completely negative and 
100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard.  
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your first image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 = 
completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your first image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard 
 
From your list, type your second image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your second image (0 = completely negative 
and 100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your second image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 




Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your second image (0 = weak and 100 = strong) 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard 
 
From your list, type your third image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your third image (0 = completely negative and 
100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your third image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 = 
completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your third image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard 
 
From your list, type your fourth image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your fourth image (0 = completely negative 
and 100 = completely positive)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your fourth image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 
= completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your fourth image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
From your list, type your fifth and final image. 
Using a scale from 0-100, how positive is your fifth image (0 = completely negative and 
100 = completely positive)?  Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how clear is your fifth image (0 = completely fuzzy and 100 = 
completely clear)? Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
Using a scale from 0-100, how intense is your fifth image (0 = weak and 100 = strong)? 
Type a number from 0 – 100 using the keyboard. 
 
(risk related decision items) 
For this next set of questions, think about the Taylor Jones situation.  Answer each 
question using you button box.  
 
PRACTICE. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: The University of Maryland should accept the psychologist‘s 
assessment of Taylor Jones. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
PRACTICE. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statement:  Taylor Jones is a typical University of Maryland student. (1 = 




DEC1. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: Taylor Jones should not be allowed to re-apply to the University of Maryland.  
(1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
DEC2. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement:  Speaking as a student at the University of Maryland, I think Taylor Jones 
should be re-admitted. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
DEC3. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement:  If it were my decision, I would re-admit Taylor Jones to the University of 
Maryland. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
DEC4. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement:  Once a student is expelled, he or she should never be re-admitted to the 
University of Maryland. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
DEC5. Using your button box, tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement:  University of Maryland administrators should re-admit Taylor Jones. (1 = 
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
 
(Slovic item) 
SLOVIC1. Would you describe Taylor Jones as being at high risk, medium risk, or low 
risk of harming someone? Please type one answer: high risk, medium risk, low risk. 
(vividness items) 
This next set of questions will ask you how vivid the psychologist‘s assessment of Taylor 
Jones is to you. Remember the psychologist concluded:  (evidence manipulation).  Press 
any key to continue.  
VIVIDNESS1. How FUZZY is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not fuzzy 
at all) to 100 (extremely fuzzy) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS2. How DETAILED is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not 
detailed at all) to 100 (extremely detailed) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the 
keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS3.  How VIVID is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not vivid 
at all) to 100 (extremely vivid) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS4. How INTENSE is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not 
intense at all) to 100 (extremely intense) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the 
keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS5. How LIFELIKE is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not 





VIVIDNESS6. How SHARP is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 (not sharp 
at all) to 100 (extremely sharp) enter a number from 0 to 100 using the keyboard. 
 
VIVIDNESS7. How WELL-DEFINED is the risk being described? Using a scale from 0 




For this next set of questions, we are interested in learning about how the Taylor Jones 
situation makes you feel.  Please use the button box to respond to the next set of 
questions.  Press any key to begin this set of questions.  
 
Having Taylor Jones at the University of Maryland is: 
AFFECT1 negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 positive 
AFFECT2 bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 good 
AFFECT3 harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 beneficial 
AFFECT4 unsafe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 safe 
 
AFFECT5 foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 wise 
AFFECT6 undesirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  desirable 
 
Having Taylor Jones at the University of Maryland: 
AFFECT7 makes me 
feel tense 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 makes me 
feel calm 
AFFECT8 makes me 
feel 
annoyed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 makes me 
feel pleased 
AFFECT9 makes me 
feel 
disgusted 





For the next set of items, please rate the psychologist‘s assessment.  Press any key to 
continue.  
The psychologist‘s assessment is: (evidence manipulation) 
CLARITY1 unclear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 clear 
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CLARITY2 confusing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not 
confusing 
CLARITY3 hard to 
understand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 easy to 
understand 
CLARITY4 vague 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 precise 
CLARITY5 not a 
noticeable 
point 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a noticeable 
point 
CLARITY6 weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strong 
CLARITY7 abstract 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 concrete 
CLARITY8 not relevant 
to the 
conclusion 




(risk perception items) 
This next set of questions will ask you how you feel about the Taylor Jones situation.  
Use the keyboard to type your answers.  Press any key when you are ready to begin.  
 
(perceived susceptibility) 
Using a scale from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen): 
SUS1. How certain are you that Taylor Jones will commit another act of violence? 
SUS2. What is the chance that Taylor Jones will commit another act of violence?  
SUS3. How likely is Taylor Jones to commit another act of violence? 
 
(perceived severity)  
Using a scale from 0 (no risk) to 100 (high risk):  
SEV1. What is the risk of Taylor Jones committing another violent act?  
SEV2. How dangerous is Taylor Jones? 
SEV3. How serious is Taylor Jones‘s violent behavior? 
 
(objective numeracy items) 
For this next set of questions, read each question and use the keyboard to provide an 
answer.  Use the scratch paper next to your computer if you need it.  Press any key to 
begin.  
 
ONUM1. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a 
disease?  1 in 100, 1 in 1,000, or 1 in 10?  Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 1 in 10) 
 
ONUM2. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease:  1%, 
10%, or 5%? Please type you answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 10%) 
139 
 
ONUM3.  If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected 
to get the disease out of 100? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 10) 
 
ONUM4. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected 
to get the disease out of 1,000? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 
100) 
ONUM5. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as 
having a ___% chance of getting the disease. Please type your answer using the 
keyboard. (Answer: 20) 
ONUM6. If person A‘s chance of getting a disease is 1% in 10 years, and person B‘s risk 
is double that of A‘s, what is B‘s risk? Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 2% in 10 years; 2 in 10; 1 in 5) 
ONUM7. If person A‘s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in 10 years, and person B‘s 
risk is double that of A‘s, what is B‘s risk? Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 2; 2 in 100; 1 in 50 in 10 years) 
ONUM8. In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%.  What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1000 people each 
buy a single ticket from Big Bucks? Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 10) 
ONUM9. Imagine that we roll a fair six-sided die 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up as an even number (2, 4, or 6)?  Please 
type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: half the time; 50%; 500; 1:2) 
ONUM10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005.  Out of 10,000 people, about 
how many of them are expected to get infected? Please type your answer using the 
keyboard. (Answer: 5) 
ONUM11. In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the chances of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets in Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car? Please type 
your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: .10; 1%) 
 
ONUM12. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a 
disease? 1 chance in 12 or 1 chance in 37.  Please type your answer using the keyboard. 
(Answer: 1 chance in 12) 
 
ONUM13. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a 
mammography.  Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant tumor and 
90 of them do not.  Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the mammography 
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indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 of them 
does not have a tumor.  Of the 90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammography 
indicates correctly that 81 of them do not have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 9 of 
them do have a tumor. Imagine that your friend test positive (as if she had a tumor).  
What is the likelihood that she actually has a tumor? Please type your answer using the 
keyboard. (Answer: 9 out of 18; 1 out of 2; 50%; 1:2) 
 
ONUM14. Imagine that you are taking a class and your chances of being asked a 
question in class are 1% during the first week of class and double each week thereafter 
(i.e., you would have a 2% chance in Week 2, a 4% chance in week 3, and 8% chance in 
week 4).  What is the probability that you will be asked a question in class during week 
7? Please type your answer using the keyboard. (Answer: 64%) 
 
ONUM15. Suppose that 1 out of every 10,000 doctors in a certain regimen is infected 
with the SARS virus; in the same region, 20 out of every 100 people in a particular at-risk 
population are also infected with the virus.  A test for the virus gives a positive result in 
99% of those who are infected and in 1% of those who are not infected.  A randomly 
selected doctor and a randomly selected person in the at-risk population in this region 
both test positive for the disease.  Who is more likely to actually have the disease? Enter 
A, B, or C using the keyboard. (Answer: C) 
A. They both tested positive for SARS and therefore are equally likely to have the disease 
B. They both tested positive for SARS and the doctor is more likely to have the disease 
C. They both tested positive for SARS and the person in the at-risk population is more 
likely to have the disease 
 
(subjective numeracy items) 
For this next set of questions, please choose one response using the 1 - 9 scale on the 
button box. Press any key to begin.  
 
SNUM1. How good are you at working with fractions? (1 = not good at all, 9 = 
extremely good) 
 
 SNUM2. How good are you at working with percentages? (1 = not good at all, 9 = 
extremely good) 
 
SNUM3. How good are you at calculating a 15% tip on a bill? (1 = not good at all, 9 = 
extremely good) 
 
SNUM4. How good are you at figuring out how much a shirt will cost if it is marked 
25% off? (1 = not good at all, 9 = extremely good) 
 
SNUM5. When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs that 




SNUM6. When people tell you the chance of something happening, do you prefer that 
they use words (―it rarely happens‖) or numbers (―there is a 1% chance‖)? (1 = always 
prefer words, 9 = always prefer numbers) 
 
SNUM7. When you hear a weather forecast, do you prefer predictions using percentages 
(―there will be a 20% chance of rain today‖) or predictions using only words (―there is a 
small chance of rain today‖)? (1 = always prefer words, 9 = always prefer percentages) 
 
SNUM8. How often do you find numerical information to be useful? (1 = never, 9 = 
always) 
 
SNUM9. When reading about the likelihood of something happening, how helpful it is to 
see the exact percentage (like ―45% chance‖)? (1 = not helpful at all, 9 = extremely 
helpful) 
 
SNUM10. How much do you like statistics? (1= not at all, 9 = very much) 
 
SNUM11. How often do you use percentages (―I am 75% done with packing‖, for 
example) in conversations?  (1 = not at all, 9 = very often) 
 
SNUM12. When you ask someone with time it is, do you prefer that they tell you the 
exact time (like ―10:04‖) or the approximate time (like ―it is a little after 10 o‘clock‖)? (1 
= always prefer the approximate time, 9 = always prefer the exact time) 
 
SNUM13. How often do you express an opinion using numbers?  For example, ―on a 
scale from 1 to 10, I give it a 7‖.  (1= never, 9 = always) 
 
(demographic items) 
This is the last set of questions.  Press any key to continue.  
 
What is your sex?  Type male or female. 
What is your race or ethnicity?  Please type your race using the keyboard.  
What year are you in at school (Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, or Senior)? Please type 
your year using the keyboard.  
What is your college major?  Please type your major or intended major using the 
keyboard.  
How old are you?  Please type your age in years.  
What was your SAT CRITICAL READING score? This score ranges from 200-800.  
What was your SAT WRITING score? This score ranges from 200-800.  
What was your SAT MATH score? This score ranges from 200-800. 
What year did you take the SAT exam? 
What is your current college GPA?  If you are a first semester freshman, type your most 
recent high school GPA.  
On a scale of 0 (very unsafe) to 100 (very safe) how safe do you feel while on the 
University of Maryland campus? 
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Do you have any questions or comments about this survey?  Please let us know if any 
questions were unclear or if you could not read any question that appeared on your 
screen.  
 
Please STOP here!  Thank you.  We appreciate your participation in this research study! 
Let the researcher know that you are finished.  This project is ongoing.  Please do not 
share the details of this research project with anyone else.  If you have any questions feel 
free to contact the researcher, Christine Skubisz at skubisz@umd.edu.   The information 
you read in this study is fictitious and does not refer to any previous or current UMD 




































Covariance Matrix for the Evolutionary Model (Study 1) 
 
 FORM1 FORM2 FORM3 ONUM FORMxONUM 
FORM1 0.19     
FORM2 - 0.07 0.19    
FORM3 - 0.06 - 0.07 0.19   
ONUM 0.00 - 0.02 0.00 4.59  
FORMxONUM 0.01 - 0.07 0.02 11.42 33.93 
SNUM  - 0.02 0.07 - 0.04 - 1.47 - 3.85 
RT - 0.00 0.01  0.00 - 0.04 - 0.10 
CLARITY1 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.01 
CLARITY2 0.08 0.02 0.02 - 0.18 - 0.47 
CLARITY4 0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.02 - 0.09 
SUS1 0.40 0.89 - 0.75 2.92 9.07 
SUS2 0.79 1.15 - 0.97 2.90 9.28 
SUS3 0.95 1.13 - 0.89 2.67 9.52 
SEV1 1.01 1.00 - 1.58 5.03 16.54 
SEV2 0.77 0.33 - 1.03 6.86 23.66 
DEC 0.31 0.42 - 0.86 8.28 22.46 
 
 SNUM RT CLARITY1 CLARITY2 CLARITY4 
SNUM  2.07     
RT 0.02 0.03    
CLARITY1 0.01 - 0.01 7.16   
CLARITY2 0.20 0.02 4.55 6.63  
CLARITY4 0.10 - 0.02 4.93 3.71 6.81 
SUS1 1.49 0.79 - 22.78 - 16.34 - 24.11 
SUS2 0.95 0.68 -23.26  -16.58 - 23.45 
SUS3 1.52 0.62 -23.77 - 15.72 - 25.13 
SEV1 - 1.32 0.52 -17.27 - 14.80 - 21.50 
SEV2 - 1.25 0.24 -7.56 - 6.12 - 7.75 
DEC - 3.18 0.37 -21.44 -15.76 -21.61 
 
 
 SUS1 SUS2 SUS3 SEV1 SEV2 DEC 
SUS1 1475.90      
SUS2 1367.19 1506.15     
SUS3 1317.06 1420.09 1462.97    
SEV1 1074.92 1178.89 1176.07 1361.92   
SEV2 716.67 768.75 767.16 803.54 997.61  







Covariance Matrix for the Affective Processing Model (Study 1) 
 
 FORM1 FORM2 FORM3 ONUM FORMxONUM 
FORM1 0.19     
FORM2 - 0.07 0.19    
FORM3 - 0.06 - 0.07 0.19   
ONUM 0.00 - 0.02 0.00 4.59  
FORMxONUM 0.01 - 0.07 0.02 11.42 33.93 
SNUM  - 0.02 0.07 - 0.04 - 1.47 - 3.85 
RT - 0.00 0.01  0.00 - 0.04 - 0.10 
AFFECT1 - 0.05 0.00  0.04  0.32  0.88 
AFFECT6  0.03 - 0.08  0.07 0.32  1.32 
VIVIDNESS1 0.25 1.02 - 0.39 6.14 13.23 
VIVIDNESS2 - 0.41 - 0.31 0.68 6.32 14.78 
VIVIDNESS3 - 0.20 0.02 1.33 2.51 5.62 
SUS1 0.40 0.89 - 0.75 2.92 9.07 
SUS2 0.79 1.15 - 0.97 2.90 9.28 
SUS3 0.95 1.13 - 0.89 2.67 9.52 
SEV1 1.01 1.00 - 1.58 5.03 16.54 
SEV2 0.77 0.33 - 1.03 6.86 23.66 
DEC 0.31 0.42 - 0.86 8.28 22.46 
 
 SNUM RT CLARITY1 CLARITY2 CLARITY4 
SNUM  2.07     
RT 0.02 0.03    
AFFECT1 - 0.03 - 0.03 1.17  0.90  1.03 
AFFECT6 - 0.29 - 0.03  0.98  0.87  1.07 
VIVIDNESS1 2.43 - 0.24 40.51 36.80 34.74 
VIVIDNESS2 - 3.85 - 0.10 39.99 26.77 38.74 
VIVIDNESS3 - 1.67 0.18 26.93 16.77 25.15 
SUS1 1.49 0.79 - 22.78 - 16.34 - 24.11 
SUS2 0.95 0.68 -23.26  -16.58 - 23.45 
SUS3 1.52 0.62 -23.77 - 15.72 - 25.13 
SEV1 - 1.32 0.52 -17.27 - 14.80 - 21.50 
SEV2 - 1.25 0.24 -7.56 - 6.12 - 7.75 
DEC - 3.18 0.37 -21.44 -15.76 -21.61 
 
 AFFECT1 AFFECT6 VIVIDNESS1 VIVIDNESS2 VIVIDNESS3 
AFFECT1 2.77     
AFFECT6 1.48 3.54    
VIVIDNESS1 12.10 10.23 1235.88   
VIVIDNESS2  10.38  11.17 326.65 865.44  
145 
 
VIVIDNESS3  6.16 4.64 269.32 536.12 1353.76 
SUS1 - 12.94 - 24.52 - 110.34 - 112.19 80.12 
SUS2 - 12.43 - 24.26 - 81.80 - 115.84 87.02 
SUS3 - 11.74 - 23.32 - 96.88 - 129.99 80.64 
SEV1 - 5.45 - 15.25 - 27.36 - 123.26 65.68 
SEV2 - 0.83 - 4.58 - 16.53 3.18 128.77 
DEC - 13.73 - 17.66 -126.83 -117.33 83.05 
 
 
 SUS1 SUS2 SUS3 SEV1 SEV2 DEC 
SUS1 1475.90      
SUS2 1367.19 1506.15     
SUS3 1317.06 1420.09 1462.97    
SEV1 1074.92 1178.89 1176.07 1361.92   
SEV2 716.67 768.75 767.16 803.54 997.61  























Covariance Matrix for the Integrated Model (Study 1) 
 
 FORM1 FORM2 FORM3 ONUM FORMxONUM 
FORM1 0.19     
FORM2 - 0.07 0.19    
FORM3 - 0.06 - 0.07 0.19   
ONUM 0.00 - 0.02 0.00 4.59  
FORMxONUM 0.01 - 0.07 0.02 11.42 33.93 
SNUM  - 0.02 0.07 - 0.04 - 1.47 - 3.85 
RT - 0.00 0.01  0.00 - 0.04 - 0.10 
CLARITY1 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.01 
CLARITY2 0.08 0.02 0.02 - 0.18 - 0.47 
CLARITY4 0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.02 - 0.09 
AFFECT1 - 0.05 0.00  0.04  0.32  0.88 
AFFECT6  0.03 - 0.08  0.07 0.32  1.32 
VIVIDNESS1 0.25 1.02 - 0.39 6.14 13.23 
VIVIDNESS2 - 0.41 - 0.31 0.68 6.32 14.78 
VIVIDNESS3 - 0.20 0.02 1.33 2.51 5.62 
SUS1 0.40 0.89 - 0.75 2.92 9.07 
SUS2 0.79 1.15 - 0.97 2.90 9.28 
SUS3 0.95 1.13 - 0.89 2.67 9.52 
SEV1 1.01 1.00 - 1.58 5.03 16.54 
SEV2 0.77 0.33 - 1.03 6.86 23.66 
DEC 0.31 0.42 - 0.86 8.28 22.46 
 
 SNUM RT CLARITY1 CLARITY2 CLARITY4 
SNUM  2.07     
RT 0.02 0.03    
CLARITY1 0.01 - 0.01 7.16   
CLARITY2 0.20 0.02 4.55 6.63  
CLARITY4 0.10 - 0.02 4.93 3.71 6.81 
AFFECT1 - 0.03 - 0.03 1.17  0.90  1.03 
AFFECT6 - 0.29 - 0.03  0.98  0.87  1.07 
VIVIDNESS1 2.43 - 0.24 40.51 36.80 34.74 
VIVIDNESS2 - 3.85 - 0.10 39.99 26.77 38.74 
VIVIDNESS3 - 1.67 0.18 26.93 16.77 25.15 
SUS1 1.49 0.79 - 22.78 - 16.34 - 24.11 
SUS2 0.95 0.68 -23.26  -16.58 - 23.45 
SUS3 1.52 0.62 -23.77 - 15.72 - 25.13 
SEV1 - 1.32 0.52 -17.27 - 14.80 - 21.50 
SEV2 - 1.25 0.24 -7.56 - 6.12 - 7.75 




 AFFECT1 AFFECT6 VIVIDNESS1 VIVIDNESS2 VIVIDNESS3 
AFFECT1 2.77     
AFFECT6 1.48 3.54    
VIVIDNESS1 12.10 10.23 1235.88   
VIVIDNESS2  10.38  11.17 326.65 865.44  
VIVIDNESS3  6.16 4.64 269.32 536.12 1353.76 
SUS1 - 12.94 - 24.52 - 110.34 - 112.19 80.12 
SUS2 - 12.43 - 24.26 - 81.80 - 115.84 87.02 
SUS3 - 11.74 - 23.32 - 96.88 - 129.99 80.64 
SEV1 - 5.45 - 15.25 - 27.36 - 123.26 65.68 
SEV2 - 0.83 - 4.58 - 16.53 3.18 128.77 
DEC - 13.73 - 17.66 -126.83 -117.33 83.05 
 
 
 SUS1 SUS2 SUS3 SEV1 SEV2 DEC 
SUS1 1475.90      
SUS2 1367.19 1506.15     
SUS3 1317.06 1420.09 1462.97    
SEV1 1074.92 1178.89 1176.07 1361.92   
SEV2 716.67 768.75 767.16 803.54 997.61  






























Covariance Matrix for the Evolutionary Model (Study 2) 
 
 FORM1 FORM2 FORM3 ONUM FORMxONUM 
FORM1 0.18     
FORM2 -0.05 0.17    
FORM3 -0.06 -0.06 0.20   
ONUM 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 5.10  
FORMxONUM 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 13.62 41.98 
SNUM  -0.02 -0.03 0.03 1.34 3.38 
RT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 
CLARITY1 -0.06 0.08 0.01 0.07 -0.08 
CLARITY2 -0.02 0.12 0.06 0.76 2.03 
CLARITY3 -0.04 0.15 0.08 0.51 1.19 
CLARITY4 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.46 
CLARITY5 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.50 1.07 
CLARITY6 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.38 
CLARITY7 -0.11 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.20 
CLARITY8 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.58 1.18 
SUS1 0.75 -0.29 -0.27 -3.99 -11.73 
SUS2 0.51 -0.01 -0.64 -7.71 -19.93 
SUS3 -0.09 0.03 0.10 -8.16 -20.96 
SEV1 0.22 0.49 -0.29 -4.77 -14.08 
SEV2 0.13 0.15 0.43 -1.03 -3.62 
DEC1 0.04 0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.26 
DEC2 0.03 0.08 -0.09 0.43 0.93 
DEC3 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.53 1.13 
DEC5 0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.39 0.82 
     
 SNUM RT CLARITY1 CLARITY2 CLARITY3 
SNUM  2.04     
RT 0.01 0.03    
CLARITY1 0.39 -0.01 4.95   
CLARITY2 0.35 0.01 3.34 6.36  
CLARITY3 0.42 0.02 2.94 4.89 6.21 
CLARITY4 0.25 0.00 3.34 2.65 2.62 
CLARITY5 0.59 0.02 2.44 2.64 2.93 
CLARITY6 0.28 0.00 2.94 2.60 2.44 
CLARITY7 0.09 0.02 2.39 2.52 2.46 
CLARITY8 0.38 0.03 1.93 2.51 2.22 
SUS1 -3.76 -0.26 -4.58 -7.84 -9.03 
SUS2 -5.43 -0.26 -5.72 -8.62 -7.03 
SUS3 -5.17 -0.17 -5.13 -9.88 -8.83 
SEV1 -2.73 0.17 -7.04 -9.05 -5.59 
SEV2 -1.10 -0.13 -0.34 -2.62 -3.73 
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DEC1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.65 -0.63 -0.37 
DEC2 -0.14 -0.03 -0.84 -0.60 -0.66 
DEC3 -0.15 -0.01 -0.87 -0.75 -0.89 
DEC5 -0.06 -0.01 -0.79 -0.63 -0.61 
 
 CLARITY4 CLARITY5 CLARITY6 CLARITY7 CLARITY8 
CLARITY4 4.31     
CLARITY5 2.24 4.94    
CLARITY6 2.68 2.86 4.05   
CLARITY7 2.15 2.26 2.46 4.92  
CLARITY8 1.41 2.45 2.01 1.88 4.19 
SUS1 -4.82 -8.84 -7.42 -5.21 -6.65 
SUS2 -4.53 -8.55 -6.75 -5.09 -8.71 
SUS3 -4.15 -5.96 -5.94 -2.69 -9.02 
SEV1 -3.56 -3.88 -6.06 -4.88 -9.55 
SEV2 1.68 -2.91 -3.30 0.46 -3.90 
DEC1 -0.31 -0.49 -0.43 -0.10 -0.21 
DEC2 -0.39 -0.51 -0.55 -0.30 -0.30 
DEC3 -0.54 -0.81 -0.68 -0.34 0.55 
DEC5 -0.40 -0.61 -0.59 -0.30 -0.44 
 
 SUS1 SUS2 SUS3 SEV1 SEV2 
SUS1 576.39     
SUS2 447.46 598.23    
SUS3 443.07 507.10 581.70   
SEV1 440.43 453.75 486.49 755.80  
SEV2 378.34 324.88 354.92 447.14 603.25 
DEC1 20.95 20.66 20.78 23.47 24.99 
DEC4 20.00 19.06 17.99 23.11 24.67 
DEC7 23.24 21.49 20.11 24.99 26.93 
DEC9 21.02 18.43 18.09 23.09 24.84 
 
 DEC1 DEC2 DEC3 DEC5 
DEC1 6.18    
DEC2 3.26 5.10   
DEC3 3.52 4.34 5.20  












Covariance Matrix for the Affective Processing Model (Study 2) 
 
 FORM1 FORM2 FORM3 ONUM FORMxONUM 
FORM1 0.18     
FORM2 -0.05 0.17    
FORM3 -0.06 -0.06 0.20   
ONUM 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 5.10  
FORMxONUM 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 13.62 41.98 
SNUM  -0.02 -0.03 0.03 1.34 3.38 
RT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 
AFFECT1 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.28 -0.77 
AFFECT2 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.35 -0.89 
AFFECT3 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.58 
AFFECT4 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.36 -0.92 
AFFECT5 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.28 -0.59 
AFFECT6 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.19 -0.27 
AFFECT7 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.24 -0.56 
AFFECT8 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.21 
AFFECT9 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.26 
VIVIDNESS1 -0.40 0.88 0.37 0.56 -1.92 
VIVIDNESS2 -0.56 0.54 0.35 -1.96 -5.38 
VIVIDNESS3 -1.11 0.31 0.49 -1.20 -3.32 
VIVIDNESS4 0.39 -0.64 0.02 -3.41 -14.24 
VIVIDNESS5 -0.43 1.19 -0.11 -6.90 -26.30 
VIVIDNESS6 -0.21 0.49 0.27 -4.74 -20.91 
VIVIDNESS7 -1.47 0.30 1.24 3.59 5.79 
SUS1 0.75 -0.29 -0.27 -3.99 -11.73 
SUS2 0.51 -0.01 -0.64 -7.71 -19.93 
SUS3 -0.09 0.03 0.10 -8.16 -20.96 
SEV1 0.22 0.49 -0.29 -4.77 -14.08 
SEV2 0.13 0.15 0.43 -1.03 -3.62 
DEC1 0.04 0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.26 
DEC2 0.03 0.08 -0.09 0.43 0.93 
DEC3 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.53 1.13 
DEC5 0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.39 0.82 
    
 AFFECT1 AFFECT2 AFFECT3 AFFECT4 AFFECT5 
AFFECT1 3.06     
AFFECT2 2.48 2.61    
AFFECT3 2.08 2.01 2.38   
AFFECT4 2.17 2.07 1.98 2.52  
AFFECT5 2.17 2.18 1.89 2.02 2.72 
AFFECT6 2.25 2.17 1.89 1.94 2.20 
AFFECT7 1.81 1.79 1.66 1.86 1.73 
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AFFECT8 2.04 1.88 1.61 1.69 1.97 
AFFECT9 1.48 1.79 1.26 1.30 1.51 
VIVIDNESS1 4.41 5.03 2.83 2.99 4.16 
VIVIDNESS2 3.81 2.46 1.88 1.36 2.64 
VIVIDNESS3 5.16 3.73 3.24 2.58 5.00 
VIVIDNESS4 -2.82 -0.79 -2.12 -3.72 -0.77 
VIVIDNESS5 6.08 5.72 0.98 2.71 5.42 
VIVIDNESS6 6.71 5.89 2.39 4.16 5.59 
VIVIDNESS7 4.72 2.81 0.63 1.29 4.32 
SUS1 -15.05 -15.42 -14.15 -16.14 -15.41 
SUS2 -12.78 -12.86 -12.89 -13.40 -14.23 
SUS3 -12.65 -13.35 -12.89 -13.98 -12.94 
SEV1 -17.32 -17.76 -17.11 -19.20 -17.10 
SEV2 -18.86 -19.98 -18.64 -21.31 -19.06 
DEC1 -2.44 -2.29 -2.05 -2.17 -2.41 
DEC2 -2.74 -2.48 -2.17 -2.47 -2.65 
DEC3 -2.77 -2.67 -2.24 -2.52 -2.84 
DEC5 -2.74 -2.62 -2.24 -2.51 -2.76 
 
 AFFECT6 AFFECT7 AFFECT8 AFFECT9 VIVIDNESS1 
AFFECT6 2.83     
AFFECT7 1.80 2.77    
AFFECT8 1.96 1.76 2.74   
AFFECT9 1.50 1.27 1.69 1.69  
VIVIDNESS1 1.38 2.43 4.07 0.67 905.12 
VIVIDNESS2 1.72 3.33 3.24 1.25 293.87 
VIVIDNESS3 3.77 2.12 2.96 -0.07 370.33 
VIVIDNESS4 -2.22 -1.42 -1.45 -1.36 167.59 
VIVIDNESS5 4.70 0.67 5.44 3.31 187.35 
VIVIDNESS6 5.03 3.39 5.41 2.38 256.42 
VIVIDNESS7 1.03 0.38 4.02 1.80 360.44 
SUS1 -13.26 -14.41 -12.76 -10.91 -43.85 
SUS2 -11.79 -12.77 -11.07 -9.36 -53.79 
SUS3 -11.38 -12.99 -10.62 -9.77 -44.22 
SEV1 -17.09 -17.12 -14.29 -12.44 -41.06 
SEV2 -18.98 -17.59 -15.28 -13.39 -21.86 
DEC1 -2.21 -1.88 -2.07 -1.73 -4.12 
DEC2 -2.50 -2.18 -2.29 -1.76 -2.72 
DEC3 -2.69 -2.24 -2.39 -1.82 -3.04 
DEC5 -2.69 -2.17 -2.39 -1.86 -2.01 
 
 VIVIDNESS2 VIVIDNESS3 VIVIDNESS4 VIVIDNESS5 VIVIDNESS6 
VIVIDNESS2 625.23     
VIVIDNESS3 385.78 787.60    
VIVIDNESS4 231.47 404.05 815.24   
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VIVIDNESS5 182.75 294.75 303.83 963.06  
VIVIDNESS6 290.46 395.21 353.17 419.81 691.15 
VIVIDNESS7 388.80 424.99 272.04 313.85 414.46 
SUS1 -20.71 2.87 75.73 7.89 9.74 
SUS2 13.57 22.18 84.68 8.86 9.95 
SUS3 6.16 35.27 82.68 40.06 8.95 
SEV1 -6.62 21.29 129.84 47.73 5.25 
SEV2 29.03 29.67 80.37 -10.93 16.29 
DEC1 -3.45 1.60 6.96 3.72 -0.12 
DEC2 -2.44 -2.50 5.06 -3.34 -5.92 
DEC3 -3.04 -3.95 2.74 -4.84 -6.82 
DEC5 -3.36 -3.18 2.19 -4.60 -5.89 
 
 VIVIDNESS7 SUS1 SUS2 SUS3 SEV1 
VIVIDNESS7 762.18     
SUS1 -25.16 576.39    
SUS2 -24.00 447.46 598.23   
SUS3 -15.07 443.07 507.10 581.70  
SEV1 -17.31 440.43 453.75 486.49 755.80 
SEV2 41.84 378.34 324.88 354.92 447.14 
DEC1 -2.16 20.95 20.66 20.78 23.47 
DEC2 -6.34 20.00 19.06 17.99 23.11 
DEC3 -3.49 23.24 21.49 20.11 24.99 
DEC5 -2.78 21.02 18.43 18.09 23.09 
 
 SEV2 DEC1 DEC2 DEC3 DEC5 
SEV2 603.25     
DEC1 24.99 6.18    
DEC2 24.67 3.26 5.10   
DEC3 26.93 3.52 4.34 5.20  
DEC5 24.84 3.45 4.19 4.53 4.82 
 
 SNUM RT 
SNUM  2.04  
RT 0.01 0.03 
AFFECT1 0.01 0.02 
AFFECT2 -0.07 0.02 
AFFECT3 0.08 0.02 
AFFECT4 -0.06 0.02 
AFFECT5 0.09 0.04 
AFFECT6 0.08 0.03 
AFFECT7 0.10 0.02 
AFFECT8 0.03 0.03 
AFFECT9 0.13 0.03 
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VIVIDNESS1 1.13 -0.10 
VIVIDNESS2 2.80 -0.63 
VIVIDNESS3 3.64 -0.22 
VIVIDNESS4 3.52 -0.32 
VIVIDNESS5 1.51 0.15 
VIVIDNESS6 2.04 -0.03 
VIVIDNESS7 5.02 -0.05 
SUS1 -3.76 -0.26 
SUS2 -5.43 -0.26 
SUS3 -5.17 -0.17 
SEV1 -2.73 0.17 
SEV2 -1.10 -0.13 
DEC1 -0.01 -0.03 
DEC2 -0.14 -0.03 
DEC3 -0.15 -0.01 

































Appendix I  
 
Covariance Matrix for the Integrated Model (Study 2) 
 
 FORM1 FORM2 FORM3 ONUM FORMxONUM 
FORM1 0.18     
FORM2 -0.05 0.17    
FORM3 -0.06 -0.06 0.20   
ONUM 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 5.10  
FORMxONUM 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 13.62 41.98 
SNUM  -0.02 -0.03 0.03 1.34 3.38 
RT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 
CLARITY1 -0.06 0.08 0.01 0.07 -0.08 
CLARITY2 -0.02 0.12 0.06 0.76 2.03 
CLARITY3 -0.04 0.15 0.08 0.51 1.19 
CLARITY4 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.46 
CLARITY5 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.50 1.07 
CLARITY6 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.38 
CLARITY7 -0.11 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.20 
CLARITY8 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.58 1.18 
AFFECT1 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.28 -0.77 
AFFECT2 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.35 -0.89 
AFFECT3 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.58 
AFFECT4 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.36 -0.92 
AFFECT5 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.28 -0.59 
AFFECT6 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.19 -0.27 
AFFECT7 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.24 -0.56 
AFFECT8 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.21 
AFFECT9 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.26 
VIVIDNESS1 -0.40 0.88 0.37 0.56 -1.92 
VIVIDNESS2 -0.56 0.54 0.35 -1.96 -5.38 
VIVIDNESS3 -1.11 0.31 0.49 -1.20 -3.32 
VIVIDNESS4 0.39 -0.64 0.02 -3.41 -14.24 
VIVIDNESS5 -0.43 1.19 -0.11 -6.90 -26.30 
VIVIDNESS6 -0.21 0.49 0.27 -4.74 -20.91 
VIVIDNESS7 -1.47 0.30 1.24 3.59 5.79 
SUS1 0.75 -0.29 -0.27 -3.99 -11.73 
SUS2 0.51 -0.01 -0.64 -7.71 -19.93 
SUS3 -0.09 0.03 0.10 -8.16 -20.96 
SEV1 0.22 0.49 -0.29 -4.77 -14.08 
SEV2 0.13 0.15 0.43 -1.03 -3.62 
DEC1 0.04 0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.26 
DEC2 0.03 0.08 -0.09 0.43 0.93 
DEC3 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.53 1.13 
DEC5 0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.39 0.82 
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 SNUM RT CLARITY1 CLARITY2 CLARITY3 
SNUM  2.04     
RT 0.01 0.03    
CLARITY1 0.39 -0.01 4.95   
CLARITY2 0.35 0.01 3.34 6.36  
CLARITY3 0.42 0.02 2.94 4.89 6.21 
CLARITY4 0.25 0.00 3.34 2.65 2.62 
CLARITY5 0.59 0.02 2.44 2.64 2.93 
CLARITY6 0.28 0.00 2.94 2.60 2.44 
CLARITY7 0.09 0.02 2.39 2.52 2.46 
CLARITY8 0.38 0.03 1.93 2.51 2.22 
AFFECT1 0.01 0.02 0.92 0.43 0.55 
AFFECT2 -0.07 0.02 0.64 0.22 0.32 
AFFECT3 0.08 0.02 0.44 0.30 0.40 
AFFECT4 -0.06 0.02 0.50 0.38 0.40 
AFFECT5 0.09 0.04 0.73 0.51 0.58 
AFFECT6 0.08 0.03 0.55 0.16 0.19 
AFFECT7 0.10 0.02 0.43 0.28 0.21 
AFFECT8 0.03 0.03 0.65 0.30 0.41 
AFFECT9 0.13 0.03 0.29 0.18 0.13 
VIVIDNESS1 1.13 -0.10 28.74 24.86 21.30 
VIVIDNESS2 2.80 -0.63 27.13 15.56 14.57 
VIVIDNESS3 3.64 -0.22 25.65 15.53 15.11 
VIVIDNESS4 3.52 -0.32 16.57 10.20 9.22 
VIVIDNESS5 1.51 0.15 22.95 13.87 16.19 
VIVIDNESS6 2.04 -0.03 25.61 14.10 13.28 
VIVIDNESS7 5.02 -0.05 33.20 23.18 20.43 
SUS1 -3.76 -0.26 -4.58 -7.84 -9.03 
SUS2 -5.43 -0.26 -5.72 -8.62 -7.03 
SUS3 -5.17 -0.17 -5.13 -9.88 -8.83 
SEV1 -2.73 0.17 -7.04 -9.05 -5.59 
SEV2 -1.10 -0.13 -0.34 -2.62 -3.73 
DEC1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.65 -0.63 -0.37 
DEC2 -0.14 -0.03 -0.84 -0.60 -0.66 
DEC3 -0.15 -0.01 -0.87 -0.75 -0.89 
DEC5 -0.06 -0.01 -0.79 -0.63 -0.61 
 
 CLARITY4 CLARITY5 CLARITY6 CLARITY7 CLARITY8 
CLARITY4 4.31     
CLARITY5 2.24 4.94    
CLARITY6 2.68 2.86 4.05   
CLARITY7 2.15 2.26 2.46 4.92  
CLARITY8 1.41 2.45 2.01 1.88 4.19 
AFFECT1 0.49 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.30 
AFFECT2 0.30 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.27 
AFFECT3 0.25 0.39 0.32 0.33 0.13 
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AFFECT4 0.18 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.26 
AFFECT5 0.43 0.65 0.58 0.50 0.45 
AFFECT6 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.14 
AFFECT7 0.12 0.35 0.47 0.40 0.43 
AFFECT8 0.36 0.52 0.58 0.65 0.53 
AFFECT9 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.39 
VIVIDNESS1 22.46 21.89 22.41 17.79 12.22 
VIVIDNESS2 23.17 14.07 22.30 12.72 7.61 
VIVIDNESS3 23.60 15.01 18.15 16.02 7.13 
VIVIDNESS4 16.24 9.46 11.64 46.57 3.87 
VIVIDNESS5 18.11 15.68 20.36 18.66 11.58 
VIVIDNESS6 23.82 14.08 19.23 15.55 4.65 
VIVIDNESS7 30.99 17.65 24.73 22.16 10.20 
SUS1 -4.82 -8.84 -7.42 -5.21 -6.65 
SUS2 -4.53 -8.55 -6.75 -5.09 -8.71 
SUS3 -4.15 -5.96 -5.94 -2.69 -9.02 
SEV1 -3.56 -3.88 -6.06 -4.88 -9.55 
SEV2 1.68 -2.91 -3.30 0.46 -3.90 
DEC1 -0.31 -0.49 -0.43 -0.10 -0.21 
DEC2 -0.39 -0.51 -0.55 -0.30 -0.30 
DEC3 -0.54 -0.81 -0.68 -0.34 0.55 
DEC5 -0.40 -0.61 -0.59 -0.30 -0.44 
 
 AFFECT1 AFFECT2 AFFECT3 AFFECT4 AFFECT5 
AFFECT1 3.06     
AFFECT2 2.48 2.61    
AFFECT3 2.08 2.01 2.38   
AFFECT4 2.17 2.07 1.98 2.52  
AFFECT5 2.17 2.18 1.89 2.02 2.72 
AFFECT6 2.25 2.17 1.89 1.94 2.20 
AFFECT7 1.81 1.79 1.66 1.86 1.73 
AFFECT8 2.04 1.88 1.61 1.69 1.97 
AFFECT9 1.48 1.79 1.26 1.30 1.51 
VIVIDNESS1 4.41 5.03 2.83 2.99 4.16 
VIVIDNESS2 3.81 2.46 1.88 1.36 2.64 
VIVIDNESS3 5.16 3.73 3.24 2.58 5.00 
VIVIDNESS4 -2.82 -0.79 -2.12 -3.72 -0.77 
VIVIDNESS5 6.08 5.72 0.98 2.71 5.42 
VIVIDNESS6 6.71 5.89 2.39 4.16 5.59 
VIVIDNESS7 4.72 2.81 0.63 1.29 4.32 
SUS1 -15.05 -15.42 -14.15 -16.14 -15.41 
SUS2 -12.78 -12.86 -12.89 -13.40 -14.23 
SUS3 -12.65 -13.35 -12.89 -13.98 -12.94 
SEV1 -17.32 -17.76 -17.11 -19.20 -17.10 
SEV2 -18.86 -19.98 -18.64 -21.31 -19.06 
DEC1 -2.44 -2.29 -2.05 -2.17 -2.41 
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DEC2 -2.74 -2.48 -2.17 -2.47 -2.65 
DEC3 -2.77 -2.67 -2.24 -2.52 -2.84 
DEC5 -2.74 -2.62 -2.24 -2.51 -2.76 
 
 AFFECT6 AFFECT7 AFFECT8 AFFECT9 VIVIDNESS1 
AFFECT6 2.83     
AFFECT7 1.80 2.77    
AFFECT8 1.96 1.76 2.74   
AFFECT9 1.50 1.27 1.69 1.69  
VIVIDNESS1 1.38 2.43 4.07 0.67 905.12 
VIVIDNESS2 1.72 3.33 3.24 1.25 293.87 
VIVIDNESS3 3.77 2.12 2.96 -0.07 370.33 
VIVIDNESS4 -2.22 -1.42 -1.45 -1.36 167.59 
VIVIDNESS5 4.70 0.67 5.44 3.31 187.35 
VIVIDNESS6 5.03 3.39 5.41 2.38 256.42 
VIVIDNESS7 1.03 0.38 4.02 1.80 360.44 
SUS1 -13.26 -14.41 -12.76 -10.91 -43.85 
SUS2 -11.79 -12.77 -11.07 -9.36 -53.79 
SUS3 -11.38 -12.99 -10.62 -9.77 -44.22 
SEV1 -17.09 -17.12 -14.29 -12.44 -41.06 
SEV2 -18.98 -17.59 -15.28 -13.39 -21.86 
DEC1 -2.21 -1.88 -2.07 -1.73 -4.12 
DEC2 -2.50 -2.18 -2.29 -1.76 -2.72 
DEC3 -2.69 -2.24 -2.39 -1.82 -3.04 
DEC5 -2.69 -2.17 -2.39 -1.86 -2.01 
 
 VIVIDNESS2 VIVIDNESS3 VIVIDNESS4 VIVIDNESS5 VIVIDNESS6 
VIVIDNESS2 625.23     
VIVIDNESS3 385.78 787.60    
VIVIDNESS4 231.47 404.05 815.24   
VIVIDNESS5 182.75 294.75 303.83 963.06  
VIVIDNESS6 290.46 395.21 353.17 419.81 691.15 
VIVIDNESS7 388.80 424.99 272.04 313.85 414.46 
SUS1 -20.71 2.87 75.73 7.89 9.74 
SUS2 13.57 22.18 84.68 8.86 9.95 
SUS3 6.16 35.27 82.68 40.06 8.95 
SEV1 -6.62 21.29 129.84 47.73 5.25 
SEV2 29.03 29.67 80.37 -10.93 16.29 
DEC1 -3.45 1.60 6.96 3.72 -0.12 
DEC2 -2.44 -2.50 5.06 -3.34 -5.92 
DEC3 -3.04 -3.95 2.74 -4.84 -6.82 





 VIVIDNESS7 SUS1 SUS2 SUS3 SEV1 
VIVIDNESS7 762.18     
SUS1 -25.16 576.39    
SUS2 -24.00 447.46 598.23   
SUS3 -15.07 443.07 507.10 581.70  
SEV1 -17.31 440.43 453.75 486.49 755.80 
SEV2 41.84 378.34 324.88 354.92 447.14 
DEC1 -2.16 20.95 20.66 20.78 23.47 
DEC2 -6.34 20.00 19.06 17.99 23.11 
DEC3 -3.49 23.24 21.49 20.11 24.99 
DEC5 -2.78 21.02 18.43 18.09 23.09 
 
 SEV2 DEC1 DEC4 DEC7 DEC9 
SEV2 603.25     
DEC1 24.99 6.18    
DEC2 24.67 3.26 5.10   
DEC3 26.93 3.52 4.34 5.20  
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